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Egalitarianism and the Corporate State in Latin America
Marina Gold and Alessandro Zagato
Th e demise of the Pink Tide in Latin America has sparked much discussion 
as to whether this represents the end of left ist governmental experiments 
in the region and a return to what seems to be the status quo domination 
of right-wing conservative politics. Perhaps a more indicting implication 
of this debate is whether the Pink Tide represents an alternative to neo-
liberalism or whether it constitutes a particular typology of this system. 
Left -leaning scholars (Ackerman 2016; García Linera 2006; López Segrera 
2016, among others) and activists counter this view by arguing that the 
Pink Tide has suffi  ciently overturned traditional structures of domination 
and provided many disenfranchised groups with the concrete possibility 
of accessing political power. While we share the perception that the Pink 
Tide has indeed eff ected long-lasting transformations in Latin American 
political imaginaries and opened concrete lines for change, we are here 
concerned with the processes of structural transformation that underpin 
the formation of the Pink Tide and its more recent destabilization. As a 
response to the excesses of neoliberalism in the region, the Pink Tide has 
incorporated alternative egalitarian ideologies to political power. However, 
it has not been able to counteract the increasing corporatization of state 
structures taking place in Latin America – as in Europe and North America 
(as well as China and Russia but in diff erent confi gurations) – a process ho-
listically aff ecting statehood, where neoliberalism is but one expression (as 
an ideology of the corporate state).
A variety of responses have emerged in Latin America to what we identify 
as global processes of state transformation that indicate the emergence of 
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new state confi gurations taking on corporate forms. Ethnographic studies 
across the region reveal the contradictions between shift ing state structures 
and contesting and resisting egalitarian movements. As was the case with 
Operation Condor1 (1968–1989), Latin America is once again a sociopoliti-
cal experiment where democratic and egalitarian processes clash with pow-
erful and hierarchical corporate interests. We propose a re-examination of 
these experiments by taking as a point of departure the current apotheosis of 
a diff erent confi guration of statehood – the corporate state – fl ourishing par-
ticularly in the Global North but with its frontiers in the Global South. Latin 
America thus provides a propitious ground for examining the processes by 
which the corporate state operates, especially given the historic relation of 
the region to colonial and neocolonial interests. Th e undermining of demo-
cratic and egalitarian procedures by the corporate state has been at the core 
of the rise and crisis of the Pink Tide.
In order to explore these processes of transformation in ethnographic 
context, we ask the following questions: a) How do we understand egalitari-
anism? b) What do we mean by the corporate state? c) What manifestations 
do these take in Latin America? Th is book will analyse the contradictions 
between the corporatization of the state in Latin America and the consolida-
tion of egalitarian movements across the continent, some within the struc-
tures of government, trying to break open the constraints of the state and 
seeking to build new forms of life or alternative governmental approaches.
Th e shift ing political balance between left  and right is considered through 
an ethnographically grounded and localized anthropological perspective of 
what is a regional (and in many ways global) crisis. At a time of crisis of the 
regular structures of political participation (political parties, elections, legal 
and parliamentary processes), the Latin American context reveals multi-
ple expressions of egalitarian movements (indigenous struggles, ecological 
groups, new forms of feminism, students’, teachers’ and other types of social 
movements) that strive and sometimes momentarily manage to break through 
the constraining structures of state power. In fact, their emergence outside 
conventional political milieus and their anti-establishment tendencies are an 
indication of the atomization and crisis of conventional political structures, 
and are characteristic of the subversion of political processes to the economic 
concerns of the corporate state (Kapferer and Gold 2018). However, these 
egalitarian expressions also have the potential of being co-opted by corporate 
concerns and procedures. Shift s in labour and class relations and the blurring 
of the distinction between parliamentary right and left  political positions are 
other indications of corporatizing state processes. Th e Latin American expe-
rience provides a unique opportunity to understand global processes of state 
transformation from the regional view of the Global South at a time when the 
left  had managed to establish itself in regional politics.
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The Pink Tide within the Neoliberal Wave
In the mid 2000s, three quarters of South America’s population (350 million 
people) were under left ist governments. Th e Pink Tide refers to a group of 
left -leaning non-communist governments that rose to power at the end of 
the 1990s and in the new millennium in Latin America (Castaneda 2006). 
By 2010, there were left ist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Peru. 
Th e Pink Tide was by no means a unifi ed block, and contested distinctions 
are drawn between the ‘good’ left  of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile – 
more akin to the European social democrats – and the ‘bad’ left  of Venezu-
ela, Bolivia and Ecuador, more authoritarian and too close to Cuba in politi-
cal ideology. However, Pink Tide governments are broadly characterized by 
a reaction against neoliberal economic practices implemented by the Wash-
ington Consensus and shared common policies of increased social spending, 
nationalization of important industries, regeneration of regional trade deals 
and in some cases the reformulation of constitutions to create more econ-
omies of solidarity. Th ese governments were in many ways a response to 
the 1998 regional recession caused by neoliberal policies of austerity imple-
mented by the World Bank and extreme privatization, potentially explaining 
the vote to the left  not as ideological but as rationally economic. Th e rise of 
the left  coincided with the commodities boom of 2003, which provided left -
ist governments with resources with which to govern (petrol, gas, mining, 
soy) and enabled redistribution policies to be implemented (Murillo 2016), 
but it did not challenge the command of capital and in many ways enabled 
the penetration of corporatizing forces through the deepening dependence 
on the global market of primary goods (Webber 2016).
Th e rise of the left  to government shift ed the confi guration of political 
scenarios in Latin America to the point that even in 2013 and 2014 when 
governmental politics began to shift  again to the right the elected conserva-
tive governments did not win with large margins (Peru, Argentina, Brazil). 
Th ese partial victories reveal the eff ects of left ist distributive policies and a 
new political scenario where the left ’s access to government is now possi-
ble. However, they can be also interpreted as a symptom of the increasing 
indistinctness between left  and right, as left ist governments in power oft en 
display policies that could well have been conceived by the right, blurring the 
platforms sustained by both political camps in the past.
Th e biggest critique levelled at the Pink Tide has been its undermining of 
democratic institutions through its association with large-scale corruption 
scandals (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay) and the increasing subversion of the 
legal structures to political purposes, seen for example in the subordination 
of socioecological concerns to extractivist policies (discussed by Ødegaard 
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and Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez this volume). While there might 
be little doubt that corruption thrived, the historic tensions within tradi-
tional elites underpinning corruption scandals are oft en overlooked, as well 
as the long-standing role of corruption within Latin American politics and 
more globally (see Gledhill and Hita this volume). Th e backlash of traditional 
power groups (the military, Catholic Church and the oligarchy) against the 
newly empowered sectors of society (women, the poor, ethnic minorities, 
indigenous people), oft en through corruption accusations and legal proce-
dures (see Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez this volume), reveals corpo-
rate interests mobilizing bureaucratic institutions to subvert political power 
to its economic concerns (Kapferer and Gold 2018).
Neoliberalism, against which the Pink Tide emerged, is ‘a peculiar form 
of reason that confi gures all aspects of existence in economic terms’ (Brown 
2015: 17) and is embedded, we argue, within the structural dynamics of the 
corporate state, representing the ideological framework supporting the un-
regulated potential of capitalism. Neoliberalism ‘ideologically refl ects and 
motivates the marked economization of the political and of the social (the 
economic as ontology)’ (Kapferer 2018: 11). Neoliberal reason penetrates 
statecraft  and business, law, the production of knowledge (in primary and 
tertiary education), the reproduction of daily life through technology and 
so converts ‘the distinctly political character, meaning, and operation of de-
mocracy’s constituent elements into economic ones’ (Brown 2015: 17). Th at 
is, neoliberalism represents the subverting of the political by the economic, 
becoming ‘a dominant economistic discourse across the class and political 
spectrum’ (Kapferer and Gold 2017: 34), one that has the capacity to bind 
its critics and proponents under the terms of market logic. Th us the right/
left  (governmental), public/private, democratic/autocratic (and other ap-
parent oppositions) – constituting a dialectical unity of meaning – are in-
ternal to (and become internalized into) the logic of the corporate state and 
get mobilized in times of crisis, subverting egalitarian ideals and democratic 
processes. Th e demise of the Pink Tide, therefore, ought to be considered as 
a manifestation of larger transformations of the state – a historical process 
long underway – and not simply as a pendular movement between left  and 
right claims over state power, nor a response to the commodity boom of the 
1990s, a much too simplistic and economistic understanding of a complex 
and on-going process of shift ing state structures.
The Corporate State Formation
When we speak of the corporate state, we depart from older theories of state 
corporatism popular in the 1970s. Th ere are certainly continuities between 
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early conceptualizations of the corporate state (see Th omson 1935), the 
state corporatism of Italian fascism and the current manifestations of the 
corporate state in Trump’s America, but the corporate state we refer to is 
a more radical state formation than a corporatism of state or the corporati-
zation of state sectors (through privatization, for example). Some elements 
of state corporatism have been re-popularized: the suspicion against liberal 
democracy; the idea that not all citizens are equal as a positive force for eco-
nomic development; the prioritization of the economy in state concerns; 
anti-systemic and anti-establishment reactions; the technocratization of 
state practices; the retreat from society; the disjunction with ‘nation’; the 
penetration of military law into the civic sphere and the internalization of 
war. However, there are new elements that have enabled an even more rad-
ical reconfi guration of state structures into what we, following Kapferer 
(2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2010a, 2010b 2018), identify as the corporate 
state. We refer to a transmogrifi cation of the nation state (that is, the cor-
porate state is inherent within the structures and history of the nation state) 
into a new assemblage of people-state relations that radically reconfi gures 
social life (Kapferer and Gold 2017).
Since the early 1990s, renowned authors like Zygmunt Bauman (1998), 
Jürgen Habermas (2001), Manuel Castells (1996) and Ulrich Beck (1999), 
among others, have proclaimed the crisis of statehood and predicted the pos-
sible disappearance of the nation state. Since then, theories of state weak-
ening achieved such an outstanding popularity that they almost became a 
cliché. Governments from the left  and right adopted these theories to jus-
tify widespread privatization campaigns. In the academic fi eld, ideas of state 
weakness (Friedman 2005), failed state (Buscaglia 2013), retreat of the state 
(Strange 1996) and demise of the state (Dasgupta 2018) are quite popular, 
and rather transversal in the ideological spectrum.
Recently, Alain Badiou (2015) has provocatively observed that the Marx-
ist theme of the ‘withering away of the state’ – the idea that aft er the eradi-
cation of the capitalist state a stateless society would be created, defi ned by 
Marx as ‘free association’ – has now become a key tendency of globalized 
capitalism. Given its transnational scope, this system has no particular inter-
est in the subsistence of territorially based national states. Th ese conditions, 
Badiou argues, generate processes of ‘weakening of the state’, which he iden-
tifi es as a crucial tendency today.
It is irrefutable that there are transnational economic processes and in-
stitutions like markets, large corporations and supranational poles of power 
that transcend state jurisdiction. However, ideas of state weakening seem to 
be themselves infl uenced by the dominant economic doctrine of neoliber-
alism – to the point that they corroborate a conception of global economic 
forces as free, detached and autonomous. However, we argue, neoliberalism 
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is more than an economic doctrine, as it takes on an ontological force behind 
the reconfi guration of state structures that gives rise to the corporate state. 
It also appears that ideas of ‘state weakening’ tend to identify statehood with 
a specifi c confi guration or typology of the state, which is currently under-
mined by global tendencies but does not embody or represent statehood as 
such.
Statehood not only transcends concrete historical forms of the state; it 
also plays an active and key role in the expansion of capitalism, which, ac-
cording to Polanyi (2001), is facilitated by state structures tying their logic to 
specifi c territories. For Wallerstein, a system resting on unlimited accumu-
lation needs to be grounded in ‘structural mechanisms by which those who 
act with other motivations are penalized in some way, and are eventually 
eliminated from the social scene, whereas those who act with the appro-
priate motivations are rewarded’ (Wallerstein 2004: 228). Th us, global cap-
italism needs ‘a multiplicity of states, so that [capitalist initiative] can gain 
the advantages of working with states but also can circumvent states hostile 
to their interests in favour of states friendly to their interests’ (Wallerstein 
2004: 228).
We develop the idea that, rather than weakening or disappearing, a his-
torical transmutation of statehood is under way, albeit one that was inherent 
in the structures of the nation state and could result in a new paradigm of 
the idea of the state. In his recent work, Bruce Kapferer (2010b, 2017) and 
Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009) articulate the problem in terms of a transi-
tion towards a ‘corporate state’, a confi guration of statehood where the eco-
nomic logic becomes ‘ontologically foundational, permeating all social and 
political relations’ (Kapferer 2010a). In the corporate state formation, the 
market does not exist as a separate entity, but it becomes ‘the principle of 
social processes’ (Kapferer 2010a). Th is happens under the eff ect of polit-
ical tendencies ‘that in themselves recognize their own constitution in the 
dynamics of the economy and the market. Th e idea of . . . corporate state . . . 
suggests that the market and the conceptualization of the economic are not 
so much re-submerged in the social and the political but become their very 
constitution and form’ (Kapferer 2010a). Neoliberalism is the ideology of 
the corporate state, which makes the economic a foundational force in the 
formation of social worlds.
Highlighting the increasing assimilation of the dominant economic logic 
by the state, ‘the infl uence over or capture of its political executive and con-
trolling mechanisms by corporate interests’ (Kapferer 2017), allows us to 
understand the two entities as akin, somehow overlapping – and not as op-
posing, excluding or weakening each other.
Starting from the Mexican case, Zagato (2018) identifi ed three main re-
lated tendencies (or symptoms) of state corporatization observable through-
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out Latin America. Namely, the disintegration of a sense of collectivity and 
public institutionality – the disappearance of what Habermas (1991) has 
described as the ‘public sphere’,2 – an increased tendency to internal war-
fare, and widespread forms of dispossession related to extractivism (Zagato 
2018). More concretely, in a phase of transition towards a corporate state, 
warfare seems to turn into a form of governance for its capacity to deeply 
shape realities and mould subjectivities and forms of life (see Zagato this vol-
ume). A hint of this tendency is seen in securitization policies implemented 
in the name of fi ghting terrorism. Corporatization seems to require aggres-
sive forms of social fragmentation and the disarticulation of the state’s civil 
functions.
State corporatization is a global tendency. In Latin America, it has under-
gone a tremendous acceleration since the end of the 1980s. Th e ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’ promoted liberalization of the markets, economic openness 
and the elimination of trade barriers, reinforcing the role of market econ-
omy. Following this trend, the majority of the governments of Latin Amer-
ica negotiated their debt and signed asymmetrical free market treaties with 
the United States. Th rough this strategy, identifi ed by Naomi Klein (2007) 
as ‘Shock Doctrine’, the United States attempted to bond Latin American 
societies to their economy, ensuring the free movement of capital, goods 
and services and the bondage of people to an indebted government through 
austerity policies in corporate interests. Th is had a decisive impact on Latin 
American statehood and radically shaped its societies.
Privatization and deregulation policies usually described as neoliberal 
are not, however, simply ‘economic’. Th ese governmental interventions al-
ter the structure of the state, including its territories and forms of life. For 
example, the free market treaty signed by Mexico involved constitutional 
changes in terms of land rights, which had a structural impact on territory, 
sovereignty and collective forms of land tenure. Such changes inaugurated 
the extractivist model that is currently shaping Mexican corporatization. 
Th is process has also variably aff ected land rights in Chile and Argentina.
State corporatization in Argentina has followed the same principle of 
reducing as much as possible the freedom of manoeuvre of public policies 
that do not pursue structural neoliberal reforms. Th is process covers the dic-
tatorship phase (1976–1983) and the years between 1989 and the fi nancial 
crisis of 2001, under a constitutional government. Th e military coup and the 
assassination of Allende as well as the dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile were 
also aimed at crushing processes of widespread politicization and the de-
mocratization of the Chilean state. Th is process turned Chile into an unprec-
edented neoliberal experiment, where state corporatization was enforced 
through structural adjustments that later contributed to shaping the Wash-
ington Consensus. Th ese included the promulgation of a new constitution 
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facilitating denationalization and the imposition of extractivist policies and 
privatization (see also De la Maza Cabrera this volume). Peru under Fuji-
mori was another instance of purposefully reformulating social and politi-
cal processes through the neoliberal model under the ‘Fujimori shock’ (see 
Ødegaard this volume). An analysis of state corporatization in Latin Amer-
ica should always consider the priority that the region constitutes for the 
United States in military and economic terms. ‘Weakness’ and ‘strength’ are 
relative concepts when applied to a state like Mexico, for example, whose 
unconditional subordination to the will of the northern neighbour couples 
with solid internal military and oligarchic domination.
Th e emergence, since the early 2000s, of so-called progressive or Pink 
Tide governments in the region might be interpreted as an attempt at con-
taining and limiting the eff ects of widespread state corporatization, through 
the introduction of egalitarian elements in the functioning of the corporate 
state. Th is was indeed a phase of egalitarian experimentalism at the level of 
governmental politics. As a general tendency, these governments recon-
fi gured national economies through reforms that attempted to correct the 
negative eff ects of the markets, redistributing national wealth and retaking 
control of strategic economic sectors. Th is allowed them to redirect funds 
towards internal social policies that contributed to alleviate poverty and 
marginality. In Argentina, for example, following the crisis of 2001, some 
workers’ movements took over the factories in an attempt to re-create la-
bour relations in more egalitarian ways, away from patronage government 
policies and as an alternative to the docile neoliberal subject (Monteagudo 
2008).
Since 2014, the fall of the prices of oil and other commodities has had a 
negative impact on the Latin American region.3 Its consequences have been 
particularly deleterious for Pink Tide governments and their social policies 
that depend on the sale of those natural resources. Th is crisis has amplifi ed 
many of the critiques that were already targeting these experiences – pre-
dominantly on what concerns their reliance on extractivism as the base of 
national wealth. Th e main critique is that they failed to eradicate a persisting 
neocolonial model of exportation of raw materials and that there was no real 
attempt to radically question or dismantle the model that they were declar-
ing to oppose (see particularly Oikonomakis this volume).
Referring to his government’s experience in Bolivia, Alvaro García Lin-
era (2006) summarizes the model as follows: ‘A strong state that regulates 
the expansion of the industrial economy, extracting its surpluses and trans-
ferring them to the community in order to promote forms of self-organi-
zation and a typical Andean and Amazonian trading model.’ He adds that 
‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism is the way that . . . better adapts to our re-
ality, improving the possibilities of labour and community emancipation in 
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the medium term. Th is is why we conceive it as a temporary and transitory 
mechanism.’
On the one hand, the pervasiveness of this mechanism is still to be empir-
ically demonstrated. Not just because structural change in a (single) national 
economic paradigm is something very complicated – even when one of the 
pillars of governability, the high international prices of commodities, comes 
down – but also because the social and ecological eff ects of extraction are 
frequently irreversible, to the extent that critical points of view consider ex-
tractivism as an authentic ‘war against the people’.
On the other hand, the use of the economic surplus by these govern-
ments to improve the living conditions of the population brought objective 
improvements and opened the possibility for the development of forms of 
egalitarian political and social organization. For instance, the Venezuelan 
comunas are radical popular experiments, in many cases independent from 
the state apparatus, and are meant to persist even in the case of governmen-
tal change (Ciccariello-Maher 2016). In Cuba, the increase of self-employ-
ment and cooperative ventures has also served as experiments (even while 
state-sanctioned) for new confi gurations of labour and class relations at 
times of severe crisis, and in oft en contradictory ways as egalitarian move-
ments contesting the accumulation of resources in the hands of the state or 
other powerful groups (see Gold this volume).
Progressive governments of the Pink Tide could not, we argue, overcome 
corporatization. Th ey merely implemented policies to limit privatization 
and partially redistribute national income. Th ey introduced egalitarian el-
ements into the structure of the state, which was however almost entirely 
preserved. Th rough access to political structures, the new right-wing4 par-
ties are rapidly dismantling the social politics and the processes of regional 
integration that their predecessors initiated. However, an indication of the 
pervasiveness of the corporate state is the blurring of distinctions between 
governmental right and left  as the interests of capital take over political ide-
ologies. Th is is evident in Argentinean politics, as the Peronists – transmog-
rifi ed into Kirchneristas – became a vehicle for state power but along their 
history have represented both social programmes and austerity measures. 
Early 2018 protests organized by the Venezuelan right appropriated forms 
of action, slogans and symbols that are typical of the left  (particularly of the 
anti-globalization movement), projecting a very ambiguous image of them-
selves in appealing to ‘freedom’ and ‘human rights’.
However, crucially, the sharpest critiques to the ‘Pink Tide model’ did 
not come from right-wing formations but from new egalitarian tendencies 
embodied in groups (frequently of an indigenous background, or other mi-
norities), who are producing diff erent forms of collectives – that is, forms 
of life that go beyond corporatization because they are totally incompatible 
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with the state form. Th is is important, as it might represent a more radical 
response to the spread of neoliberalism, which has penetrated left  and right 
political ideologies and amalgamated political diff erences under economic 
models of management.
The Contradictions of Egalitarianism
Latin America has undergone an intense period of crisis and transformation 
since the 1990s, which has seen the rise and apparent demise of what looked 
like alternatives to the global neoliberal model. Indigenous movements, co-
operative ventures and state-led redistribution practices have represented 
reactions against global elites and corporate interests. Nevertheless, Latin 
American societies remain profoundly hierarchical (along class and race), 
as egalitarian movements have not completely broken up class stratifi cation 
and oligarchic groups. One must not – particularly in the Latin American 
context – confuse egalitarianism with equality or sameness.5 Alexis de Toc-
queville’s (2003 [1835]) wishful critical conception of American democracy 
as guaranteeing equality of conditions does not apply to the rest of the con-
tinent. Egalitarianism as we understand it does not refer to economic or po-
litical equality nor does it stand in a dualist opposition to hierarchy, as De 
Tocqueville perceived.
We understand egalitarianism as the inner logic of a particular ideolog-
ical form that manifests in modern issues, including nationalism (Kapferer 
2012), but is also present in other movements of rupture, such as indigenous 
movements, anti-establishment social movements, or labour protests, for 
example. Kapferer does not position egalitarianism above hierarchy or vice 
versa; he understands hierarchy as a potentiality of egalitarianism and not 
a transformation of it. Dumont conceives of hierarchy as the social obverse 
(and underlying force) of egalitarian individualism, which he understands as 
the atomistic reverse of the same coin (Dumont 1992: 85). Th at is, egalitar-
ianism and hierarchy defi ne and produce each other. As a reaction to Rous-
seau, who saw the individual as the basic element of all value, existing prior 
to social relations (Rousseau 1762), Dumont instead understands value not 
as absolute but as given by the relation: the whole is the structure of that re-
lation, and it grants the parts their value. Diff erent structures are determined 
by their own hierarchies of value. It is the relationship between power and 
values or ideology that determines these structures (Dumont 1977). Hierar-
chy, crucially, is not understood by Dumont as power, rank or stratifi cation 
but rather as a value6 relation within a totality (Kapferer 2010a). Th ese hier-
archical value relations encompass their own opposition, which is overcome 
in their very encompassment. Th erefore, the totality must be in constant 
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redefi nition, given that it is redefi ned in the process of encompassment of 
diff erence. Beyond what critique might be levelled at Dumont, we rescue 
the importance of the relational conception of egalitarianism to hierarchy,7 
which in Latin America is crucial to understand race, class, labour and eth-
nic relations, in the contradictions between western egalitarian values and 
the diff erent hierarchies within the American continent. Th e relationship 
between the hierarchical force of state structures and the rupturing inten-
tions of egalitarian social movements is a key analytical focus of this collec-
tion. Th is crucial historical moment is witnessing the radical reconfi guration 
of global structures of power – which we understand in terms of corporati-
zation. Furthermore, we warn that while egalitarianism holds a liberating 
promise, it can also have dehumanizing potentiality, as Rousseau had envi-
sioned (1762).
In western history, nationalism has proven as an instance where the de-
structive potential of egalitarianism is realized, through particular concep-
tions of nation, state and person. It is important to note that the idea of the 
destructiveness of nationalism comes from a very western, particularly Eu-
ropean, perspective. Nationalism in Latin America has arguably also mani-
fested regenerating potentials: pan-Americanism, Bolivarianism and some 
forms of Andean nationalism. Simultaneously, however, the egalitarian po-
tential of nationalism has also resulted in exclusionary hierarchies along 
class, ethnicity and political lines in the multiple military regimes that have 
harnessed nationalist passions.
A foundational characteristic of Euro-American egalitarian ideology is 
the conception of the individual as of fundamental value: autonomous and 
free, self-determining and a moral unit (Kapferer 2012: 15). Th is dates back 
to Hobbes and Rousseau’s explorations of the nature of the individual in re-
lation to the state. For Rousseau, the individual was a moral ideal that was to 
be realized as individuals freely subjecting themselves to the common good, 
making the political the emancipatory force of egalitarianism. Natural man, 
by contrast, was undiff erentiated, free in an equal sense but unable to fully 
develop its potential (Dumont 1992: 87). Th e individual is at the centre of the 
social construction in the western egalitarian sense, and there is a constant 
concern that the individual not be consumed by the totality, which would 
cause it to lose its identity. Th ere is indeed an unresolved friction between 
the ideas of freedom (more linked to the individual dimension) and equality 
(which necessarily anchors on collective grounds) – and which ‘fraternity’ 
attempts to somehow smoothen in the French Revolutionary motto.
Dumont’s analysis of the development of the ideology of individualism in 
the west in Essays on Individualism (1992) and in From Mandeville to Marx 
(1977) refl ects the historic developments that turned the medieval holistic 
man slowly into the ideal of the individual as imbued with value and at the 
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core of modern conceptions of the human in the west. Th rough Dumont’s 
historic analysis, it is possible to see that egalitarianism is not so much a set 
of principles in themselves – these have changed throughout history as has 
the conception of individualism – but more specifi cally a reaction against 
confi ning orders, such as the Church, the state, colonial structures and aris-
tocratic hierarchies (Dumont 1992).
Th e diff erent conceptions of the self, emerging within national spaces, 
represent an aff ront to the individual of Euro-American egalitarian tradi-
tions. However, paradoxically, they are also intrinsic in the reproduction of 
that individual, which needs an ‘other’ against which to conceptualize the 
self. Th is is also the case with Marxism, the last great occidental egalitarian 
ideology, where individuality is subsumed into the idea of class (and class 
develops its subjectivity in contradiction to another class), and where the 
realization of egalitarianism consists in the eradication of class division. 
Importantly, while egalitarianism in Latin America has been infl uenced by 
western philosophical thought, it does not share to the same extent the pro-
foundly individualistic sense of the Euro-American tradition, especially in 
contexts or movements shaped by indigenous cosmologies that privilege the 
collective over the individual.
In general, due to the weight of processes like colonialism, and the per-
petuation of a regime of coloniality in the independent states, egalitarian 
thought and practices in Latin America have been shaped by peculiarities 
(and complexities) that are not always contemplated by occidental (uni-
versalist) traditions. Conventional conceptions of class and nation are fre-
quently reductive when applied to the concrete social historical contexts of 
this region.
Latin American Egalitarian Thought
An obvious observation – but an important one nonetheless – is that egali-
tarian ideologies do not have the same content or intensity throughout the 
region. A distinction can be made between countries that were more rap-
idly industrialized and received large European immigration in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba) and 
those in which less European immigration and a more rural and indigenous 
population delayed the formation of a working class consciousness, as the 
proletariat was conformed by displaced indigenous people, craft smen and 
farmers (Bolivia, Peru, Central America). Th erefore, indigeneity, race and 
class radically determined egalitarian thought and struggles throughout the 
continent.
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Early expressions of egalitarian movements in Latin America date back 
to indigenous forms of resistance to colonization and then to the struggle 
for liberation under colonial rule – a struggle to which many contemporary 
indigenous movements still relate. Later movements more directly linked 
with occidental ideologies that emerged, like the mutualist societies created 
in Mexico in 1872 (el Gran Círculo de Obreros) and Peru in 1884 (La Unión 
Universal), which emerged even before syndicates. When these emerged, 
the anarchic branches within them rapidly gained traction: Federación 
Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA) in 1904, Federación Obrera Regional 
Uruguaya (FORU) in 1905, Federación Obrera Regional Brasileña (FORBE) 
in 1906 and la Casa del Obrero Mundial in Mexico in 1912 (Vilaboy and 
Chaves 2011). By the early twentieth century, the fi rst socialist syndicates 
and political parties appeared (as early as 1896 in Argentina and 1906 in 
Chile). Juan B. Justo, the leader of the Argentinean socialist party, would 
become an infl uential forger of Latin American critical thought.
Th e Mexican Revolution of 1910, with its agrarian, indigenous and an-
ti-imperialist profi le, and its leader Emiliano Zapata, became central to most 
revolutionary struggles throughout the continent, even when its indigenous 
character was not always completely embraced. Th e Peruvian Marxist José 
Carlos Mariátegui tried to fuse indigenous struggle with Marxist ideas in an 
attempt to produce an autochthonous critical thought. Th e infl uence of the 
Russian Revolution was strong in the Latin American left , and the ideolog-
ical divisions that plagued the European struggle also crossed the Atlantic. 
Nicaraguan Augusto César Sandino, for example, contested the mandates of 
the Th ird International as not appropriate for the Latin American realities. 
Divisions between socialist and newly emerging communist parties were 
common in the 1930s (in Brazil, Cuba and Chile, for example), giving rise to 
a strong anti-imperialist character of egalitarian struggles in Latin America. 
Amongst the leading thinkers and militants that contributed to the formation 
of Latin American (Marxist-infl uenced) revolutionary ideologies are the Pe-
ruvian Mariátegui, the Argentinean Aníbal Ponce, the Ecuadorian Manuel 
Agustín Aguirre and the Cuban Julio Antonio Mella. Th ese men, amongst 
others, aimed to unpack the structures that framed the life and history of 
Latin American peoples across the continent, not only in industrialized ur-
ban centres of the Southern Cone but also in rural, peasant and indigenous 
communities in the Caribbean.
Th e history of peasant and workers’ struggles materialized in the 60s and 
70s into the Cuban Revolution (1959), the Sandinista Revolution (1979) in 
Nicaragua, the democratic election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 and 
the short-lived revolution in Granada under Maurice Bishop. Th ese diff er-
ent concretizations of egalitarian ideologies provided for Latin America the 
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hope that an alternative was possible – even while none of these instances 
represented absolute egalitarian possibilities for everybody involved. Th ey 
were, however, experiments in emancipation that pushed existing political 
structures to the limits. Th e ideological propositions of the various Latin 
American thinkers that shaped the independence struggles of the nineteenth 
century and the workers and peasant struggles of the twentieth century have 
been taken up again in the twenty-fi rst century by governments aiming to 
implement an alternative to neoliberalism. Herein lies the complication that 
seems to have plagued the Pink Tide governments in the last decade. Th e 
egalitarian dynamic of movements and ideas that contests the hegemonic 
structures and hierarchies can achieve its opposite potential (a totalitarian 
eff ect) when institutionalized in governing elites – regardless of left  or right 
inclination. Egalitarian processes emerge as responses against diff erent hier-
archical orderings and result in the break up, even if momentarily, of those 
ordering structures. Th is did not stop egalitarian passions from taking on 
destructive expressions themselves, like in the Europe of the Reformation 
(Cohn 2004 [1957]) and in the Reign of Terror aft er the French Revolution 
(Marx 1995 [1858]). Both Cohn and Marx consider the ambiguous power of 
moments of crisis within which egalitarian forces break through the estab-
lished structures of power.
Egalitarianism is, therefore, an ideology that determines the constitution 
of the person in its relationship to the state and the nation. However, it is 
simultaneously a dynamic of power. It describes a set of relations and ideas 
that defi ne reality and are in a relation to a hierarchy of values. Equality is 
but one expression of egalitarianism as an ideological element, as are the 
French Revolution’s tenants of fraternity and liberty, today expressed in the 
notion of freedom, the concept of which can radically vary.8 However, more 
recently, egalitarianism in the west has increasingly represented economic 
equality of opportunity. Th ese are values that become ingrained in the defi -
nition of the human in western societies, strongly embedded in education 
systems, nationalist ideology and political and normative structures, such 
as human rights legislation. However, there is another element to egalitari-
anism that is more dynamic and perhaps emerges from its original intention 
as a response to totalizing powers. It is the latter that can shed light on the 
recent transformations in Latin America, the issue on which this collection 
aims to focus.
The Contributors’ Arguments
Th e contributors to this volume consider the diff erent responses to the fur-
ther encroachment of neoliberalism, only partially regulated by the Pink 
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Tide. By looking at the relations between local communities and the state, 
these diff erent case studies reveal the contradictions in the dynamics be-
tween egalitarian processes and the increasing power of the corporate state. 
Contributors discuss within their geographic location – but considering the 
larger regional geopolitical orders – the apparent demise of the Pink Tide as 
a moment of intensifying contradictions.
Th e chapters that compose this collection are grouped by common 
themes into three diff erent sections. Th e fi rst section deals with processes 
of corporatization related to extraction and shaped by heterogeneous po-
litical trajectories like in Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia. Th ese contributions 
represent large countries with economies based on the extraction of pri-
mary resources and dependent on the global cost of commodities. Th ey 
are, however, three very diff erent national contexts, with diff ering colonial 
histories and dissimilar confi gurations of population. Th ey also represent 
three very diff erent settings within corporate state dynamics, as Brazil has 
shift ed to the far right, and Bolivia is an iconic representative of the Pink 
Tide. However, their extractivist economies generate ripe conditions for 
the expansion of the corporate state, albeit to varying degrees and through 
multiple manifestations.
Th e second section focuses on states working ‘in the name of the com-
mon good’, considering contexts where egalitarian struggles aim to guaran-
tee common goods against the privatizing tendencies of corporate states like 
Ecuador, Chile and Venezuela. Th e focus in this section is not only on state 
dynamics but also on other egalitarian movements that are not always within 
the main state spheres. Th e three very diff erent contexts (Chile, Ecuador 
and Venezuela) show how corporate state dynamics operate in right and 
left -wing contexts alike. Delving into development discourse, democratic 
ideologies and expectations on the state, these three chapters represent how 
the corporate state can work against the common good by subverting dem-
ocratic practices in the interest of capital.
Finally, the third section focuses on forms of social organization in the 
margins of the corporate state. It aims to consider the multiple expressions of 
social and not necessarily political organization, whose existence develops 
alongside the corporate state but also clashes with its general tendencies. By 
focusing on the cases of Cuba and Peru, this section contemplates how dif-
ferent social structures can also act as reservoirs for corporate logics as well 
as a source for their contestation. Th ese sections represent one of many pos-
sible underpinning threads that connect the diff erent contributions, which 
together off er a snapshot of a crucial historic period on the brink of transfor-
mation. While the situation that is described in these chapters has already 
changed, this does not invalidate the observations of the underlying dynam-
ics that these authors consider. Th is is particularly signifi cant for the cases of 
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Brazil and Venezuela, which have undergone the most radical changes since 
the authors’ contributions, but the sharp analysis of Angosto-Ferrández and 
of Gledhill and Hita is still relevant to understand the current situation.
Th e diff erent authors identify particular elements of the proliferation 
of the corporate state in left ist governments (like Cuba and Venezuela), 
the more moderate left  of Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia and the right-wing 
governments of Chile, Mexico and Peru. Th ey capture emerging tensions 
between the still powerful governing elites and the ever disenfranchised 
marginal populations (indigenous people, rural villages, urban poor, pre-
carious labour, workers movements, women, etc.) in concrete ethnographic 
studies of the lives and struggles of ordinary people and their claims on local 
and national authorities to deliver their promise of emancipation.
However, despite the section groupings, the chapters in this book cor-
relate in diff erent ways, and common arguments are oft en identifi ed by the 
authors in each chapter. In Peru, the development of entrepreneurial activ-
ities by indigenous people in the margins of state-sanctioned activities rep-
resents the making of a subjectivity that is not quite neoliberal, not quite 
traditional and supported by the resurgence of social networks and social-
ities of the Peruvian Andes, contesting state hierarchies (see Ødegaard). In 
a similar contradictory process, Cuban self-employed ventures (both coop-
eratives and activities in the home, infl uenced by matrilineal and matrifocal 
ties) can contest state centralization while potentially becoming corporate 
groups themselves, susceptible to corporatizing infl uences from émigré Cu-
bans, NGOs and fi nancial organizations providing credit, redefi ning revolu-
tionary subjectivity (see Gold). From a contrasting perspective – thus one 
that illustrates the contradictions embedded in the processes underpinning 
state corporatization – Angosto-Ferrández considers the expectations of a 
social subject that demands the state to resist corporatizing processes and 
remain the representative of a collective subject against the exploitations of 
neoliberal political disorder.
Taking a more general perspective, Oikonomakis presents an analysis of 
the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and its initially egalitarian process that 
managed to (at least temporarily) overturn the hierarchies of class and po-
litical power, even if it was then once again co-opted by the dynamics of the 
corporate state and subverted to the interests of economic elites. Th e situa-
tion in Ecuador is in some ways comparable to that of Bolivia, in that the cur-
rent moment is revealing that the initial processes of subversion produced 
by Correa and his twenty-fi rst century socialism have now been tamed by 
the interests of corporate elites. Th e case study of Ecuador Estrategico de-
veloped by Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez reveals the contradictions 
between egalitarian movements and their potential to be co-opted by hier-
archical powers – in this case of development discourse, legal procedures 
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and centralizing government organizations. De la Maza Cabrera presents 
an interesting contrast, given the Chilean historical association with neo-
liberalism, where she analyses the demands of the Mapuche indigenous 
community and its interconnections with environmental discourses and the 
co-option of these discourses by governing and economic elites in order to 
enable further penetration of neoliberal policies in the name of the common 
good. Gledhill and Hita’s analysis of the Brazilian 2016 coup captures the 
eff ect on democratic processes as corporate interests undermine political 
structures to the detriment of social interests. In Mexico, corporatization 
is tightly related to the praxis of internal warfare, which facilitates the im-
plementation of structural reforms, dispossession of communal lands and 
goods, social fragmentation and the formation of a disenfranchised, vulner-
able and fully exploitable workforce.
Despite the diff erent perspectives from which the contributions to this 
volume are tackling issues of egalitarianism and state corporatization in the 
Latin American continent, the historical and global nature of some of the de-
scribed processes provide a point of convergence and a possible connection 
with similar studies to be developed in other regions. Th e particularity of the 
Latin American context has to do with the wave of left -wing governments 
that have shaped the region, the processes of change and political debate 
they made possible, and the current return of their conservative opponents 
into governmental positions. We are concerned with ‘corporatization’, the 
processes of structural transformation that underpin both the formation 
of the Pink Tide and its more recent destabilization – a process that goes 
beyond the alternation between left  and right claims over state power. We 
argue that the nature of corporatization has to do with the process by which 
economic logic becomes ontologically foundational of social relations. Th is 
is particularly evident in a context and a time where the left  has managed to 
establish itself in regional politics, sometimes with a strong anti-neoliberal 
discourse, but has failed to subvert the main tendencies brought about by 
corporatization and its neoliberal ideology.
Egalitarian claims and movements have developed alongside – both 
within and outside – these structural processes of transformation. We con-
sider egalitarian tendencies as highly unstable and haphazard instances that 
might have, from time to time, an impact on hierarchical structures, manag-
ing to reshape or temporarily suspend them.
Th e egalitarian instances brought about by Pink Tide governments have 
defi nitely produced changes in how the fi eld of the ‘possible’ might be per-
ceived by subordinate groups (even those who were critical towards pro-
gressive governments) and in their ‘empowerment’ within society. Such 
egalitarian energies will persist and shape the actions of antagonist groups 
and movements in the coming future.
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NOTES
 1. Operation Condor, a result of the Cold War, was an agreement established in the 
1970s until the late 1980s between the diff erent military governments in South 
America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador) and the United States, prepared by the CIA (Central Intelli-
gence Agency) to suppress the emergence of left ist governments in the region (such 
as Salvador Allende’s government in Chile).
 2. Th e public sphere does not correspond to the national sphere (or the sense of na-
tion – nationalism), which tends to persist and even grow in the current phase as 
a spectacular and false opposition to corporatization (See Zagato’s chapter in this 
volume).
 3. Between January 2011 and October 2015, the fall of the prices of raw materials and 
energy (oil, gas and carbon) was close to 50 per cent. Countries exporting hydrocar-
bons and metals like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela Chile and Peru were 
particularly aff ected.
 4. Th ese are not really ‘new’ and do not respond to traditional divisions between Right 
and Left , as the current political landscape is characterized by the collapse in these 
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distinctions and a tendency towards a moderate, but weakened, coalition that un-
dermines the capacity of the political to enact signifi cant and long-term changes. 
 5. Studies of egalitarianism based on Norwegian society (Bendixsen, Bente Bringslid 
and Vike 2018; Gullestad 2002) imply that it is a tendency to conceptualize people 
as the same and thus inherently establish exclusions based on diff erent markers (eth-
nic, class, racial).
 6. Th e notion of value is intended here anthropologically, rather than economically. 
 7. Th is has also been stressed by Turner in his analysis of the dialectical relation be-
tween structure and communitas (Turner 1969).
 8. Perhaps an interesting comparison is that between the North American conception 
of freedom of the individual and a Swiss understanding of liberty as a political com-
munion, whereby citizens fi nd their liberty in their compromise to their local com-
munity. See, for example, Frenkel (1993) for the Swiss context and Patterson (1991) 
for the context of freedom in the United States. 
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AND WARFARE IN MEXICO
Alessandro Zagato
Introduction
Th is chapter investigates state corporatization in Mexico. It does so with a 
particular concern with the praxis of war/warfare, which I present as a key 
feature of current trends in the evolution of statehood and its logics of dom-
ination. Th e prominence of warfare is particularly evident in a country like 
Mexico, where the nexus of power is being shaped by fl uid and mutating 
assemblages of conventional state agencies, organized crime and private en-
terprises and corporations – crystallizing in real war machines operating on 
(and ruthlessly transforming) the national territory.
Th is research develops work published in 2018 (Zagato 2018), where, 
starting from the analysis of a case of extreme violence – the Ayotzinapa mass 
murder and kidnapping – I highlight how Mexico has been experiencing, 
since 2006, a situation of internal war. In this chapter, I argue that such a situ-
ation directly relates to processes of ‘state corporatization’ as they have been 
described by Kapferer (2010, 2017a) and Kapferer and Gold (2017, 2018).
On 1 July 2018, the country elected a new president in the middle of one 
of the most violent periods in its recent history, with more than 200,000 peo-
ple murdered during the previous twelve years, which is more than those 
who died in the confl icts in Afghanistan and Iraq over the same time period. 
According to the Secretary of Public Security, more than 35,000 people are 
currently reported missing, with independent NGO data reaching 100,000. 
Th ese enormous fi gures still fail to account for the amount of brutality af-
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fl icting Mexican society, the trauma suff ered by countless communities from 
Sonora to Chiapas and the magnitude of the social transformation underway.
A context of rampant and diff used militarization and violence is push-
ing people into a culture of aggression, fear and isolation, generating dis-
orientation and social meltdown. In the military domain, each operation is 
open-ended and comes backed with intelligence and psychological warfare. 
‘Military operations are truly a manner of speaking,’ highlight the Invisible 
Committee as they quote General Vincent Desportes, ‘hence every major 
operation is above all a communication operation whose every act, even a 
minor act, speaks louder than words’ (Invisible Committee 2015). Waging 
war today is ‘fi rst and foremost to manage perceptions, the perceptions of 
the set of actors whether close by or far away, direct or indirect’ (ibid.). Mex-
ican sociologist Alejandro Saldaña has described this governmental strategy 
as ‘institutional production of fear’ (Saldaña 2018; my translation). How-
ever, the horizon that I am attempting to describe here goes well beyond the 
control of collective feelings.
Over the last decade, an unprecedented acceleration in the process of 
decomposition of the nation state’s institutionality, model of society and 
related forms of life has taken place in Mexico. In this context, I have high-
lighted how dispersed ‘clusters of power’ are taking shape at diff erent scales, 
convoked by the array of economic opportunities made available nationally 
by broad governmental reforms (Zagato 2018). Such reforms include, for 
example, those to the Energy sector, approved by the Senate of the Republic 
on 11 December 2013 (with the aggregate laws of hydrocarbons, the elec-
tric industry, geothermal energy and mining, among others). Articles 25, 
27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution have been modifi ed, and the energy 
sector was opened up to the initiative of private international enterprises. 
With the reform, the extraction and exploitation of hydrocarbons, mining 
and the public service of energy provision are viewed as activities of primary 
strategic and social interest as well as a matter of public security. Th us, the 
legislation prioritizes such projects over any other activity involving the use 
of the surface or the subsoil of any given piece of land or territory. Th is facil-
itates processes of dispossession of communal or private land to the benefi t 
of national and international corporate powers.
Th ese rearrangements respond to a new cycle of capitalist expansion 
and accumulation grounded in structural reforms and extraction. Endemic 
corruption, violence and destruction assist the implementation of these de-
velopments, especially when they meet popular resistance (Zagato 2018). 
Taking advantage of a situation of social, political and institutional melt-
down, corporate powers are implementing their plans based on explicit neo-
liberal ideological grounds.
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
24 Alessandro Zagato
Structural economic developments go together with what we could de-
fi ne as a subjective restructuring of society. Indeed, as Kapferer and Gold 
(2017: 34) highlight, ‘in the apotheosis of the corporate state’, neoliberalism 
tends to be imposed as ‘a theory of society’ and therefore ‘as the dominant 
economistic discourse across the class and political spectrum’, a performa-
tive discourse indeed, aimed at constructing its own subject. Th e neoliberal 
prescription of the domination of the economic over the political (social, na-
tional and so on) becomes a state’s ontological principle. Moreover, the idea 
that the economic and the market are independent and determining fi elds
is transmogrifi ed into processes that are prior to all else. In this, the economic 
inhabits all modes of existence so that even if they are not conceived as overtly 
economic actions or institutions (e.g., love, friendship, family interaction, polit-
ical practice, etc.), they teleologically exemplify an economic logic or principle. 
In other words, what are notions born in an era of the independent recognition of 
the economy ideologically lose such historical connection and become profound 
universal ontological principles to which all can be reduced and justifi ed. (Kap-
ferer 2010: 127)
In the opening session of the 81st Bank Convention held by the Bank of 
Mexico, Marcos Martínez, the current president of the Association of Mex-
ican Banks, defi nes the country’s current economic and political approach:
Mexico is today more solid and more productive thanks to the vision embodied 
in the delicate political decision that conducted the renewal of the institutional 
bases of our country. Th anks to the most ambitious agenda of structural reforms 
in the recent history of our nation, today we are one of the most important des-
tinations for private investment. In the energy sector, for example, investment 
commitments are already higher than 200 billion dollars, just considering what 
remains of President Peña’s term – imagine what will come next. (Mexican Gov-
ernment 2018, my translation)
In the meantime, according to an article in La Jornada (2015), ‘In the last 
10 years, foreign and domestic mining companies have obtained 774 tons and 
667 kilograms of gold from the national subsoil. During three centuries of 
colony, New Spain mining extracted 190 tons of gold.’ Th e concept of ‘neoco-
lonialism’, used by many scholars and analysts to identify the current phase 
of capitalist/imperialist expansion in Latin America, is certainly appropriate 
but also incomplete when it comes to analysing ongoing structural trends.
I interpret widespread warfare, fragmentation and the destruction of 
previously established forms of life as necessary steps towards a full corpo-
ratization of the Mexican (in this case) state. Indeed, the concept of ‘state 
corporatization’, as it is developed in Kapferer (2017a), points to a process 
of ‘removing the constraints that the nation state placed on many of the po-
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tentials of capital’. Such operation is taking place with varying intensities, on 
a global scale. It involves ‘radical changes or transformations’ of ‘the bureau-
cratic, institutional and socio-political relational order of the nation-state . . . 
including the values that are integral to it’ (Kapferer 2017a). Corporatization 
is therefore a tendency that implies a highly destructive, protracted course 
of action – an assault  on institutions, places and aspects of human life that 
needs to be eradicated or transformed.
Referring to such tendencies in the United States, Noam Chomsky (2018) 
recently argued that while the media and public attention are concentrated 
on Trump – the spectacular performer and ‘showman’ – the ‘wrecking crew’ 
is working in the background. Th ese are the cabinet personnel writing exec-
utive orders and systematically dismantling every aspect of government that 
works for the benefi t of the population, including workers’ rights, environ-
mental pollution and rules for protecting consumers and so on. All these ef-
forts, claims Chomsky, are fanatically devoted to enriching and empowering 
their actual constituency, which is super wealth and corporate power.
In Mexico, long-established forms of social/institutional cohesiveness 
are being forcibly replaced by anarchic arbitrariness, fomented by aleatory 
power alliances, violence and widespread corruption. As I will highlight, the 
violent consolidation of the Mexican corporate state implies the repression 
of egalitarian tendencies, laws and institutions shaping (or even just attempt-
ing to shape) Mexican society. Brutal repressive and counter-insurgent oper-
ations like Ayotzinapa 2014 (Zagato 2018) or Nochixtlán 2016 (Zagato 2016) 
are representative of the Mexican corporate state’s approach to dissidence. 
Th e social space of debate, interaction and collaboration described by 
Habermas (1991) as the ‘public sphere’ is violently suppressed and replaced 
by chaotic warfare.
One could argue that corporatization is producing a ‘disjunction between 
state and nation’ (Quadrelli 2018), a historical rupture between these two 
instances. Corporate power does not operate in the interests of a nation(al 
population); its logic and orientation is transnational. Th e principle of na-
tion (its relevance, production and reproduction) becomes a residual aspect 
that serves to justify the existence of borders and an increasing evanescent 
sense of identifi cation to a state oriented towards global dynamics and log-
ics. Surviving public institutions need to fully assume ‘business principles of 
decision-making and effi  ciency’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018). Indeed, corpo-
rate transformation involves the ‘trimming down of bureaucratic complexity 
and its managerialization. Business principles of decision-making and ratio-
nal effi  ciency are adopted even where state functions have not been actually 
taken over by corporate enterprise’ (ibid.).
Th e rise of nationalist populism in Europe and elsewhere can be inter-
preted as a means to face and respond to social inequity, uncertainty and 
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misidentifi cation as a consequence of the suppression of the social per-
formed by corporatization. Right-wing populism’s strategy consists in con-
structing a fi ctitious enemy (migrants, the poorest and so on) against whom 
to direct popular anger while at the same time not giving back anything to 
the national ‘people’ that such a discourse claims to represent, since these 
‘people’ are themselves a hologram. Indeed, populism serves to shape and 
produce subjectivities to the extent that it operates as ‘a mode of perfor-
mative discourse that activates, creates and invents the People of which it 
speaks as well as the terms of its orientation’ (Kapferer 2017b), thus operat-
ing from a point of instability and potential.
Being ‘people’ means, therefore, to emphasize a diff erence – a negative 
rather than a positive connotation. It means not being a stranger, not being 
poor, not being a misfi t (Quadrelli 2018). Populism operates thus as an en-
gine of depoliticization, preventing the upsurge of anti-systemic, class-based 
movements or forms of organization.
In Mexico, through the corporate state form, capitalism intervenes on as-
pects of human life and the economy that it previously considered marginal. 
Th ese include natural resources that have assumed economic prominence 
on a global scale (some in view of a future scarcity, like of water, for instance) 
and social groups – or forms of life – that (for reasons that go from resistance 
to exclusion) have managed to exist to some extent outside the logics of cap-
ital and that now need to be ‘put to work’, removed or displaced. Th is is the 
case, for example, for many native groups that populate Mexico and Latin 
America. In the south of Mexico, the indigenous Zapatistas argue that since 
the conquest the Mayan population of Chiapas has had to face constant land 
theft  by invaders. With the imposition of cachiquismo (a sort of feudal mode 
of land tenure), indigenous people were forced to abandon fertile fl atlands 
and fi nd shelter and agricultural land in inhospitable places like jungles and 
mountain areas, living in isolation. Now, due to their rich subsoil, vegetation 
and biodiversity, those remote areas have become highly profi table, with 
catastrophic consequences for those who inhabit them, including displace-
ment, destruction or radical transformation of their living environment, la-
bour reconfi guration, communitarian divisions and violence.
Recently, the Zapatistas have also highlighted that from a state-political 
point of view the wave of reaction that the progressive governmental exper-
iment known as the Pink Tide is suff ering throughout the Latin American 
continent shows that not even a reformist, modestly egalitarian, redistrib-
utive and moderately anti-imperialistic and national-statist attitude can be 
accepted by corporate powers. Leaders like Lula (for example) are being 
punished for taking action to restrain the unlimited craving of the corporate 
state, which does not admit forms of egalitarian moderation, contrary, per-
haps, to the nation state (see Gledhill and Hita this volume).
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However, it is not always just the ‘right-wing opposition’ who is pushing 
for a corporatizing agenda. Th ere are cases where ‘progressive governments’ 
themselves are acting as violent corporatizing agents, illustrating how this is 
a historical and thus transversal process concerning the very nature of state-
hood – a non-reversible tendency. In Nicaragua, for instance, corporatiza-
tion led to what Raúl Zibechi (2018) has described as the ‘privatization of the 
Sandinista Front’, a paradoxical expression if we consider the revolutionary 
history of that organization. However, Nicaragua’s political elites have en-
forced a regime operating against ordinary people and in favour of corporate 
forms of concentration of wealth and power. Th e subordination of the coun-
try to the global logic of capital has deepened dramatically, based on the 
exploitation of available natural resources and cheap labour. To comply with 
its own agenda, the current regime needs to eradicate social opposition and 
resistance – and Ortega’s regime does so by exercising strict social control 
and repression (Zibechi 2018).
In Mexico, two of the main constraints to corporate and neoliberal ex-
pansion are the reforms in education and land that the Mexican Revolution 
(1910–20) brought about and that governments, one aft er the other, are vig-
orously trying to obliterate. In particular, this is a country with more than 
half of its territory (106 million hectares) managed by almost six million 
peasants under the collective legal forms of ‘Ejidos’ and ‘Agrarian Commu-
nities’. Th ese social confi gurations are part of the massive process of redistri-
bution of land triggered by the Revolution. Most of these rural collectivities 
still identify with the revolutionary process, which motivates them to keep 
defending those lands from the predatory aggression of corporate power. 
Moreover, 60 per cent of national forests are actually part of ejidos and 
agrarian communities, who have played a key role in the preservation of eco-
systems and biodiversity. Not only have these social realities become com-
pletely irrelevant to corporate logics, the land they occupy is oft en packed 
with the type of resources that national and international capital craves. Th e 
disarticulation of these collective forms of life passes through military and 
legal aggression. Previously structured, cohesive and organized societies are 
being dissolved into a plebeian mass of generalized cheap (sometimes free) 
workers and off ered to corporate initiative.1
Focusing on the military aspect of corporatization, in this chapter I anal-
yse the transformation of war as a process organic to the transformation of 
the state (corporatization). Mexico is a representative case but defi nitely part 
of a global tendency. Corporatization is a process that requires structural 
adjustments. However, it is also based on the transformation of the forms 
of life shaping a particular community/society. I argue that the implementa-
tion of internal warfare is an eff ective and quick way to achieve the required 
human profi le – besides reshaping hierarchies and disarticulating resistance. 
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Mutated forms of life are the necessary condition for the transformation of 
the labour force, increasingly subjugated to a condition of servile and forced 
labour. Massive migration processes from countries or regions aff ected by 
wars and crises are functional to the formation of such disenfranchised, frag-
mented, vulnerable and fully exploitable workers. Cases like Syria and Libya 
(where slavery is de facto being reinstituted) are representative in this sense. 
What is viewed by many ‘as chaos and ineptitude is instrumental to corporate 
state formation, thoroughly benefi cial to fractions of the bourgeoisie who are 
part of the new elites of the corporate rich’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018).
Th e tight relation between war and labour was highlighted by Marx (2005 
[1858]) in the Grundrisse, where he argues that ‘War developed earlier than 
peace; the way in which certain economic relations such as wage labour, ma-
chinery etc. develop earlier, owing to war and in the armies etc., than in the 
interior of bourgeois society. Th e relation of productive force and relations 
of exchange are also especially vivid in the army.’ Today’s armed confl icts 
are producing highly exploitable forms of life. For example, the militarized 
frontier between Mexico and the United States actually functions as a rights 
dispossession machine, producing a labour force subject to clandestine and 
exploitable conditions.
To be such, global capitalism cannot do anything else but, in tendency, 
deal with an undiff erentiated, malleable, fl exible and constantly blackmailed 
work force (Quadrelli 2010). Th e corporate state form responds to this ne-
cessity of producing the producers. Th e Mexican maquilladoras, the inten-
sive lemon and avocado plantations (Fuentes-Diaz 2015) and poppy crops 
directly controlled by organized crime, among other examples, trace the 
general lines of current production relationships; they constitute a model for 
the current phase of capitalist accumulation. Not surprisingly, Mexico is the 
country in Latin America with the largest number of people in conditions of 
modern slavery, understood as forced labour (Walk Free Foundation 2018).
I base my arguments on extensive fi eldwork conducted in Mexico over 
the last fi ve years. Moreover, I rely on the analysis of current policy trends 
embraced by the Mexican government. I am particularly interested in struc-
tural reforms facilitating the activity of national and international corpora-
tions on the territory, as well as in (tightly related) legislations concerning 
the management and structure of the armed forces, the conduction of spe-
cifi c military operations on the national territory and so on. In this sense, 
the idea that I am trying to illustrate is that, internationally, war is getting 
through a process of internalization, which is functional to the transforma-
tion of statehood. In this chapter, I am taking into consideration the recently 
approved Internal Security Law, which epitomizes ongoing tendencies and 
provides the President of the Republic and the Federal Army with unprece-
dented legal power and freedom to decide on internal military intervention. 
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Th is Law, I argue, legalizes and validates a process of internal militarization 
that has shaped Mexican society over the last decade, producing a situation 
of chaos and uncontrolled violence.
The Transformation of War
One could argue that we are experiencing a generalization of the possibility 
of war. Not only are wars and warfare spreading internationally at an ac-
celerated path and intensity. Th e diff usion of a warfare imaginary through 
the media and public discourse and the generalization of a feeling of con-
stant war-threat are increasingly shaping societies, even those that used to 
perceive themselves as immune and war as an ‘outside’, which has been the 
subjective perception of western societies since the end of World War II. 
Additionally, it is becoming increasingly clear that warfare constitutes the 
soul and essence of the current regime, where commercial, bureaucratic and 
military means coexist and merge into what we could defi ne as real, trans-
versal war machines.
War – its form, conduct and aims – is radically changing from the para-
digm that shaped most of the twentieth century. Th at was a model based on 
the existence of a ‘cohesive’ state-national apparatus. War was meant to take 
place outside the national frontiers, since the consistency and stability of a 
state was inseparable from an undisputed condition of internal peace. Even 
in the case of a state of occupation or the loss of national territory, a rigid 
distinction between the inside and the outside – between ‘we’ and ‘them’ – 
needed to be maintained as the grounds for internal political and military 
legitimacy.
In that context, the national working classes played a crucial role as a 
supply of soldiers (mass military lever) and workers (factories – agricultural 
industry) necessary to the conduct and sustainability of war. Th is confi gu-
ration refl ects the idea of industrial war, which presupposes a specifi c type 
of technological/infrastructural development and a specifi c labour model. 
Industrial war envisages the complete and coordinated mobilization and 
subordination of resources, including politics and the social structures, to 
the cause of war against an external enemy. A country can react against the 
enemy’s attack until it preserves the moral energies and integrity to sustain 
its will to fi ght back. It is therefore necessary to produce intolerable condi-
tions for the adversary. A quick and eff ective strategy is to directly intervene 
against the disarmed populations of the cities and against the big industrial 
districts. In this context, the air forces have the explicit task of turning war 
into a catastrophe, in order to push the victims to seek refuge into peace. It 
is the terrorist logic implicit in the carpet-bombing tactic.
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Th us, this model is based on the structured organization and control of the 
national population – especially the working classes – and in the hegemony 
of the nation state as a confi guration of statehood, shaping the economic 
logic. Th e eventual collapse of this structure could threaten state-national 
cohesiveness to the point of bringing about internal (civil or revolutionary) 
war. Social politics were aimed at maintaining a healthy and productive la-
bour force and at averting the prospect of internal confl ict. Th ere is indeed a 
tight connection between industrial war and the welfare state, since they ‘can 
be fruitfully understood as aspects of a tendency to state capitalism which 
prevailed in the fi rst half of the twentieth century . . . resting on the capacity 
of individual states to manage their own segments of the world economy’ 
(Adams 1988: 27). Th is tendency was off set ‘by a countervailing tendency to 
internationalization’ (ibid.). Even though social policy relates to the supply 
of effi  cient labour power and it depends in part on working-class pressure 
for adequate living standards, ‘national effi  ciency’ and social solidarity be-
come key to a successful imperialism in the context of a world economy of 
competing state capitalisms, where states are the organizers and defenders 
of national economic development. ‘Th e working class became a national 
resource, to be educated, kept in health, and adequately maintained if pro-
ductivity and military capacity were to match international levels’ (Harman 
1984 in Adams 1988: 35).
Today’s tendency is instead for war to be conducted, with diff erent in-
tensities, both internally and externally to the national territory – increas-
ingly against a state’s own population. If in the corporate state form there 
is no longer an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ because these two dimensions live 
simultaneously side by side in every context, an ‘inclusive’ policy by a state 
towards its own people has become unnecessary (Quadrelli 2010). In this 
sense, corporatization means withdrawal of the state from society and ex-
treme reduction or elimination of social spending – that is, no interest in 
the ‘nation’. From the economistic point of view of the corporate state, the 
inside-outside dualism is no longer relevant. Th ere is instead a transversal 
battlefi eld of economic competition where the degrees and modalities of the 
same confl ict are played out.
According to Emilio Quadrelli (2018), the current state form tends to 
exclude the ‘people’ from the state framework, rather than bringing them 
in. Such a tendency condenses the entire eclipse of the Welfare State. State 
and war continue to exist in dialectical unity. However, this dialectic is shift -
ing the focus from a ‘state of war’ typical of the twentieth century’s inter-
imperialist confl ict to a ‘state in war’. Th is war has no more boundaries be-
cause, in the fi rst instance, it is a war that must be fought against the masses 
(Quadrelli 2018).
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Louis A. DiMarco, lieutenant colonel of the US Army and teacher at the 
Army Command and Staff , argues that today ‘One-third of the global ur-
ban population lives in poverty and disease-ridden urban ghettos. Th is envi-
ronment is characterized by crime, disease, and political unrest. Warfare is 
conducted in response to politics; politics is the interaction of citizens in so-
ciety’ (DiMarco 2014: 213). According to this prominent exponent of North 
American war theory, social interaction constitutes today a main enemy for 
Empire. Th is implies that any possible situation of peace is necessarily one 
of social fragmentation. He adds that today’s warfare ‘requires much more 
than sophisticated conventional military capability. Hybrid combat also re-
quires military capabilities not normally necessary for conventional combat. 
Th ese include special operations capabilities, civil aff airs expertise, sophisti-
cated intelligence gathering focused on the human terrain of the urban envi-
ronment, and close coordination between military and political policy’ (Di 
Marco 2014: 212). Such new necessities inform the Internal Security Law, 
which I will discuss in the next section.
Th e actors of the type of confl ict described by DiMarco are multiple, and 
they operate at diff erent scales. Th e act of war against the population tran-
scends national borders. It is frequently sustained or managed bilaterally – 
as, for example, in the case of the Mexican ‘war on drugs’ jointly conducted 
by Mexico and the United States. Th ose two armies are not fi ghting against 
each other or against a third regular army. Th e spectre of the ‘drug trade’, 
their enemy, is diluted in the population itself, which becomes the real target 
of military operations. ‘War on terrorism’ constitutes a very similar device. 
In both cases, the state perpetrates a strategy of internal warfare and recon-
fi guration, based on the existence of a threat that is at the same time ambig-
uous and boundless.
Military action is increasingly carried out by private or semi-private para-
military forces operating semi-independently from offi  cial armies. Terrorist 
and narco groups are in charge of specifi c military operations. In many re-
gions, they overlap with the offi  cial authority. Th is ambivalent and dispersed 
way of operating militarily is coextensive to the process of corporatization. 
Th e necessity of carrying out both formal and informal activities, ‘legal and 
illegal’ (breaking rules and damaging state and non-state institutions), de-
mands more fl exible apparatuses and professional fi gures. Th e interaction 
between formal and informal armed groups is fl uid like the economic inter-
ests to which these bodies respond. Such networks are constantly evolving, 
and they are not exempt from sudden ruptures and transformations. En-
tire sections of the police and the army can eventually turn into mercenary 
forces (or the opposite way around) and establish new complex forms of 
cooperation with the state apparatus. Considering Althusser’s argument that 
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‘the distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to 
bourgeois law and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law 
exercises its “authority”,’ and considering that the state’s domain ‘escapes it 
because the latter is “above the law”: the State, which is the State of the rul-
ing class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition 
for any distinction between public and private’ (Althusser 1970: 12), one 
could argue that with corporatization the state suddenly operates (even mil-
itarily) in a way that tends to go (empirically) beyond this distinction.
Para-militarization and ‘dispersion’ turn warfare into a semi-independent 
process, an automatism that tends to aff ect and mobilize specifi c popula-
tions, whereby operations are decided and organized by power lobbies with 
a high degree of autonomy. Th e aims of such wars are intrinsic to the process 
of corporatization. Th ey capture territories and situations not yet submitted 
to the logics of capital, contexts where resources are available and where re-
sistance is opposed; they perform the destruction of no longer necessary or 
tolerable forms of institutionality2 and the transformation of forms of life and 
labour. Kapferer and Gold (2018) argue that ‘Participatory capitalism’ – and 
I would add participatory warfare – ‘substitutes participatory democracy’. 
In their perspective, corporatization ‘is both a restructuring of the governing 
process of the erstwhile nation state in accordance with structural dynamics 
most apparent among contemporary corporate conglomerates, and a pro-
cess of social transformation whereby the structure of social relations, of so-
ciety itself, is re-constituted, potentially down to the very existential nature 
of human being’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018).
The Mexican Corporate State’s Militarization 
and the New Internal Security Law
While 2017 broke many records in terms of violence,3 the presence and in-
trusion of the army into the political and social life of the country reached 
unprecedented levels, settling a hard blow to an already decrepit democratic 
life and national sovereignty. Th e Mexican elites are surreptitiously fostering 
a process of ‘legalization’ and legitimation of internal warfare, whose impli-
cations are diffi  cult to foresee in the long term.
In Mexico, federal executive powers have traditionally resorted to the 
armed forces as an instrument to control organized crime and drug traffi  ck-
ing. Th eir function in terms of internal security was always circumscribed to 
drug seizure, the search of clandestine plantations and airports, surveillance 
of borders and so on (Maldonado Aranda 2009). However, the genesis of 
the current escalation dates back to 2006, when, from the very beginning of 
his mandate, President Felipe Calderón started the infamous War on Drugs, 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 State Corporatization and Warfare in Mexico 33
purportedly aimed at fi ghting organized crime and the drug trade. With this 
strategy, the armed forces were involved in direct military confrontation 
with organized crime groups. Th ey also carried out a number of activities 
(like autonomous criminal investigations, detentions and assassinations) 
that are unconstitutional and lack an established protocol for the use of mil-
itary force in civil operations (Fondevila and Mejía 2014: 82). Calderón’s 
term started with accusations of electoral fraud, widespread social mobiliza-
tions and even the self-nomination of the losing candidate, Andrés Manuel 
Lopez Obrador (‘AMLO’), as the legitimate president. In such conjuncture, 
the strategy adopted by the government to allegedly face organized crime 
and extreme social instability lead to a state of exception, of sorts, that broke 
with the constitutional guarantees of the nation state (Fondevila and Mejía 
2014: 83). Such conjuncture was the beginning of what one could describe 
as an acceleration of the corporatization process in Mexico.
Since the beginning of the War on Drugs, the government has adamantly 
maintained that the militarization of public security would be a temporary 
measure, an urgent national security operation in defence of a threatened 
state – and functional to the ‘depuration’ and professionalization of obsolete 
police forces. However, soon it originated multiple complaints, denunci-
ations and reports of illegal detentions, raids without judicial order, road-
blocks, enforced disappearances, torture, homicides, violent confrontations 
in urban areas etc.
One should consider that armies exist to be employed in wars. Th e for-
mation of their personnel is not necessarily consistent with the respect for 
human and civil rights. Th eir intervention in civil operations bears the dan-
ger of excesses of violence and abuse of power – and therefore it tends to be 
restricted and highly regulated. However, in the Mexican case, the deploy-
ment of the army against drug trade came unrestricted, with no regulatory 
framework. Aft er twelve years, violence has spiralled out of control. Th e re-
cent introduction of a new Internal Security Law suggests that there is no 
end in sight to this situation.
Th e Internal Security Law, approved on 30 November 2017 by the Cham-
ber of Deputies, establishes a procedure by which the President of the Re-
public can directly order the intervention of the army and the navy in any 
part of the country, so long as he identifi es ‘threats to internal security’ that 
federal or local police forces are incapable of handling. Typically, to initiate 
this process, he fi rst needs to consult the National Security Council and de-
termine the nature of the intervention. Within seventy-two hours, he needs 
to issue a ‘Declaration of Security Protection’, which requires approval by 
the National Security Council. Th e Ministry of the Interior must notify the 
Bicameral Commission of National Security and the National Commission 
of Human Rights before making the Declaration offi  cial. However, ‘in cases 
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where those threats put in danger people’s integrity or the functioning of 
the main governing institutions’, the President of the Republic ‘under his 
own strict responsibility’ can order the immediate intervention of the armed 
forces. Th is clause confers exceptional powers to the president, opening the 
doors to unilateral decision making and facilitating abuses of power. Th is 
regulation circumvents Article 29 of the Constitution, which obligates the 
president to obtain authorization from the Congress before implementing 
any suspension of constitutional guarantees and drastically limits the time 
extension of such operations.
Th e law also establishes that the federal and armed forces will undertake 
intelligence activities in matters of ‘internal security’ based on their areas 
of specialization and with no restrictions on the legal methods they can use 
for gathering information. In a country where military power already en-
joys exceptional independence from other state apparatuses and has a strong 
infl uence on governmental decision making, the army becomes de facto in 
charge of the internal order. It turns into a legitimate and autonomous po-
litical force capable of intervening unilaterally at almost any time, with the 
freedom to persecute political opposition and social movements. It becomes 
free to constantly produce and reproduce a situation of warfare – the only 
situation it is supposed to deal with.
Aft er more than a decade of military presence in the streets, central power 
felt that a regulatory framework was needed. Th is decision was also due to 
popular and international pressure on the government to fi nd a solution and 
normalize a controversial and somehow embarrassing situation. Indeed, at 
federal level, there is no law that regulates the use of force. Consequently, 
the Mexican Army lacks legal parameters to guide the use of force in its func-
tion of maintaining internal security (Fondevila and Mejía 2014: 92). How-
ever, the Internal Security Law does not establish clear limits to the ongoing 
‘exceptional’ tendency. On the contrary, it normalizes a situation of wide-
spread low-intensity warfare through an unconstitutional approach based 
on very general and vague ideas such as ‘containing risks and threats’ and 
‘democratic governability’.
Th e law consolidates and expands a logic of state and military intervention 
into civil matters. Th is initiative could eventually increase military presence 
in the streets, with implications including systematic human rights viola-
tions and heavy limitations on the right to congregate and freely circulate in 
public spaces. Th e act of replacing the public ministry in the investigation 
of crimes committed by civilians paves the way towards a generalized es-
pionage system with no limits or forms of democratic control and account-
ability. Information collected by the army is indeed considered national 
security material and is therefore impossible to investigate. Th e army can 
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also be involved in situations concerning, for example, the implementation 
of structural reforms (like the energy sector reforms), which were declared 
as activities of a primary strategic and social interest as well as a matter of 
public security – formalizing in this way the participation of the army in cor-
porate expropriation.
Also remarkable are the consequences in terms of national sovereignty, 
given the tight operational ties existing between the Mexican Armed Forces 
and the Army of the United States. With President Vicente Fox (2000–
2006), Mexico was integrated into the United States Northern Command. 
Many Mexican Army leaders and cadets are trained in the United States 
and operate under its direct infl uence. Even leaders of narco cartels like the 
Zetas were trained in the United States as counter-insurgency forces. Aft er 
breaking with the regular army, they established complex new pathways 
of cooperation with the Mexican state. Th eir practices include seizure of 
communal land and resources and the production of fear and hopelessness 
in society, to the advantage of corporate profi t making (Zagato 2018). Th ey 
became part and parcel of the corporate state project, refl ecting its com-
position and sharing its scopes and aims, especially in terms of the imple-
mentation of what I previously defi ned as a war against the people, and in 
line with the perspectives of North American military theorists like Louis 
DiMarco (2014).
With the security law, through a self-justifying act of power supported 
by no valid or rational argument, the leading national parties are fully em-
bracing and legalizing the military option. Mexico is consolidating an inter-
nal constitutional transformation, which is roughly transferring portions of 
power from the civil to the military sphere. Since it cedes to the govern-
ment an unprecedented capacity to impose a heavy hand, this law is setting 
a juridical foundation for coming forms of repression. Th is is also a sign of 
transformation of a state unwilling to maintaining control and ‘security’ un-
der civil and democratic conditions, and which fi nds it more convenient to 
rule in a situation of chaos, widespread violence and impunity, and where 
the value of human life stands at its historical lowest point. Th e presence 
on the national territory of authentic extermination camps is symptomatic 
of the ongoing normalization of brutality and violence. In many cases, the 
state itself acts as the administrator of mass graves, which are created by the 
prosecutor’s offi  ce outside any international or even national legal standard. 
Th ousands of human bodies with no associated investigation folder, without 
a necropsy, with signs of torture, with tied hands, blindfolded, with their 
clothes on, thrown like garbage (Dayán 2017).
In just nine years, between 2007 and 2016, 1,075 clandestine graves were 
found in Mexico, with a total of 2,024 bodies. Several decades aft er the so-
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called ‘dirty war’ (against social and revolutionary movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s), the clandestine burial of people perpetrated by state and non-
state actors is a practice that is recurrent but with a new correlation of ac-
tors and contexts. According to a study of the Universidad Iberoamericana 
and the CMDPDH4 (2017), two patterns of behaviour can be observed: on 
one hand, the constant presence of graves in certain municipalities – with 
peaks in particular years; on the other hand, the presence of a high number 
of graves in states aff ected by exceptional violence in a specifi c year (CMD-
PDH 2017). Th e above-mentioned study argues that today this practice has 
the objective of ‘eliminating’ the bodies of previously disappeared people. 
But it does so leaving visible signs of the violence exerted on them. Th e aim 
is to generate terror, achieve control and display the situation of generalized 
impunity shaping Mexico.
In the transversal battlefi eld produced by contemporary wars, national 
and private armies are jointly employed to fi ght entire populations rather 
than other armies. Th e distinction between military targets and the civilian 
population increasingly blurs, and warfare is normalized, becoming part of 
people’s day-to-day lived experience. I suggest that this constant level of (in-
ternal) warfare is functional to the current phase of state corporatization, 
since it facilitates structural reconfi guration and corporate intervention into 
specifi c territories and regions.
As Alain Badiou argued some years ago, ‘[T]he objective of . . . military 
intervention is to create plebeian masses everywhere deprived of any ca-
pacity of collective cohesion’ (in Pozzana and Russo 2005: 208). Indeed the 
hegemonic economization and profi t rationality require violent fragment-
ing and atomizing processes and ‘the dislocation and disarticulation of the 
state’s civil functions . . . [T]he present military campaigns are only the fi rst 
steps in a plan to fully militarize the state’ (Pozzana and Russo 2005: 208). 
In this sense, the new Internal Security Law is compatible with the current 
non-democratic landscape shaped by aggressive forms of corporatization 
and the propagation of warfare.
In a recent development, the Internal Security Law was declared uncon-
stitutional by two federal judges, one in Mexico City and the other in the 
state of Guanajuato. Th ey consider that the implication of the armed forces 
in tasks of public and internal security involves threats to the exercise of 
the fundamental rights of the people. Th ey also denounced military actions 
in public security because it may lead to off enses of impossible reparation 
against members of society.
Despite such an important institutional response to the implementa-
tion of the Law, the tendencies prefi gured by the Internal Security Law are 
meant to be implemented one way or another, as I will highlight in the next 
section.
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The Election of Lopez Obrador and 
Consequences in Terms of Internal Security
Th e July 2018 elections in Mexico were unique. For the fi rst time, they in-
volved the designation of presidential and congressional seats as well as the 
appointment of mayors and state governors for the entire Federal Republic. 
Amidst this massive political process – with almost 90 million of potential 
voters involved – Lopez Obrador was elected president, with 54 per cent of 
the share. Th e victory confi rmed fi gures forecasted since the beginning of 
the electoral campaign. Th is was Lopez Obrador’s third attempt. Th e pre-
vious two were disrupted by irregularities and fraud. His party, MORENA,5 
and the coalition that supported him, won the majority of seats in both 
chambers as well as in the main national constituencies, including Mexico 
City. On Sunday night, a wave of euphoria fl ooded the streets of a country 
exhausted aft er twelve years of the ‘war on drugs’ strategy, widespread vi-
olence and brutality, and poverty levels hovering at 50 per cent. Over the 
previous six years, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had 
deepened an unprecedented social, political and economic crisis. Amidst 
this catastrophic situation, a large sector of the Mexican people perceived 
the triumph of Lopez Obrador (and the defeat of PRI) as a change of course 
and reason to hope for a better future. Th is was a victory made possible by 
the organization of broad sectors of the working classes and the incessant 
struggle of historically insubordinate groups and communities throughout 
the country. Th e fi gure of Lopez Obrador was able to ride (and make use of ) 
such a widespread dissent in the electoral process.
However, it would be misleading to understand the new leadership in a 
radical left ist or even anti-establishment perspective – which is how some 
national and international media are depicting them. Lopez Obrador and 
MORENA reiterated the neoliberal nature of their plans throughout the en-
tire electoral campaign. Th ey never stopped guaranteeing loyalty to neigh-
bouring countries and international corporations with large economic 
interests in Mexico. Th ey pledged that no current main economic or infra-
structural development would be touched – not even the contested energy 
reforms. In other words, AMLO has promised adherence to the current state 
project and that he will work to protect its continuity. It is crucial not to 
confuse his ‘anti-corruption’ (and anti-‘mafi a with power’) discourse with 
‘anti-capitalism’. Perhaps, his commitment to fi ghting widespread illegality 
will have a positive impact on the functioning of certain public and private 
institutions – and maybe contribute to alleviating violence – but it will not 
stop corporate aggression on communities and territories. Th e entering gov-
ernment will perhaps apply a number of palliative measures and off er some 
‘fresh air’ – ‘breath’ (as the Zapatistas put it) – to a suff ocating society. How-
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ever, AMLO’s victory will not change power and class relations in Mexico, 
especially for indigenous and peasant groups, who are suff ering processes 
of predatory dispossession, displacement and the destruction of their forms 
of life, labour and sociality. Such groups will need to continue to resist and 
build forms of political and social autonomy at a distance from the state and 
the dominant economic system.
Since December 2017 (when he still was in the electoral campaign), 
AMLO has assured that there is no need to fear the recent approval of the 
Internal Security Law, since it operates no change in the Constitution for 
the fact that the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces – 
and, he said (in a populist way), ‘I will never order a repression against the 
people’, emphasizing the legitimacy of his subjective will as the (eventual) 
ruling person over structural concerns. He also assured that, aft er reaching 
the Presidency, he would not delegate the responsibility of fi ghting insecu-
rity and said that every day ‘at six in the morning’ he will hold meetings 
with the Secretaries of Defence, the Navy and with the attorney general. As 
a president, he said, ‘I’m going to take command. Th is is established by the 
constitution, so nobody should be afraid of the reform that was recently 
introduced.’ He added that ‘without the Army or the Navy, we cannot face 
the problem of insecurity’ (El Financero 2017). Lopez Obrador’s discourse 
does not diff er substantially from Felipe Calderón’s (and later Peña Nie-
to’s) justifi cation of the ‘war on drugs’ and the employment of the army in 
internal security tasks – based on the ineffi  ciency of the police forces, who 
‘are not prepared to do what soldiers and marines do’, and on the excep-
tionality (and reversibility) of the situation. Th is approach marks a conti-
nuity rather than a rupture with the previous administrations. It somehow 
confi rms the historicity and therefore the necessity of the processes we are 
analysing.
Raúl Ramírez Baena, executive director of the Citizen Commission for 
Human Rights of the Northwest, stressed that the attitude of the newly 
elected president ‘is touching extremely sensitive fi bres, especially for vic-
tims of human rights violations committed by the Army and the Navy’. Th e 
activist recalled that more than 99 per cent of the atrocities committed by 
military elements in the framework of the ‘war on drugs’ were left  in impu-
nity. Th erefore it is urgent to have a plan for the gradual withdrawal of the 
military to their bases. Otherwise, ‘the panorama of abuses and violations 
could continue or even worsen’ (La Jornada 2018).
Corporatization is a historical process that in the fi eld of the state leaves 
little room for alternatives. Th e contradictions produced by this process tend 
to exacerbate both in contexts where neoliberalism is left  free to unleash its 
forces without limitations – as for example in Mexico, where warfare shapes 
economic and social relations – and in countries where critical governments 
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have been trying to implement palliative policies to moderate the eff ects of 
neoliberalism.
Moreover, the action of freeing the forces of capital from the restrictions 
of the nation state involves diff erent practices and strategies depending on 
the contexts in which it is carried out. Nevertheless, these trajectories are 
not linear or even free from internal frictions. In Mexico, for example, mili-
tarization and widespread violence are facilitating (as I highlighted) counter-
insurgency and processes of corporate appropriation of public or communal 
territories and resources. However, structural violence is at the same time 
aff ecting and discouraging national and international investors in other key 
economic sectors (like tourism). International businesspersons consulted 
by the World Economic Forum place Mexico among the seven countries 
that generate the most costs to investors to face crime and violence. Th e eco-
nomic impact of violence in Mexico in 2017 amounted to 4.72 billion pesos 
(249,000 million dollars), equivalent to 21 per cent of the country’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP). Problems related to public insecurity have remained 
one of the two most recurrent obstacles to growth and expansion.6 Looking 
at the current process of ‘pacifi cation’ of Colombia, the feeling is that chaotic 
violence and warfare can represent a phase of rupture and a prelude to a 
subsequent phase of normalization of social relations, under new corporate 
logics, and a necessary stabilization of markets and business relations.
For now, in this chapter, starting from the concept of state corporatiza-
tion, I have limited myself to analysing some of the key trends in Mexico. In 
particular, I highlighted how in the current phase, corporatization tightly 
relates to the practice of warfare, which I present as a key feature of current 
trends in the evolution of statehood. Th e prominence of warfare is particu-
larly evident in a country like Mexico, where over the last decade an unprec-
edented acceleration in the process of decomposition of the nation state’s 
institutionality and society has taken place. Today, the nexus of power is be-
ing shaped by fl uid and mutating assemblages of conventional state agencies, 
organized crime, and private enterprises and corporations crystallizing in 
war machines operating on the national territory. I argued that corporati-
zation is producing a historical disjunction between state and nation. Not 
only does corporate power not operate in the interest of the national popula-
tion, but its logic and orientation is transnational. Th e current logic of dom-
ination aims at subjugating parts of the population to a condition of servile 
and forced labour. Massive migration processes from countries or regions 
aff ected by wars and crises are functional to the formation of a disenfran-
chised, fragmented, vulnerable and fully exploitable labour force. To sup-
port my arguments, I took into consideration the recently approved Internal 
Security Law, which epitomizes ongoing tendencies and provides the Presi-
dent of the Republic and the Federal Army with unprecedented legal power 
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and freedom to decide on internal military intervention. Th is Law, I argue, 
legalizes and validates processes of internal and dispersed militarization that 
shaped Mexican society over the last decade.
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NOTES
 1. See, for example, my analysis of such processes in the state of Guerrero (Zagato 
2018).
 2. See, for example, the case of Ayotzinapa.
 3. Th e year 2017 was the most violent year in Mexico’s recent history, with at least 
25,339 homicides, the highest rate since an offi  cial registration began in 1997 
https://expansion.mx/economia/2018/04/10/la-violencia-le-costo-33-000-pesos-
a-cada-mexicano-en-2017.
 4. Mexican Commission of Defense and Promotion of Human Rights.
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POLITICAL PARTIES, BIG BUSINESS, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
THE ‘VOICE OF THE PEOPLE’
Views from Above and Below on the Crisis 
Created by the 2016 Coup in Brazil
John Gledhill and Maria Gabriela Hita
In 2016, the Brazilian congress voted to impeach the country’s fi rst female 
president, Dilma Rousseff  of the Workers’ Party (PT). Th e removal of the 
PT from power through a ‘constitutional’ coup d’état might seem puzzling. 
Having abandoned socialism for neoliberalized social democracy and class 
conciliation, the PT had become the ‘acceptable face’ of the Latin Ameri-
can Pink Tide in Washington and provided generous subsidies to Brazilian 
capitalists. In this chapter, we will examine specifi cally Brazilian dimensions 
of the fall of the PT and the political polarization that has resulted from the 
coup. Yet Brazilian experience also mirrors broader global trends.
Th e relative harmony that briefl y existed in the twentieth century be-
tween capitalism and inclusive democracy in the North Atlantic world is 
being replaced everywhere by increasingly authoritarian combinations of fi -
nancialized corporate capitalism and neoliberal modes of governing society. 
Elites are uncompromising in the sacrifi ces that they demand from working 
people in order to satisfy the ‘economic imperatives’ of a capitalist accumu-
lation process that produces ever greater wealth inequalities and diminish-
ing prospects for intergenerational social mobility . Yet even the poor and 
destitute are conscripted into participating in contemporary market society 
(Kapferer and Gold 2018: 43). Th e techniques developed to defend this new 
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order erode social bonds and solidarity and promote individualistic transfor-
mations of personhood and identity that serve a capitalist logic (Dardot and 
Laval 2014: 325). Yet they were embraced by centre-left  social democratic 
parties throughout the world.
Th e failure of these parties to provide satisfying responses to the social 
consequences of labour market restructuring and deindustrialization has 
created a generalized crisis of liberal representative democracy. But dem-
ocratic life has also been undermined from above, by elites and corporate 
think tanks arguing that eff ective capitalist management of the economy 
becomes impossible within inclusive democracies that give serious repre-
sentation to the interests of the working masses and subaltern groups such 
as indigenous people.
As Wolfgang Streeck (2016) argues, authoritarian neoliberalism seems 
incapable of preventing the global capitalist system from succumbing to its 
contradictions, but the consequences are likely to be messy, since contem-
porary movements of the Left  have found it diffi  cult to defi ne a coherent 
radical alternative and been pushed onto the political defensive. Latin Amer-
ica manifests many forms of grass-roots resistance to capitalist ‘accumula-
tion by dispossession’ (Harvey 2007) in both rural and urban areas. Yet the 
lesson from Brazil is that even if political ‘turns to the left ’ do not necessarily 
empower such resistance, ‘turns to the right’ prove very much worse. Aft er 
2016, Brazilian democracy fell into a deep crisis that was infl ected by con-
ditions rooted in the country’s particular history, but there is a more than 
a passing similarity between the Brazilian crisis and the crisis of liberal de-
mocracy in Euro-Atlantic states, as diagnosed by Wendy Brown (2009) and 
other authors already mentioned.
A Long Cycle of Coups and the Fall of the PT
In many ways, Rousseff ’s ouster is another episode in a long historical cy-
cle of interruptions of democracy engineered by an oligarchy determined to 
defend its preferred economic model and privileges of wealth and racially 
encoded status. Th e 1964 coup against João Goulart was followed by two 
decades of military dictatorship, whereas the 2016 coup was engineered 
through ‘lawfare’ against the PT and the judicialization of politics (Coma-
roff  and Comaroff  2007). In 2016, there was no immediate threat of military 
intervention, although the military did subsequently re-emerge as a polit-
ical actor in a lower profi le manner. Nevertheless, the role of the congress 
and right-wing media in undermining a democratically elected president 
closely replicated events leading up to the 1964 coup and also the moves to 
unseat Goulart’s mentor, populist president Getúlio Vargas, in 1954. Vargas 
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responded to the incipient coup by committing suicide, leaving a ‘testament 
letter to the Brazilian people’ that ensured his passage from life to myth and 
bought Brazil another decade of civilian rule before Goulart’s plans to em-
bark on the radical reforms in the countryside that Vargas had avoided pro-
voked another round of elite rebellion.
Brazilian society today is very diff erent from that of the days of Vargas 
and Goulart, but the ghosts of populism past still haunt the present. One 
of the main objectives of the 2016 coup was to end the guarantees provided 
to labour by Vargas’s 1943 Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), which big 
business decried as an anachronism limiting Brazilian competitiveness in 
the global economy. New legislation allowed unrestricted subcontracting 
and outsourcing, even of teachers in public schools. Th e permitted length 
of the working day and number of working days allowed without rest days 
was increased. Th e aim was to replace workers enjoying state benefi ts and 
protection with cheaper, more precariously employed substitutes, reducing 
their costs further by relaxing health and safety regulations. Extreme even 
in terms of the ‘new normal’ of precarianization that now exists through-
out the capitalist world economy, it is tempting to see Brazil’s ‘labour re-
form’ as a refl ection of employer attitudes towards labour rooted in a slave 
mode of production not legally abolished until 1888. In the case of rural 
workers, the powerful agribusiness lobby in congress secured particularly 
regressive changes in employment conditions under a post-coup regime that 
relaxed vigilance of modern slavery as well as environmental conservation 
safeguards.
Th e Vargas era is also a point of reference in criticisms of the post-coup 
regime’s reckless abandonment of national resource sovereignty and its will-
ingness to sell off  national assets to foreign capital at knock-down prices. 
On both labour rights and the virtues of economic nationalism, PT govern-
ments identifi ed themselves with the tradition of Vargas and his followers in 
contrasting their policies with those of the neoliberal administrations that 
preceded them between 1995 and 2002 under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
whose Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) remained the PT’s main 
rival in subsequent contests for the presidency. Th e coup’s new rules on out-
sourcing were based on draft  legislation from the Cardoso era that the in-
coming PT administration persuaded congress to put on ice.
Dilma Rousseff  was the chosen successor of the fi rst PT president to be 
elected, Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. Th ese two fi gures could hardly be more 
diff erent in terms of social profi le. Lula was born in north-east Brazil into a 
poor family, whose members joined the stream of migrants heading south to 
seek a livelihood in the industrial hub of São Paulo when the future president 
was seven years old. Lula began his working life as a child, selling on the 
street to support a mother abandoned by her husband. His only formal edu-
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cational qualifi cation is his certifi cate as a lathe operator. He became a lead-
ing fi gure in the militant independent trade union movement that emerged 
in the ABC industrial region of São Paulo under military rule, which formed 
the ‘popular’ base of the new Worker’s Party of which he was a founding 
member.
Dilma Rousseff  was the university-educated daughter of a prosperous im-
migrant businessman from Bulgaria. She joined the urban guerrilla move-
ment against the military dictatorship as a student and was captured and 
tortured. Her career prior to assuming the presidency had followed a tech-
nocratic path, and she never displayed much relish for the kind of political 
deal-making at which Lula proved exceptionally adept. Dilma won public 
respect for taking a tough stand on corruption and facilitating rather than 
impeding the work of federal police and public prosecutors in investigating 
it, even when it was disadvantageous to her own party. But many PT sup-
porters came to criticize what they saw as her defi cit of political skills.
Lula gained offi  ce, on his fourth attempt, in 2002, in a run-off  against the 
PSDB’s José Serra in which he secured almost 53 million votes. Although 
Lula gained more votes from organized labour than his opponent, his vic-
tory was based on socially liberal middle-class voters opting for the PT, since 
he failed to secure a majority amongst the working poor of the urban slums 
(called favelas in Rio de Janeiro), and the rural poor in the north-east (Singer 
2009). Th is pattern changed when Lula was re-elected for a second term in 
2006 by over 58 million electors, securing a landslide win of over 60 per cent 
of the vote in the second round against the PSDB’s Geraldo Alckmin. By this 
stage, increased economic growth resulting from the global commodities 
boom had enabled the Lula government to stabilize prices, increase min-
imum wages, create many new formal sector jobs and introduce schemes 
that gave poorer citizens credit to improve consumption standards. Singer 
argues that this was more important than the Bolsa Familia conditional cash 
transfer programme in enabling Lula to win huge majorities amongst the 
poor in the north-east in 2006 because poor working families had become 
convinced that a PT government could redistribute resources to them with-
out wrecking the economy.
Lula now became ‘popular’ for the same reasons that Vargas became 
‘popular’, as head of a government that delivered improvements to the lives 
of the very poor and social mobility to working- and lower middle-class 
families that enjoyed higher incomes. Yet Lula’s humble origins gave him an 
even stronger appeal to lower-class Brazilians than Vargas, a member of the 
landowning classes. Elite Brazilians, including former president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, proved unable to disguise their class prejudices against 
a fi gure they deemed unfi t to occupy the highest offi  ce of state. Yet even if 
the economic boom that fuelled Lula’s rising popularity was built on fragile 
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foundations, this ‘uneducated’ president became a respected international 
statesman who raised his country’s profi le on the world stage. Th e coup re-
gime rapidly squandered this asset as well as the reduction of income in-
equality secured by the PT governments.
However, as Lula himself came to recognize aft er the coup, PT govern-
ments did not transform the durable class divide reproduced by intergener-
ational transmission of wealth and cultural capital, despite affi  rmative action 
policies in higher education designed to counter disadvantages linked to 
race as well as family income. Aft er his second defeat by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, Lula had insisted that the PT abandon its earlier commitments to 
socialism, provoking a split that led to the founding of the Socialism and 
Liberty Party (PSOL). He continued to emphasize his personal affi  nity with 
‘the people’ (o povo) and promised to create a more egalitarian society from 
which hunger, poverty and illiteracy would be banished forever. Yet in the 
2002 presidential campaign, Lula sought to reassure ‘the markets’ and estab-
lished economic oligarchy by promising to preserve the neoliberal ‘sound 
economic management’ of Cardoso. As president, he put international in-
vestment banker Henrique Meirelles in charge of the Central Bank. Meire-
lles later became fi nance minister in the government imposed by the coup, 
pushing through a fi scal austerity package that froze public spending for 
twenty years, a move with drastic implications for public education and an 
already overstretched universal public health system. Meirelles also pushed 
for an equally socially regressive ‘reform’ of the state pension system, al-
though that measure’s unpopularity with voters forced the regime to put it 
on hold until aft er the October 2018 elections.
Critics inside his own movement accused Lula of turning PT politics into 
a neopopulist ‘Lulism’ based on his personal charisma and Faustian bargains 
with the established political class and Brazilian capitalism, which would 
eventually prove the party’s undoing. Although they were not exactly wrong 
about the long-term outcome, this diagnosis was superfi cial, since it failed to 
address more fundamental contradictions that emerged within the PT as a 
whole from the moment that the party started winning municipal elections. 
But before turning to that, we will explore the mechanics of the coup pro-
cess, since that reveals why PT rule was vulnerable to threats arising from 
the unreformed deep structures of social and political power.
Corruption, Lawfare and the Judicialization of Brazilian Politics
Dilma Rousseff  was elected in 2010 with over 56 per cent of the vote, eas-
ily defeating the PSDB candidate in the second round, who was once again 
José Serra. Yet with clouds of recession gathering as the commodity boom 
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ended, her majority was reduced to 51.4 per cent of the vote in a tightly 
fought re-election campaign in 2014 against the PSDB’s Aécio Neves. Many 
of the more than 54 million voters who continued to prefer the PT were 
disappointed when the new Rousseff  administration partly capitulated to 
the demands for fi scal austerity that had been made by her rival during the 
election campaign. As the coup process unfolded, a deepening association 
of the PT with corruption further eroded grass-roots support for the party 
amongst poorer citizens who had previously voted for it.
Th e PT’s claims to be diff erent from other political parties had been bat-
tered during the fi rst Lula administration as a result of a scandal over ‘little 
monthly payments’ paid to deputies in congress to buy their support for gov-
ernment legislation, the mensalão. Th e fi rst Lula administration allocated 
ministries to minor parties with which the PT had some ideological affi  n-
ity, leaving it little alternative but to off er such material inducements to less 
comfortable bedfellows. Yet disillusion over the mensalão was concentrated 
amongst the middle class voters in the south of Brazil, who had backed the 
PT in 2002, a loss more than compensated for by increased support from the 
poor in the north-east. However, as Rousseff  took offi  ce for the second time, 
an even more devastating corruption scandal was emerging as a result of the 
Operation Carwash (Lava Jato) investigation being carried out under the di-
rection of Federal Judge Sergio Moro in Curitiba. Th is centred on bribes paid 
to politicians by major construction and engineering companies in return 
for favours delivered in securing contracts with the national oil company 
Petrobras and other government entities. Most prominent amongst these 
companies was Odebrecht, founded and headquartered in Salvador, Bahia.
Odebrecht became a transnational company, and foreign politicians, in-
cluding several presidents of Peru, have been charged with receiving illicit 
payments from its highly organized slush fund. It was clear to impartial ob-
servers that corruption at Petrobras had existed before the era of PT rule 
and that networks of corruption involved all the leading political parties. Yet 
Judge Moro’s team focused their attention on the PT and its allies and sys-
tematically diverted attention from accusations that were made at an early 
stage against politicians from other parties. It rapidly became clear that their 
priority target was former president Lula himself. In 2017, Lula was found 
guilty by Moro of receiving bribes from another Bahian company, OAS, 
in the form of an apartment, despite the fact that he had never owned or 
lived in it. Th e principal evidence in the case came from the plea bargain 
testimony of OAS chief executive Leo Pinheiro, who had initially exonerated 
Lula but was subsequently persuaded to change his story.
Moro claimed inspiration from the Italian anticorruption investigation 
Mani Pulite (‘Clean Hands’), arguing that since corrupt fi gures enjoying po-
litical power tend to be particularly adept at covering their tracks, it was nec-
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essary to use plea bargains to induce partners in crime to denounce them, 
and legitimate to fi lter information to the media before the investigation was 
completed to increase the pressure. Th ere is no prima facie case for regard-
ing Mani Pulite as an unqualifi ed success. It did destroy the traditional party 
system but simply ensured that more sophisticated methods of corruption 
would be used in future, opening the way to nine years of scandal-ridden 
government by Silvio Berlusconi (Vannucci 2009). Berlusconi was eventu-
ally convicted for tax fraud, although this did not end his political career; he 
was elected a member of the European Parliament in 2019. Yet what hap-
pened in Brazil revealed additional fl aws in a justice system in which judges 
and members of the elite associate with the parties opposed to the PT, en-
joying close ties of kinship and friendship, and are united by shared class 
prejudices.
As international human rights lawyer Geoff rey Robertson pointed out, 
the judicial process conducted by Judge Moro did not conform to European 
standards. Moro acted as both investigating judge, organizing the prosecu-
tion, and trial judge, reaching a verdict on the evidence and passing sentence. 
Th e three appeal court judges in Porto Alegre who unanimously confi rmed 
Moro’s conviction of Lula for corruption and money laundering in January 
2018, increasing his sentence from nine and a half years to twelve years and 
one month, allowed the defence team to make a case but ignored it in pro-
ceeding to read out their already prepared and coordinated judgements.
Lava Jato investigators selectively fi ltered accusations against the PT to 
a mainstream press disposed to report them as if they were already proven 
matters of fact, prompting Lula’s defence team to argue that their client 
was a victim of ‘lawfare’ based on the media spectacularization of charges 
without presentation of evidence. Th e nadir of this process was a press con-
ference given by Lava Jato lead prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol, who used a 
PowerPoint graphic to illustrate how the PT had installed a regime of ‘crim-
inal governance’ centred on ex-President Lula as ‘supreme commander’ of 
a ‘bribe duct’ from Petrobras but off ered no proof of his accusations. Th e 
presentation also blurred the distinction that might be made between per-
sonal corruption and corruption linked to securing illegal campaign funds, 
routine in all major political parties.
Dilma Rousseff  was not impeached by the congress for corruption but for 
manipulating the public accounts to make the economic outlook seem bet-
ter than it was prior to the election. Such pedaladas fi scais, moving money 
from one category of public spending to another, had not attracted criticism 
from congress when employed by previous administrations, including those 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In the event, Rousseff ’s alleged ‘crime of 
responsibility’ played a relatively insignifi cant role in the impeachment de-
bate. Deputies in the lower house voting for the impeachment preferred to 
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invoke God, the family, morality and decency, whilst more sober elements 
in the Senate laid the blame for economic downturn on the president’s mis-
management of the economy. Rousseff ’s ouster was a political lynching.
Th e fact that the PT administrations had strengthened anticorruption 
investigations by guaranteeing the Federal Police and Public Prosecutor’s 
Offi  ce freedom from political interference worked to the party’s disadvan-
tage initially because the system was biased, but the damage did spread to 
the entire established political class in the longer term. Th e impeachment 
process was launched in the lower house by its leader, Eduardo Cunha of 
the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). Lula had de-
cided to make the PMDB, the largest party in congress, the PT’s main coa-
lition partner in national government aft er his 2006 election victory, hoping 
to avoid the governability problems that had produced the mensalão. Th e 
PMDB had emerged from the dictatorship with some moral authority but 
was subsequently converted into an electoral machine lacking a consistent 
ideological orientation. Dedicated to securing the spoils of offi  ce, partic-
ularly at state government level, the PMDB’s lack of competitiveness in 
presidential elections made doing the same at federal level through coali-
tion an attractive strategy. Rousseff ’s PMDB vice president, Michel Temer, 
automatically became unelected president of the country as a result of the 
impeachment.
Rousseff  refused to block investigation of the sources of the large sums 
of money that Eduardo Cunha had salted away in off shore accounts, which 
gave him a personal motivation to seek revenge. Once he had fulfi lled his 
role in the coup, Cunha was found guilty of corruption and gaoled, but Mi-
chel Temer was subsequently accused of buying his silence on the sins of 
other leading fi gures of the PMDB, including himself. A growing number 
of members of the House and Senate from the main parties supporting the 
coup, the PMDB, PSDB and right-wing Democrats (DEM), became subject 
to corruption investigations as a result of plea bargains off ered to Odebrecht 
executives. Another federal police investigation into corruption in the meat 
packing and export industry led to the head of the JBS company, Joseley 
Batista, seeking a plea bargain. Always assiduous in tape recording his confi -
dential dealings with politicians, Batista discredited both the defeated PSDB 
candidate in the 2014 elections, Senator Aécio Neves, and substitute presi-
dent Temer.
Although the Federal Police had found it impossible to ‘follow the money’ 
from Petrobras to Lula, in the cases of Neves and Temer they managed to 
fi lm large sums of cash being carried in bags by associates of the politicians. 
Observing that ‘the bag says it all’, the Federal Attorney General launched 
two indictments against Temer, but congress voted to prevent investigations 
proceeding further. Deputies justifi ed their votes as necessary for mainte-
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nance of ‘economic stability’ (read as protecting the coup agenda). Temer 
purchased his impunity by authorizing big new public spending plans to 
enhance the political capital of the representatives who voted for it, hardly 
consistent with the claimed need for draconian fi scal austerity.
Neves was suspended from the Senate, but a supreme court judge ruled 
that he should resume his seat, on the grounds that the electors of Minas 
Gerais who had voted for him would otherwise be unrepresented. Th is 
might seem an odd decision, given that the removal of Dilma Rousseff  left  
54 million voters unrepresented, but it was symptomatic of bias at the high-
est level of the judiciary that called the reality of a separation of powers into 
question. Th ere are many other examples. As she fought to defend her gov-
ernment, Dilma had tried to appoint Lula her chief of staff , only to have the 
move blocked by Gilmar Mendes, a Supreme Court judge notorious for his 
PSDB sympathies, aft er an illegally wire-tapped telephone conversation be-
tween the petistas was made public by Moro. Yet the Supreme Court had 
no problems when Temer chose Wellington Moreira Franco to head the 
General Secretariat of the Presidency, rejecting a petition by the PSOL that 
he be debarred on the same grounds as Lula, since accusations of corrup-
tion made against him by Odebrecht executives would no longer fall under 
Moro’s jurisdiction once Moreira Franco became a minister but enter the 
notoriously drawn out process of judgement by the Supreme Court. Th is 
exemplifi es another diff erence between Lula’s treatment and that of politi-
cians aligned with the coup. Cases against Lula were pursued with unusual 
celerity, whereas the latter could be confi dent that their day of judgement 
would not come any time soon, should it ever come at all.1
Yet the PMDB and PSDB could not stop the public exposure of the cor-
ruption in their ranks. One of the most damaging cases was the fall of Bahian 
PMDB strong man Geddel Vieira Lima. Forced to resign from Temer’s cab-
inet for attempting to bully a fellow minister into committing an improper 
administrative act to benefi t his personal real estate investments, Geddel was 
later arrested, in September 2017, aft er Federal Police found 51 million reais 
in cash stashed in suitcases and boxes in an apartment that he owned in Sal-
vador. As the corruption scandals generalized, and the economic situation 
failed to improve for most Brazilians, citizens became increasingly conscious 
that an unelected government was writing off  the debts of big companies 
and agribusiness to the tax and social security systems while introducing leg-
islation to make working people pay for the crisis through lower earnings, 
precarianization of employment and loss of public services. In December 
2016, the PT suff ered heavy losses in municipal elections, but as 2017 ad-
vanced, Lula declared his candidacy for re-election as president, secure in 
the knowledge that he was leading the polls with support from voters across 
the class and age spectrum.
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Even aft er the appeal court ratifi ed his conviction by Moro, opinion polls 
continued to show Lula trouncing all other likely candidates for president in 
the October elections. Yet his candidacy was threatened from the start by an-
other anticorruption move that Lula had himself sponsored when in power, 
the ‘Clean Slate Law’ (Lei da Ficha Limpa). Whether that could be invoked 
before the nation went to the polls depended on further rulings by superior 
courts. Th e judicialization of politics, and the politicization of judges and 
police, had become a major problem for Brazilian democracy in the coup’s 
ever-expanding state of exception. Furthermore, the continuing centrality 
of the fi gure of Lula in Brazilian political life did not necessarily imply that 
his party or the Brazilian Left  in general were guaranteed a resurgence. To 
see why, we need to explore deeper structural perspectives on the contra-
dictions of PT rule.
Critical Refl ections on the PT in Power 
and the Broader Dilemmas Facing the Left
Media demonization of Lula did damage his personal reputation, and it be-
came commonplace to hear people in poor communities complaining that 
‘Lula is a thief, like all the rest’. Yet the damage suff ered by his party was 
even greater. In the 2016 municipal elections, the PT mayor of São Paulo, 
Fernando Haddad, considered one of the brightest lights in the younger gen-
eration of leaders, lost his campaign for re-election by a catastrophic margin 
to João Doria, a wealthy and fl amboyant media baron who presented him-
self as an ‘administrator’ rather than a professional politician, even though 
he was the offi  cial PSDB candidate, supported by state governor Geraldo 
Alckmin. In Rio de Janeiro, the new mayor was Marcelo Crivella, nephew 
of Edir Macedo, founder of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, of 
which Crivella had been a bishop. Th is neo-Pentecostal church has extended 
its reach far beyond Brazil and has considerable economic and social power 
within the country, owning one of the three biggest television networks. 
In the second round, Crivella defeated Marcelo Freixo, a candidate of the 
PSOL famous for campaigning against the politically connected paramili-
tary groups called milicias. Th e milicias drove drug traffi  cking gangs out of 
many favelas, only to terrorize and extort their residents. Crivella won in 
the favelas, and not simply because the milicianos told people not to vote for 
Freixo. Freixo’s vote, like Lula’s in 2002, principally came from the ‘progres-
sive’ middle classes.
Th e PT itself was weak in Rio favelas because the federal governments of 
Lula and Dilma had backed the city and state governments in implementing 
policies that had had deeply negative impacts on the lives of many favela 
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residents. Deindustrialized Rio strove to reinvent itself by hosting sporting 
mega events and redeveloping its central zones to make them more attrac-
tive to foreign tourists and higher income residents. Depicted as sites of 
criminality and violence, the favelas were ‘securitized’ as a menace to other 
users of urban space. Since some of the space that the favelas occupied was in 
prime locations appropriate for redevelopment and gentrifi cation, the new 
security models developed to police them also served to support the forced 
relocation of some residents, a process that combined ‘social cleansing’ of 
the poorest with opportunities for real estate developers to profi t from ‘ac-
cumulation by dispossession’ (Freeman and Burgos 2017).
Beginning with the 2006 Federations Cup football tournament, PT gov-
ernments sent troops to reinforce state government-controlled police in 
‘guaranteeing the security of visitors’, placing some favelas under a virtual 
state of siege. Equally signifi cant was the continuing development of a policy 
of mass incarceration under the PT. Whereas Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
became an advocate of drug decriminalization aft er leaving offi  ce, under 
Lula and Dilma Brazil’s gaols became ever more overcrowded because poor 
black men and women found in possession of drugs continued to be rou-
tinely convicted of traffi  cking by a class and racially biased judiciary, if they 
were not simply left  sitting in a cell waiting for their case to be heard. Th e 
prison system has not simply become an incubator of crime but the principal 
basis for the national expansion of organized criminal networks born within 
its inhuman conditions, provoking violent confl icts between them for con-
trol of both gaols themselves and the poor communities outside them that 
are dominated by criminal factions.
All this lies at the heart of a national public security crisis that has contin-
ued to deepen since the coup (Gledhill 2018). Th e PT federal government 
backed the PMDB-controlled state government’s strategy of implanting 
Pacifi catory Police Units (UPPs) in Rio’s favelas, which PT state governors 
copied in Bahia. Any prospect of securing the consent and collaboration of 
favela residents had faded by the time Rio hosted the Olympic Games. Th e 
social programmes that should have complemented the new policing model 
failed to materialize, and the governor on whose watch they were initiated 
was subsequently gaoled for corruption. Th e bankrupt state over which his 
successor presided could do nothing about escalating violence between traf-
fi ckers and police or increasing police corruption. Th is gave Temer a pretext 
for taking security out of the hands of the state authorities and handing over 
control of the police and prisons to the military, despite the fact that past 
use of the military had proved ineff ective in suppressing crime but increased 
complaints from favela residents that their human rights were being vio-
lated. Th is unprecedented ‘intervention’ in what had been a responsibility of 
democratic civilian government since the dictatorship ended provided the 
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immediate political bonus of making it impossible for congress to vote on 
the unpopular pension reform because no constitutional changes could be 
voted through while it was in force. Yet it was preceded by a measure that 
reassigned the trials of soldiers accused of human rights violations from ci-
vilian juries to military courts, raising further worries about where this new 
process of militarization might end, especially in relation to repression of 
protests.
Th e ‘Olympic legacy’ in Rio de Janeiro thus proved negative for the PT, 
which had also been complicit in promoting social exclusionary patterns of 
neoliberal urbanism in other regions of the country. A more structural per-
spective on the PT’s record shows that the explanation for this goes far be-
yond any ‘Faustian bargain’ with capital made by Lula to further his personal 
ambitions.
Th e PT, founded in 1980, was the political fruit of a convergence between 
the trade union movement of São Paulo’s ABC region, whose strikes during 
the dictatorship were led by Lula, and left -wing intellectuals, artists and pro-
fessionals. Th is new unionism, the base of the CUT (Single Workers’ Cen-
tral), still a bastion of petismo, emerged beyond the state’s systems of control, 
co-optation and clientelism. Th e PT also enjoyed the support of other types 
of grass-roots movements, promising to promote broad and inclusive ‘pop-
ular participation’ in decisions about public spending and urban develop-
ment. From the standpoint of the 1980s’ new social movement theory, with 
its exaggerated emphasis on the autonomy and internal democracy of the 
new movements, the novelty of the PT lay in its off er to make them partners 
in socially inclusive, participatory, democratic governance. Nevertheless, 
as Willem Assies (1999) pointed out, this perspective obscured the role of 
other types of actors in the PT’s development, notably sectors of the Catho-
lic Church and segments of the middle class that had been temporarily rad-
icalized by the suspension of their democratic rights under the dictatorship.
Many middle-class activists became disillusioned with the popular move-
ments when the restoration of civilian government brought a return to ‘tradi-
tional’ clientelistic relations that undermined their autonomy. Furthermore, 
when professionals such as lawyers, architects, urbanists and social workers 
went back to working on the interface between the state and civil society, 
they began to think more in terms of ‘concrete results’ than mobilization, 
and their own class interests (and prejudices) began to play a stronger role in 
shaping their behaviour. Once the professionals started working within the 
framework of the neoliberal government of social problems that continued 
under the PT, middle-class professionals lost interest in listening to their for-
mer allies in militancy, as members of the lower classes were converted into 
‘target groups’ and individual ‘clients’ of the social programmes that they 
designed as ‘experts’ (Assies 1999: 223). At the same time, many once radi-
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cal activists became distanced from the masses in whose name they claimed 
to speak as spaces opened up for them within the state apparatus (Lehmann 
2018).
Although Lula’s decision to move the PT from socialism to social de-
mocracy provoked ideological splits, not all the internal confl icts within the 
party had an ideological character. From the moment in which the PT be-
gan to win municipal elections, the party entered into the ‘normal’ logic of 
Brazilian political life. Th e motives behind many disputes were local, with 
questions about personalities, and alliances between diff erent interests, 
organizations and movements. Th e conquest of power opened up new op-
portunities to accommodate PT militants and representatives of allied civil 
society organizations in government. Th is was essential to secure control 
of the government apparatus, but it also created opportunities to cultivate 
clientelistic relations. Th e transformation of the role of middle-class pro-
fessionals provoked by the embrace of neoliberal techniques of governance 
also impacted on the forms of citizen ‘participation’ that PT administrations 
delivered in practice. As Albert (2016) demonstrates in an ethnographic 
study of the participatory institutions of the petista municipalities of the 
ABC region, in some contexts representatives of independent social move-
ments and NGOs did enjoy a degree of protagonism in participatory assem-
blies and public consultations by virtue of playing a role in the direction of 
these meetings. Yet in the most important meetings, the representatives of 
popular organizations were obliged to sit in the seats for the general public 
and content themselves with directing questions to a technical team of pub-
lic functionaries, who controlled the proceedings about policies that were, 
in fact, being made in advance at another level and according to criteria that 
mixed a concept of ‘social interest’ formulated from above with consider-
ations of a more narrowly political kind.
Th e greater inclusion of social movements within government enmeshed 
these actors in the pragmatic logics of the political fi eld, in particular the 
logic of winning elections, which inevitably included the less transparent 
side of the acquisition of campaign funding and negotiation of contracts. 
Th e eff ects of institutionalization went far beyond Lula’s alleged ‘person-
alism’. Oliveira (2006: 10–11) observed that leaders of the ‘autonomous’ 
trade union movement became workers’ representatives on the boards of 
the private pension funds, which played a major role in Brazilian fi nance 
long before 2002. During the deindustrializing years of the Cardoso admin-
istration, they became complicit in decisions on redundancies and plant clo-
sures, which had eroded the party’s base in the organized working class by 
the time it fi nally achieved national power. Furthermore, as Caldeira and 
Holston (2015) observe, the greater ‘participation’ of ‘civil society’ in gov-
ernment decisions proved a double-edged sword in the case of ‘democratic’ 
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consultations about urban planning. Within an egalitarian frame in which 
every voice counted equally, representatives of property developers and the 
middle classes had an equal right to express their point of view. Even in the 
absence of political infl uence and bribery, a logic of treating actors diff er-
entiated by economic and social power as equals fails to guarantee that the 
interests of lower-class citizens will be privileged.
In addition to its eff orts to improve the incomes of poor Brazilians, in-
crease formal employment with entitlement to social security benefi ts, and 
restore expectations of social mobility extinguished under PSDB rule, the 
PT sought to reverse deindustrialization and promote future economic 
growth through infrastructure modernization. Key instruments of an eco-
nomic policy whose economic nationalist orientation contrasted with that 
of the administration that preceded it, and was totally abandoned aft er the 
coup, were the National Development Bank (BNDES) and subsidies off ered 
to the private sector from the public purse. Yet even industrialists in Brazil 
preferred the rentier profi ts provided by some of the highest interest rates in 
the world to new investment and technological innovation (Oliveira 2006: 
14), fi nally opting to back a coup to drive down wages by precarianizing 
employment. Th e profound fi nancialization of Brazilian capitalism is one 
of the country’s most serious problems. Although the pensions enjoyed by 
some privileged categories of benefi ciaries, notably judges and politicians, 
might seem excessive, Brazil’s fi scal crisis was not the consequence of a state 
pension system that was overly generous to the majority of employees. Its 
principal cause was the enormous cost of servicing the public debt that re-
sulted from the high interest rates underpinning extraordinary bank profi ts, 
a deeply regressive personal tax system and the unpaid taxes of the corporate 
sector, mostly written off  since the coup.
PT governments strongly supported internationalization of some of the 
country’s most important corporations. Th ese included Odebrecht and JBS, 
two companies that exemplify the links forged between the logics of fi nan-
cialization, rentier profi ts and corruption. Th e economic performance of 
PT-led governments proved fatally dependent on agro-exports and mining, 
but this dependence also made it diffi  cult for the PT to support the radical 
Movement of Landless Workers (MST), just as its support for neoliberal ur-
ban development made it impossible to support the Movement of Home-
less Workers (MTST). Although both these social movements opposed the 
coup, since its implications for them were clearly far worse than continu-
ing PT rule, resentment over past neglect remained profound. Th e PT also 
failed to win much applause from indigenous people and environmentalists 
for its strong backing for the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project. What 
was at the time the worst environmental disaster caused by mining in Brazil-
ian history occurred during the Rousseff  presidency.
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Yet beyond the PT’s more obvious ‘pacts with capital’ lay a deeper em-
brace of the logic of neoliberal market society, with profound repercussions. 
With the laudable intention of improving their living standards, the PT 
promoted the extension of credit to the poorer sectors of Brazilian society. 
A sense of being able to participate in consumer society added to the ‘feel 
good’ eff ect of PT rule, but the economic downturn rapidly produced cri-
ses of personal debt. It also promoted the neoliberal cultural transformation 
towards construction of the self through consumption. Th is kind of individ-
ualization had negative consequences for maintaining solidarity within com-
munities and social movements. In this, PT governments were acquiescing 
in processes of social change being promoted by other forces, including ever-
expanding evangelical churches preaching prosperity theology and self-
help, which was also part of the package promoted by neoconservative US 
foundations. Th ese foundations proved active in fostering the ‘turn to the 
right’ throughout Latin America through organizations such as the libertar-
ian Atlas Network.
Membership of a neo-Pentecostal church may come to substitute faith in 
the ability of politicians and the state to off er individuals a better future. Yet 
as Crivella’s victory in Rio de Janeiro demonstrated, evangelicals could com-
pete successfully with left  parties for the votes of the working poor within 
the political fi eld itself. Furthermore, although it helped Lula regain ground, 
the discrediting of the PSDB and PMDB resulted in a situation in which the 
next most favoured candidate in the polls was the ultra-right, racist, sexist 
and homophobic former soldier Jair Bolsonaro, whose solution to the coun-
try’s problems of crime and violence was to put a gun in the hand of every 
‘decent’ Brazilian. Th e only form of politics at which Bolsonaro is truly adept 
is the politics of hate.
Openly expressing his admiration for the military dictatorship, Bolson-
aro, who had been a particular mediocre federal deputy for more than a 
quarter of a century, was not really the uncorrupted political outsider that he 
claimed to be, and he and his sons, also politicians, turned out to have strong 
personal links with Rio’s milicias. Yet his authoritarian and socially illiberal 
attitudes had some appeal across class boundaries, although the hard core of 
his support came from segments of the white middle classes resentful of the 
threat posed to their social privileges by the success of PT governments in 
improving the living standards and access to higher education of lower class 
people of colour.
Once Bolsonaro also declared his support for ultra-neoliberal economic 
policies, the damage that corruption scandals had done to the electoral pros-
pects of the PSDB and PMDB made him an acceptable means of pushing 
forward the coup agenda both to Brazilian elites and to the US interests 
that supported their eff orts to drive the PT from power. Bolsonaro chose 
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Paulo Guedes, a Chicago-trained economist and investment banker who had 
worked in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, as his economic advisor 
for the 2018 election campaign, subsequently appointing him Minister of the 
Economy aft er winning the election in the second round against Fernando 
Haddad, who replaced Lula once the candidacy of the ex-president, now 
convicted and held in solitary confi nement in Curitiba, was blocked by the 
Superior Electoral Tribunal.
Bolsonaro won the presidency in the 2018 elections with the strong sup-
port of evangelical churches and television stations and also through the sys-
tematic diff usion of lies and ‘fake news’ via an unprecedented social media 
campaign, fi nanced by Brazilian business and US ‘dark money’, which re-
morselessly directed a negative politics of hate towards the PT, who were 
accused of undermining ‘Brazilian moral values’ as well as being a ‘commu-
nist’ organization, whose economic mismanagement was responsible for all 
the country’s problems. Yet Bolsonaro’s win also refl ected the impact of the 
highest rate of voter abstention since 1989. Th is replicated the basis for the 
defeats that the Left  experienced in the 2016 municipal elections at the hands 
of Crivella in Rio de Janeiro and Doria in São Paulo. Voting is mandatory in 
Brazil, but it is possible to cast a null or blank vote. In both these metropoles, 
the number of null or blank votes exceeded those cast for the candidates who 
were elected. Th is kind of ‘antipolitical’ reaction is not unique to Brazil. Th e 
record rate of abstention in the French general election that brought Em-
manuel Macron to power should be considered in any argument that liberal 
democracy can be rescued by looking for a fresh face supposedly represent-
ing the ‘centre’ of politics. Bolsonaro was neither a fresh face nor a centrist, 
but he was the benefi ciary of the same kind of disillusion with established 
political parties. Doria, the plutocratic opportunist, was happy to endorse 
him in the second round even though this could be seen as a betrayal of his 
former political patron, defeated PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin.
Th e growth of ‘antipolitics’ is evident from our own research in a large 
favela with a long history of grass-roots militancy in Salvador, Bahia, pre-
sented in the next section. But before turning to that, we complete the anal-
ysis of this section by looking at how a ‘popular’ critique of the 2018 Rio de 
Janeiro carnival parade unsettled the coup regime by projecting an under-
standing of the roots of the country’s problems that is consistent with our 
own arguments.
Two Rio samba schools stole the show by organising parades that were 
immediately read as ‘political’. Beija-Flor (Hummingbird), the champi-
ons, entitled their parade ‘the forgotten children of the country that gave 
birth to them’, juxtaposing the corruption of elites with the violence of drug 
gangs, police ‘stray bullets’, mass incarceration and social exclusion, which 
remained the lot of the people of the favelas. Beija-Flor made the bags of 
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money delivered by businessmen to politicians a central motif, but its parade 
conformed to a reading of Brazilian history in which corruption is seen as 
an enduring legacy of Portuguese colonialism, making the country a Fran-
kenstein’s monster, the fi rst allegorical fi gure in the Beija-Flor parade. Th is 
reading contrasted with that of Paraíso do Tuiuti, the samba school voted 
carnival vice champions, whose theme ‘My God, my God, is slavery extinct?’ 
pointed the fi nger at slavery as the foundation of Brazil’s enduring social in-
equalities by focusing on the coup’s attack on the rights of workers.
Th is school savagely satirized those who had participated in the street 
demonstrations in favour of Rousseff ’s impeachment; they were presented 
as being manipulated by giant hands, representing the Globo media empire 
and the São Paulo Federation of Industries (FIESP), creator of the symbolic 
yellow ducks on which other manifestoches (demonstrator puppets) were 
mounted.2 Th e last element in Paraíso do Tuiuti’s parade was an image of a 
vampire bearing a striking resemblance to Temer and wearing a presidential 
sash. Direct critique of the coup proved too much for Globo TV, whose com-
mentators simply stopped commentating as the meaning of the performance 
unfolded, but it was to little avail, since the video immediately went viral on 
social networks.
A number of journalists and academics have commented on the diff er-
ence between the Beija-Flor reading of the roots of Brazil’s problems and 
that of Paraíso do Tuiuti. Th e latter conforms to sociologist Jessé Souza’s 
insistence that we should stop trying to explain Brazil’s problems in terms of 
historically rooted cultures of corruption. Corruption is hardly a uniquely 
Brazilian vice and is associated with contemporary capitalist fi nancializa-
tion (Souza 2017). Souza urges us to focus instead on how Brazil’s elite has 
replicated the logic of a slave-owning society up to the present, not only 
in its attitudes to labour but in its entire strategy of accumulation, charac-
terized by a short-term rentier orientation based on plundering the popu-
lation through high interest rates and liquidating natural resources without 
thought for the future.
A View from Below: The Political Perspectives of the ‘Popular’ Classes
We have conducted more than a decade of fi eld research in collaboration 
with the leaders of Bairro da Paz, a ‘socially peripheral’ area of the city of Sal-
vador created by land invasion whose residents now fi nd themselves living 
in a principal new centre of residential and commercial expansion. Our aim 
here is to develop the kind of political ethnography that Pinheiro-Machado 
(2016) deems essential for deepening understanding of how what Brazilians 
call the ‘popular classes’ think and act in the context of a coup. Our analysis 
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rests on a wide range of observations and shared experiences; in particular, 
our extended case study of the community’s Permanent Forum of Entities 
(FPEBP), of which our research team were founding members, off ering ad-
vice and logistical and technical support (Hita and Gledhill 2018).
We focus here on internal disputes between leaders of the Forum and 
other community organizations. We recorded the themes and political de-
bates that emerged in the exchanges between members of a WhatsApp list3 
created to discuss issues of interest to the Forum in 2015 and subsequently 
expanded by the participation of various other activists and fi gures from 
outside the community involved directly in its aff airs, complemented by 
various interviews with these protagonists conducted at the end of 2017. We 
examine four diff erent but interrelated conjunctures. Th e fi rst, from March 
to May 2016, is when the national debate around the impeachment began. 
Th e second, between August and October 2016, started with the Senate’s 
confi rmation of Rousseff ’s impeachment and ended with heavy electoral 
defeats for the PT throughout the country. Th e third, between November 
2016 and February 2017, was one in which the coup advanced its agenda on 
fi scal austerity and labour reform, but the country was sliding deeper into 
economic and political crisis. Th e fourth conjuncture takes us up to January 
2018, which was marked by growing support for Lula’s return to the pres-
idency in the face of escalating political polarization and moral crisis, and 
ending with the Porto Alegre tribunal’s ratifi cation of Lula’s conviction by 
Moro. Th is made Lula’s imprisonment and eventual exclusion from the elec-
tion possible, aft er the Supreme Court rejected pleas from Lula’s defence 
team and a ruling from the United Nations Human Rights Committee that 
the sentence be deferred until all appeals had been exhausted.
Th e objectives of the FPEBP are defi ned by Article 2 of its rules, revis-
ited by its secretariat, employees of the Santa Casa de Misericordia NGO, 
between April and May 2016 in an eff ort to defend the collective against the 
attacks of critics, especially Bocão, volunteer anchor person of the Commu-
nity Radio station, who always questioned what other community leaders 
did in an aggressive manner. Bocão never tired of accusing leaders of off er-
ing ‘pseudo leadership’, describing the community as a place where there 
were ‘many chiefs but few Indians’. He complained that when he denounced 
major problems reported to the Community Radio on the WhatsApp list, 
leaders showed little interest in resolving them, preferring to participate in 
meetings that never led to action and pursue their personal interests. Article 
2 states that the Forum should act as an inclusive higher council for delibera-
tion and debate on the community’s problems, diagnosing them but leaving 
it to the individual entities, in particular the Residents’ Council, to execute 
actions to solve them. Yet the principle of seeking to support the entities 
without competing with them in the production of concrete actions was al-
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ways interpreted in diff erent ways by diff erent participants, particularly new 
members not familiar with the Forum’s rules or the history of past discus-
sions. Th is inevitably produced confl icts and misunderstandings, a sensation 
of always starting everything again from scratch, and desires to establish 
new rules depending on who was participating most at a given moment.
Th e postures of members of the WhatsApp list remained more or less 
consistent during the fi rst three conjunctures, refl ecting their ideologies and 
political and party preferences. Nevertheless, the third conjuncture proved 
a watershed, aft er election results had shown a signifi cant advance for the 
right. During the fi rst conjuncture, discussion focused on the impeachment 
and produced heated and polarized positions. One side opposed the im-
peachment in defence of democracy and the verdict of voters in the 2014 
election. Some acknowledged mistakes by the government and especially 
by Dilma Rousseff  herself, whom they not only recognized as lacking Lula’s 
charisma and political skills but also felt had betrayed his legacy. Yet they 
contested various accusations that the other side was making against the PT, 
arguing that the party had provided Brazil with its best government in his-
tory, a government that looked to the interests of the poorest. On the other 
side were those who defended the principle that Dilma had to go, arguing 
that the impeachment was not a coup or attack on democracy but a consti-
tutional act that was a legitimate response to a deepening crisis. It was clear 
that a majority believed most of the news that the mainstream media was 
propagating against the PT, which laid responsibility for corruption exclu-
sively or principally at the door of that party.
In the fi rst camp were Mino, leader of Apompaz, a grass-roots socio-
educational NGO in the community; Bocão from the Community Radio; 
Dulce and Mario, important community leaders active in Catholic lay organi-
zations; and Lia, also connected to Catholic groups and the PT’s local candi-
date for election as a city councillor. Th ose on the other side, whose opinions 
were regularly based on Globo’s anti-PT reporting, included the most im-
portant small businessman living in the community, Faustão, who had been 
very active in the Forum and Residents’ Council in earlier years, along with 
some participants in community groups dedicated to Afro-Brazilian music 
and culture. Some of the latter were followers of Salvador’s mayor, ACM 
Neto, who had returned control of municipal government to the political 
right in 2012 as a DEM candidate, although the state government remained 
under the control of the PT. ACM Neto astutely sought to build political 
support in poor communities by patronizing truly ‘popular’ black culture.4 
Th e main DEM political operator in the community and candidate for city 
councillor was Waldemar, a native of São Paulo, who had lived in Bairro da 
Paz since 2012 and worked for the municipality, bringing problems reported 
by residents to the relevant city government departments for resolution.
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Other leaders of cultural groups belonged to the ranks of the critics of 
impeachment but adopted a soft er tone. Particularly notable was Caio, who 
had been co-ordinator of the Forum during one of its most active periods. 
Associated with militant black politics, Caio adopted more aggressive pos-
tures towards authority, including the police Community Security Base in-
stalled under Bahia’s equivalent of Rio’s UPP programme. A member of the 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and advisor to Silvio Humberto, one of its 
town councillors and an important fi gure in the Unifi ed Black Movement, 
Caio seized the opportunity to criticize the PT but without supporting the 
impeachment. Th is was also the posture of the PSB’s leader in Bahia, Senator 
Lidice da Mata. Rejecting the pro-impeachment stance adopted by her party 
nationally but without defending the record of a party that was an electoral 
rival, she participated in street protests convened in the name of defending 
democracy that identifi ed the impeachment as a coup.
Few participants in these debates referred to these street protests, with 
the exception of Bocão, who constantly pointed to information that did not 
appear on Globo News, and Renan, who worked on family health projects 
and posted news reports from the New York Times that also questioned the 
vision off ered by mainstream Brazilian media. Th e debates during the fi rst 
conjuncture focused on whether the impeachment was correct or not, and 
the postures adopted were strongly polarized, refl ecting the pattern in soci-
ety as a whole.
In the second conjuncture, discussion of the impeachment virtually 
ended, and attention was focused on the coming elections. Th e majority be-
lieved the impeachment to be irreversible and justifi ed by the incapacity of 
the PT and Rousseff  to control the crisis that the country was experienc-
ing, for which they had rightly been judged culpable. Only those who had 
declared themselves against the impeachment continued to defend the PT 
indirectly, and most of those produced arguments in favour of the type of 
left -wing leaderships for which people should continue to vote because they 
defended the interests of the kind of people who lived in the neighbourhood. 
In the new conjuncture, Caio aligned less ambiguously with this group. Yet 
anyone sympathetic to the Left  was ferociously counterattacked. Th ose with 
strong partisan sympathies tried to use the WhatsApp list to make political 
propaganda in favour of their preferred candidates, inside and outside the 
neighbourhood, provoking a reaction in which the majority of participants 
favoured a rule prohibiting its use for party political purposes. Th e FPEBP’s 
secretariat argued that the list’s space for expression of popular perspectives 
on politics should focus on the common good of the neighbourhood rather 
than party politics, which only raised passions and produced disunity.
Th e results of the October 2016 local elections showed that the major-
ity of the 7,720 registered voters of Bairro da Paz had withdrawn the sup-
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port that they had previously given to the PT. In Salvador as a whole, mayor 
ACM Neto secured re-election with an overwhelming majority, including 
within the popular classes. He reversed his heavy defeat by the PT in Bairro 
da Paz in 2012 by securing 63 per cent of the community’s votes – 2,000 votes 
more than the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) candidate of a left  coa-
lition that included the PT. In the elections for councillors, the candidates 
of minor parties that the mayor brought into his coalition and provided with 
active personal support included the pagode singer Igor Kannário, whose 
songs were enormously popular amongst the youth of the urban periphery 
because of their constant references to the world of crime and police vio-
lence. Kannário received 150 votes in Bairro da Paz. Of the community’s own 
candidates, Lia of the PT secured most votes, with 328, but was only just 
ahead of Waldemar, the DEM candidate, with 299, and candidates from the 
mayor’s coalition secured over 24 per cent of the votes for councillors cast 
in Bairro da Paz. Yet even more voters no longer wanted to have anything to 
do with political parties. Th e number of null and blank votes amounted to 
almost 29 per cent.
Symptomatic of how popular anger focused on disillusion with the PT 
during the second conjuncture was Bocão of the Community Radio, who 
earned his living working as a security guard in a supermarket in a nearby 
middle-class neighbourhood. Having once been a PT militant himself, he 
continued defending Lula even aft er confessing his disillusion with the party, 
but he now began to make stronger criticisms of PT corruption. When Mino 
continued to defend the PT in a combative manner, this provoked escalating 
counterattacks from the antipetistas. Th ey not only accused Mino of having 
a personal economic interest in defending his party, as an advisor to PT pol-
itician Vãnia Galvão, but also attacked his socio-educational projects, which 
had played an important role in getting young people from Bairro da Paz 
access to higher education and received economic support through his po-
litical networks outside the community. Some of Mino’s critics, especially 
from the cultural groups patronized by ACM Neto, went so far as to seek to 
humiliate him personally.
Polarization on party lines was dampened a little by the debates about 
the divisive nature of using the WhatsApp list for electoral propaganda pur-
poses, which continuously produced calls for the unity, tolerance and pa-
tience that would enable people to focus on what really mattered for the 
neighbourhood as a whole. Yet no real consensus was reached on this issue, 
and other contradictions emerged. Lia, the PT candidate for councillor, ad-
ministered one of the community’s Catholic crèches. She was enthusiastic 
about the various social projects that the Community Security Base (BCS) 
was developing in the neighbourhood and enjoyed cordial relations with 
its commander. Despite the doubts expressed by some of the leaders of the 
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other entities that participated in the FPEBP, the commander insisted that 
the BCS had the right to become a member of the Forum as an entity work-
ing in the neighbourhood, in the same way as the Santa Casa or groups from 
the Federal University. He also participated in the WhatsApp debates, which 
provoked diffi  culties when participants complained about truculent treat-
ment of residents by the base police and Special Patrol Group police, who 
periodically entered the community searching for drug traffi  ckers.
Diffi  culties escalated as the Forum began to prepare a public meeting on 
neighbourhood security to discuss alleged abuses committed by police and 
agents of the municipal government’s commercial regulation department in 
the community. Th e base commander declared that this meeting was being 
transformed into a political act, attacking Caio in particular, in public and via 
the WhatsApp list, for criticizing the BCS as an institution of the repressive 
state without recognizing the benefi ts of its social programmes to the com-
munity. As tensions mounted, some new WhatsApp groups were created 
that excluded all ‘external entities’ and were restricted solely to residents of 
the neighbourhood.
When neither of the neighbourhood’s own candidates (Lia and Walde-
mar) were elected councillors, some participants in the original list com-
plained that the eff ect of trying to suppress discussion of electoral matters 
had been to ensure that more residents gave their votes to candidates from 
outside the community. One of the outsiders, Igor Kannário, had enjoyed a 
special opportunity to enhance his profi le inside it. In September 2016, he 
had been the star attraction in an event called ‘Culture of Peace’, criticized 
by the Residents’ Council, some Forum members and the community news-
paper for having been sponsored by the Military Police through the BCS. 
Th is was certainly not all ‘new politics’. Some of the younger members of 
the cultural groups may not have campaigned directly for Waldemar and the 
DEM but they did help him to hand out T-shirts and drum up votes in return 
for promises to asphalt streets and attend to other infrastructure problems in 
more precarious areas of the community.
Th e Kannário show was followed by support from the BCS and munici-
pality for their own events. It was no coincidence that new members from 
these groups joined the WhatsApp list before the elections, arguing that the 
community had to ask for more of the kinds of benefi ts that Kannário’s event 
had brought, which included some free medical attention. Th ese young 
people aggressively rejected the platforms of other parties, including Caio’s 
insistence on the need for affi  rmative action to combat racial inequalities, 
which united this PSB militant with Mino of the PT in a further polarization 
of the debates. But the DEM triumph refl ected the success of the Right in 
deploying clientelistic ways of doing politics to make the most of an electoral 
environment reshaped by disillusion with the PT and antipolitics.
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Th ere were still moments in which more or less the whole community 
managed to come together. Th e public meeting on security produced ev-
idence of real problems and served as a vehicle for complaining about 
inadequate investigation of past human rights abuses, which included ex-
trajudicial killings. Th e Forum and Residents’ Council successfully resisted 
the BCS commander’s demand to act as co-organizer of the event, provok-
ing a truculent reaction in which he threatened to take action against some 
community leaders for disrespecting his lawful authority. Another case that 
produced consensus amongst members of the WhatsApp group was a de-
mand that the construction companies responsible for building a new metro 
station that would aff ect residents of the neighbourhood should negotiate 
about the compensations due to the community in the form of social proj-
ects with its representatives rather than impose them without consultation. 
Direct action in the form of blocking the main road running past the neigh-
bourhood into the city centre was discussed as a way of pressing this and 
other demands related to getting the same kinds of benefi ts for the commu-
nity out of the restructuring of the local transport system as were planned 
for middle-class residential areas in the vicinity. Nevertheless, there is ev-
idence that the presence of the BCS has become more acceptable to resi-
dents over the years and that it has produced greater fragmentation in the 
popular organizations of the community as the result of the emergence of 
new leaders more closely aligned with government as a result of the projects 
sponsored by the base.
 Th e tendency in our third conjuncture was for sentiment to turn against 
the government installed by the coup. In diff erent ways, and with growing 
critical attention to what was disseminated by mainstream media, even the 
most conservative participants in the WhatsApp group began to diminish 
their expressions of rage against PT corruption, as if they were fi nally be-
coming conscious that they had been manipulated. Th is seems to have been 
the case with small businessman Faustão, but there was also a change of pos-
ture on the part of the followers of Kannário, who slowly began to disengage 
from defence of the DEM. Th is change of attitude was driven by rejection 
of the coup’s retrograde legislative agenda on labour and public spending, 
and direct experience of rising unemployment and precarianization of the 
jobs that remained. Growing evidence for corruption on the part of leading 
fi gures of the PMDB and PSDB also helped shift  the focus of discussions to-
wards rejection of Temer. Although some participants still refused to name 
the coup a coup, most who had contested the idea that the impeachment 
had been a coup earlier now fell silent. Some continued to express a special 
hatred towards the PT and insisted that its eventual return to power was un-
thinkable, but expressions of indignation about the corruption of all politi-
cians became the order of the day. Th is strengthening of ‘antipolitics’ during 
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the third conjuncture did not, however, seem likely to produce a general PT 
recovery.
Yet as the results of interviews conducted towards the end of the fourth 
conjuncture demonstrated, Lula’s personal political recovery did manifest 
strongly in Bairro da Paz. Even some who suspected that he might actually 
be guilty of personal corruption now saw his return to the presidency as the 
best solution for the country and the poor, confi dent that a new Lula govern-
ment would cancel the retrograde measures imposed by the coup regime. 
A striking result was that even some of ACM Neto’s supporters, including 
Waldemar, declared that they would vote for Lula in national elections, and 
there were tantalizing hints that some would vote for an alternative candi-
date nominated by Lula should he be debarred from contesting the election. 
Th ese results are consistent with the hypothesis that Lula opened up a new 
chapter in Brazilian populism by being ‘of ’ the people rather than simply 
managing to convince them that he could govern successfully in the interests 
of the less privileged. National polls at the time of these interviews showed 
that Lula’s support was particularly strong in the north-east, but it was not 
restricted to that region, as he enjoyed substantial middle-class support as 
well, although it was less clear to whom, if anyone, his votes would transfer 
were he unable to stand. Some of those interviewed in Bairro da Paz simply 
said that they would not vote at all if they could not vote for Lula.
Conclusions
Th e one thing that all Brazilians could agree upon at the start of 2018 was 
that their society was profoundly polarized. Although this polarization ex-
pressed itself in a politics of resentment on the part of better off  Brazilians 
towards citizens who had achieved a modest social ascent during the years of 
PT rule, we have shown ethnographically that polarization, anger and hate 
also became manifest within relatively deprived communities. Th e crisis 
provoked by the coup revealed long-standing strands of social conservatism 
and support for authoritarian solutions in Brazilian society. Yet change in 
social values is also evident.
Some of the young people who took to the streets to demand the ouster 
of Dilma Rousseff  combined support for unfettered free market econom-
ics with socially liberal attitudes on questions such as sexual preference. 
Th e fostering of cultures of consumption and identity politics have turned 
Brazil into a neoliberal market society that sometimes seems the epitome 
of a new social world in which the economic becomes the measure of all 
things, inhabited by individualized subjects who, as Dardot and Laval put 
it, are ‘one day invited to change cars, the next to change partners, the next 
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their identity, and another day their sex’ (Dardot and Laval 2014: 325). Yet 
since many people in poor communities like Bairro da Paz, including some 
PT supporters, remain socially conservative, support for the politics of Jair 
Bolsonaro can be found in all social classes. Bolsonaro’s proposals for solv-
ing the crisis in public security were obviously class biased, but lower-class 
Brazilians have shown a notorious willingness to accept repressive policing 
when it is directed at ‘bandits’ rather than at themselves as ‘honest workers’. 
Th is ensured some support for Bolsonaro’s ‘iron fi st’ public security policies 
amongst (mostly male) residents of poor communities nationally, although 
in the 2018 elections Haddad did beat Bolsonaro in Bahia and the other 
states of the north-east. In terms of both repression and interventions by so-
cial workers in the lives of the poor, Brazil exemplifi es the Janus face of what 
Wacquant calls the ‘neoliberal government of social insecurity’ (Wacquant 
2009) but in doing so draws on historically rooted notions about keeping 
racialized lower classes in their proper place, with which members of those 
classes can be partially complicit.
Nevertheless, the political resurrection of former president Lula demon-
strated that the lower classes have a sticking point when it comes to elite 
attempts to renew their exclusion from democratic political life. In dismiss-
ing ‘lulapetismo’ as ‘mere populism’ based on the manipulation of ‘ignorant 
nordestinos’, Brazilian elites make two mistakes. Th ey misread the deep-
seated demands for respect and equal treatment embedded in the structures 
of feeling of the ‘popular classes’ and the capacity for self-organization that 
they still possess despite the impacts of neoliberal governmentality. Th ey 
also ignore those sectors of the middle classes whose politics are not driven 
by resentment but by a genuine desire to create a fairer and more egalitar-
ian society free of patriarchal violence and homophobia. Only elites have 
any reason to welcome the coup’s eff orts to return Brazil to its former status 
as an agro-export and resource extraction periphery of the capitalist world 
economy at whatever environmental and social cost, advanced further by 
the Bolsonaro government giving the green light to accelerated deforesta-
tion in Amazonia and agribusiness use of ever more dangerous agro-toxins 
despite high existing levels of contamination of urban water supplies and 
other public health risks.
Where polarization and the growth of a politics of resentment and hate 
will eventually lead remains as uncertain in Brazil as in the rest of the world, 
but it would be premature to assume that the diff erence between ‘left ’ and 
‘right’ has become irrelevant under neoliberal capitalism, even if old certain-
ties about what the Left  should do have been eroded. What the Right stands 
for is now starkly obvious to working-class Brazilians. Th e Left  may need to 
pay more attention to the communalistic transformation of social property 
relations, as recommended by Harvey (2012) and Dardot and Laval (2015), 
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and to delivering on past promises to make democracy more participatory 
and also rethink how state power should be deployed if it is to truly em-
power citizens and promote a more egalitarian society. Lula may have had 
little practical alternative to conciliating elites and accommodating PT rule 
to existing political and judicial institutions, but the unreformed nature of 
those institutions combined with the reproduction of existing structures of 
social power made even moderate social democratic government vulnerable 
to overthrow in Brazil. Even so, it was necessary to resort to extraordinary 
measures to prevent Lula returning to power in 2018.
Th e road ahead remains diffi  cult. Th e developments that brought Bolson-
aro to power have revealed the anti-democratic consequences of the failure of 
Brazilian democracy to bring the military to account for the crimes commit-
ted under the dictatorship and the failure to protest against the military being 
assigned the role of ‘guardians of order’ under the 1988 democratic constitu-
tion. Generals felt empowered to make directly political declarations with-
out precedent since the dictatorship in the new environment created by the 
2016 coup. Equally unprecedented since the dictatorship was the number of 
former soldiers that Bolsonaro appointed as government ministers, although 
this also contributed to internal confl ict within the administration between 
the more pragmatic military fi gures and civilian ministers determined to pur-
sue ultra-rightist ideological projects. As time has gone by, the ‘hidden hand’ 
of US foundations, think tanks, corporate interests and government in the 
assault on Brazilian democracy and national resource sovereignty has also 
become more visible and documentable, especially in relation to Operation 
Carwash. Judge Moro was rewarded for services rendered to the coup and 
Bolsonaro’s election by being appointed Justice Minister in the new govern-
ment, with the promise of a Supreme Court seat to come in the future.
Nevertheless, as its true nature and the mechanisms through which it was 
carried out became clearer, the latest in the long cycle of Brazilian coups 
exposed the weaknesses not only of the Left  but also of the Right and of 
the political forces supporting the coup that tried to represent themselves 
as occupying the ‘centre’ of the political fi eld. Th is off ers hope that the latest 
episode of authoritarian rule will be followed by the more profound struc-
tural reforms necessary to end the cycle for good.
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NOTES
 1. Both Moreira Franco and Michel Temer were fi nally charged with corruption in 
2019 but only aft er they had left  offi  ce and fulfi lled their roles in the coup process.
 2. Th e 2013 street protests against rising public transport charges as well as the costs 
of hosting the Games in a country that needed to spend more money on public edu-
cation and healthcare rattled the Rousseff  administration prior to the Olympics and 
were generally seen as a positive awakening of young people. Less noticed at the 
time was the role of protestors with right-wing agendas, who joined the organized 
movements that demanded Rousseff ’s impeachment in 2016 (Gohn 2017).
 3. WhatsApp proved a crucial element in the Bolsonaro electoral campaign on social 
media. Bulk dissemination of messages was funded, illegally, by business interests 
backing Bolsonaro and ‘dark money’ originating in the United States.
 4. Mayor Antônio Carlos Peixoto de Magalhães Neto is the grandson of Bahia’s most 
important twentieth-century politician, Antônio Carlos Magalhães, original bearer 
of the soubriquet ACM. ACM Grandson (Neto) has skilfully updated the right-wing 
populism that assisted the ‘conservative modernization’ directed by his distin-
guished forebear.
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THE ELECTION OF MAS, 





Up until a few decades ago, the indigenous Bolivians who constitute the 
vast majority of this landlocked country were not even allowed to walk on 
the cities’ sidewalks, not to mention vote. In 2005, however, the country 
elected its fi rst indigenous President, Evo Morales Ayma. His government 
while having up to a certain extent empowered the previously excluded has 
done so in a ‘controlled’ manner and without disempowering the country’s 
economic elites. At the same time, the type of social change that has been 
brought about in Bolivia in the past fourteen years has not been as radical 
as some had hoped and others had feared. While in the cycle of protest that 
preceded Evo’s rise to state power several radical egalitarian and emanci-
patory proposals were articulated and practised in Bolivia, once Evo was 
elected the more radical proposals lost steam, while cri tics of the govern-
ment were either suppressed or dismissed as ‘traitorous’.
In this chapter, I argue that despite the fact that Evo’s election was por-
trayed as ‘the rise of the Bolivian social movements to state power’, in fact 
his government ended up being one the izquierda permitida – to borrow 
Webber and Carr’s (2013) term – and not one of izquierda radical. In ad-
dition, again focusing on the Bolivian experience, I also question the role 
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of elections during cycles of protest, and I argue that they contribute de-
cisively towards the minimization of social mobilization and its translation 
into – moderate – party politics, leading to the division of movements and 
the weakening of radical, prefi gurative, egalitarian political processes. Th at 
way, they contribute to translating protest into a more controlled political 
process that minimizes the threat to the survival of political and economic 
elites and to the ‘corporate state’ that sometimes appears during cycles of 
protest. In such a process, what appears as ‘egalitarianism’ may also produce 
(or reproduce) its own hierarchies, elites and political relations.
The Country to Whose Founding the Indigenous Were Never Invited
El 22 de enero del año 2002, Evo fue expulsado del Paraíso. O sea: el diputado 
Morales fue echado del Parlamento. Mucho antes de la expulsión de Evo, ya los 
suyos, los indígenas, habían sido expulsados de la nación ofi cial. No eran hijos de 
Bolivia: eran no más que su mano de obra. Hasta hace poco más de medio siglo, los 
indios no podían votar ni caminar por las veredas de las ciudades. (Galeano 2006)
In the above text, Eduardo Galeano reminds us that up until half a century 
ago the indigenous peoples of Bolivia – the majority of its inhabitants that 
is – were not even allowed to walk on the cities’ sidewalks, not to mention 
vote in elections. In 2006, in one of those twists of history, Evo Morales, an 
indigenous Aymara who had been growing coca leaves, ‘the devil’s leaf ’ ac-
cording to Galeano, and had led the struggle of the Bolivian – and especially 
the Chapareño1 – cocaleros against the uprooting of their bushes, was being 
sworn President of the country: not only of the indigenous, the cholos, or 
the blancos, but of the whole country. His election sparked hopes and fears 
not only in Bolivia but in the whole region and the world. An indigenous 
person, one of the historically most excluded, was about to take power in 
that landlocked, highland country. Th e indigenous and the poor – who in 
Bolivia largely coincide – were full of hope that fi nally justice and equality 
would reign in the country. It is also a fact that the emancipatory potential 
of a poor, indigenous person being sworn President was more than welcome 
but not everywhere or by everybody though.
Th e Bolivian economic and political elites were nervous and unsure of 
what would follow. Would their centuries-long privileges be questioned 
now that the indios had taken power? And what did that mean for other 
economic elites and other historically excluded populations in the region? 
Th e United States, who had long controlled the country through aid and 
trade, were also anxious. Aft er all, it was the US ambassador Manuel Rocha 
that had warned against voting for Evo Morales in 2002, more or less com-
paring him to Osama Bin Laden. It backfi red: the Bolivians were so fed up 
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with North American meddling with their country’s internal aff airs that 
they rushed to vote for Evo. So much did Ambassador Rocha’s intervention 
backfi re that Evo Morales joked that he would employ Rocha ‘the owner of 
the – Bolivian – circus’ as head of his electoral campaign (Astelarra 2014).
Fourteen years have passed since Evo’s rise to state power, and though 
he remains popular in Bolivia, he is not as popular as he used to be. In a 
2016 referendum, 51 per cent voted against a Constitutional amendment 
that would allow Evo Morales to be re-elected for the 4th time in the 2019 
elections – almost as many as had voted him for President ten years earlier. 
Th e Constitutional Tribunal, however, had a diff erent opinion: it considers 
it a constitutional right for any Bolivian citizen – including Evo – to be an 
electoral candidate as many times as he/she wishes, thus bypassing the re-
sult of the referendum. Evo’s vice president, Álvaro García Linera, saw no 
contradiction in this development, saying in an interview with El País that 
if we stick to the constitutional rules, Evo would have to go, but that would 
be political suicide, since he is ‘the personifi cation of the unifi cation of the 
people . . . something that happens every 100 or 200 years’ (Molina 2018). A 
recent poll, however, signalled that if the Bolivians were to be asked again, 
63 per cent of them would back the referendum’s initial result: Evo would 
not be allowed to run for President in 2019. At the same time, it seems that 
Evo’s popularity is also losing ground in the four most important Bolivian 
cities: from 58 per cent it has dropped to 34 per cent (El Deber 2017).
While the MAS has not identifi ed a suitable candidate that could substi-
tute Evo Morales, they have been busy with other concerns until now, said 
the vice president, fourteen years aft er Evo was sworn President, and while 
he has just lost his fi rst major political battle, it seems like a good time to look 
back in a critical manner and make some fi rst evaluations of his presidency’s 
performance. From this author’s perspective, Evo’s governments have been 
neither as radical as it was feared, nor as egalitarian as it was hoped. While 
Evo Morales’ policies have had a redistributive character and did undeniably 
benefi t the least privileged Bolivians, at the same time they did so without 
having to disempower the most privileged, thus maintaining an unequal sys-
tem of power relations in the country instead of overturning it.
Riding on a Wave of Protests
Th e MAS (Movimiento Al Socialismo), Evo’s party, was conceived as the 
political instrument of the Bolivian indigenous-campesino movement led 
by the Chapareño cocalero movement, the Six Federations of the Tropic of 
Cochabamba. Elsewhere, I have described in detail how it was conceived 
and how the electoral route won the ideological battle within the cocalero 
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movement itself against other, more radical and certainly more violent op-
tions that were on the table such as guerrilla warfare (Oikonomakis, 2018, 
2019a, 2019b; Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014). Why a ‘political instru-
ment’ and not a party? Moira Zuazo (2009: 38) argues that this has to do 
with two factors: a) the prevalent idea within the campesino-indigenous 
movement that ‘political parties divide us’ and b) the delegitimization of the 
political party as an organizational form that has its roots in Bolivia’s ‘turbu-
lent years’ 2000–2005. It was offi  cially approved in the Sixth Congress of the 
United Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB, Con-
federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) in 1994 
and offi  cially formed a year later in the congress on ‘Land, Territory and 
Political Instrument’ that took place in Santa Cruz. Th ere, representatives of 
several campesino-indigenous organizations such as the CSUTCB, the Bar-
tolina Sisa National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women (FNMCB-BS, 
Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa), the Syndicalist 
Confederation of Bolivian Colonizers (CSCB) and the Indigenous Central of 
the Bolivian East (CIDOB) established the Asamblea de los Pueblos (ASP), 
which would later become the MAS-ISP and eventually what we know to-
day as the MAS.
It is widely believed that the most infl uential factor behind the birth of 
the MAS was the introduction of the Popular Participation Law (LPP – Ley 
de Participación Popular) introduced in 1994. Th e LPP was an opening in 
the Bolivian political system that would allow greater popular participation 
at the local administrative level, since it increased the share of the national 
budget destined to the country’s 311 local municipalities to 20 per cent from 
10 per cent (Kohl 2003: 153). Th erefore, it is considered that the LPP pro-
vided a political opening for indigenous and other local grass-roots orga-
nizations to participate in local electoral politics. Th is political opening is 
viewed as the political opportunity that gave birth to the political instrument 
of the campesino-indigenous movement of Bolivia, the MAS. Even the dates 
point to that direction: the MAS was established in 1995, just one year af-
ter the introduction of the LPP. However, if we take a deeper look into the 
internal dynamics of the campesino-indigenous movement, we will realize 
that the creation of the political instrument was not an instinctive reaction 
to the introduction of the LPP by the central government but rather a care-
fully planned move within the movement at least since 1984. According to 
Durand Ochoa (2012: 161), the decision to create a political instrument was 
taken by the CSUTCB in 1992, long before the introduction of the Popu-
lar Participation Law. Pablo Stefanoni (2010) also emphasizes the fact that 
the plan to create a political instrument was being discussed by the Bolivian 
campesino movement ever since at least 1988. My own research also points 
towards that direction: Don Filemón Escóbar and other political instructors 
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such as Alex Contreras, Oscar Coca and David and Germán Choquehuanca 
organized more than 600 seminar workshops in the Chapare in favour of the 
creation of a political party already from 1984 onwards (Escóbar 2008: 201; 
Oikonomakis 2018) Don Filemón wrote respectively: ‘Our seminars were 
extended all over the map of Bolivia. Th e main work was to give seminars . . . 
We were converting the concentrations into seminars for thousands of com-
pañeros. With this consequent and permanent work we forged the political 
instrument’2 (Escóbar 2008: 191–92).
In 2009, Moira Zuazo (2009) interviewed 85 MAS deputies and senators, 
using a structured questionnaire in which she tried to trace back the birth 
of the MAS. Two of them, Wilber Flores Torres and Gustavo Torrico, who 
were involved in the creation of the political instrument (the rest were not) 
mention 1992 as the year of its conception, which is before the introduction 
of the LPP. What is also surprising is that not a single one of the 85 of them 
identifi es the LPP as the instigator behind the creation of the political instru-
ment, even though some of them identify it as ‘infl uential’ in their personal 
political development. Th erefore, I argue that while the LPP functioned as 
an additional argument in order for the cocaleros of the Six Federations of 
the Tropic of Cochabamba to engage with the electoral route, the ideological 
preparation for this development had begun long ago, and it is that prepa-
ration that facilitated the electoral strategy of the cocaleros of the Chapare, 
which of course also took advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
LPP. Eventually, thanks to the cocaleros’ electoral success in the municipal 
and national elections of 1995 and 1997, in the Chapare mainly, Evo Morales 
and the cocaleros of the Chapare managed to win the internal battle for the 
leadership and control of the MAS-ISP, against the other two aspiring candi-
dates: Alejo Véliz Lazo, a Quechua ex-secretary general of the CSUTCB and 
fi rst leader of the ASP, and Felipe Quispe, the mallku (leader) of the Aymaras 
of the Altiplano.
From 2000 onwards, Bolivia went through its turbulent years. Starting 
with the Cochabamba Water War, a cycle of popular mobilizations managed 
to topple two Presidents (in 2003 and 2005) and eventually brought Evo 
Morales to the Presidency. Th e protagonists in these mobilizations were not 
political parties (not even the MAS) but social movements such as the au-
tonomous self-organized Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida de 
Cochabamba (Coordinating Body for the Defense of Water and Life), trade 
unions like the Bolivian Workers Central (COB, Central Obrera Boliviana) 
and the CSUTCB, neighbourhood assemblies such as Federación de Juntas 
Vecinales de El Alto (Federation of El Alto Neighbourhood Councils), and 
the cocaleros of the Chapare and Yungas La Paz. Th e aforementioned cycle 
of protest was instigated by the neoliberal austerity policies that were being 
introduced by successive governments, which included the privatization of 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
76 Leonidas Oikonomakis
water, and natural gas, as well as the banning of coca leaf growing among 
other things. Fernando Mayorga (2012) writes that during this period Bo-
livia witnessed a double crisis: a) of representative democracy and its insti-
tutional tools such as the political parties, and b) of neoliberalism as a system 
of economic governance.
Two counter proposals were developed and were either demanded or 
experimented with on behalf of the movements: participatory democracy – 
direct or communitarian – as far as political organization is concerned, 
and state economic nationalism for economic policy. We also witnessed in-
stances of horizontal direct-democracy forms of organization as it appeared 
in Cochabamba, where the Water War was coordinated by the Coordinadora, 
who assembled in the main square of the city, and where spokespersons of 
the diff erent neighbourhood assemblies gathered to discuss their strategy 
and future plans. Processes of a similar nature were experienced in El Alto, 
where the water and the gas wars were planned and fought on the squares of 
La Ceja and the other neighbourhoods under the communitarian organiza-
tional form of the ayllu.
Th ese ‘wars’ were so called because what was at stake was political sov-
ereignty regarding the ‘ownership’ and administration of natural resources, 
and the two sides that fought these wars were the Bolivian corporate state 
(Kapferer and Gold 201 7) and the egalitarian forces represented by social 
movements. Th e MAS was not the protagonist in any of these instances ex-
cept for the Coca War, which took place in January–February 2002, when 
the government decided to ban the production, sale and transportation of 
the coca leaf and ordered the closure of its main markets, especially the one 
in Sacaba, in the periphery of Cochabamba. Th e Cochabamba Water War 
was mainly fought by the Coordinadora, while the Water and Gas wars of 
2005 and 2003 were mostly fought in El Alto by the Aymaras of the Alti-
plano. However, of the three main political proposals that emerged during 
those years – the autonomous self-management of the Coordinadora, the 
exclusionary revolutionary indigenismo of Felipe Quispe and the institu-
tional electoral route proposed by the MAS and Evo Morales – the latter 
managed to gain ground, translating (Dinerstein 2014) in a way the more 
radical proposals into electoral politics and channelling popular discontent 
towards electoral participation for social change.
Central to this process was the fi gure of Evo Morales, the indigenous dep-
uty who was ousted from the Parliament in 2002 accused of instigating the 
Coca War and for whom the American Ambassador openly advised the Bo-
livians not to vote, giving him even greater popularity. It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to investigate how and why social mobilization in Bolivia was 
translated into electoral politics – I try to do that elsewher e (Oikonomakis 
201 8). My main argument is that despite the fact that during the protest cy-
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cle in Bolivia there have been instances of egalitarian, directly democratic 
and communitarian organizational forms, they never really managed (to be 
fair, they may not have had the time to do so) to articulate an alternative 
political proposal for the country’s economic and political administration. 
Th erefore, when elections were called, the only tangible proposal was that 
of the MAS: the electoral path to state power. In the lines that follow, how-
ever, I will try to evaluate whether the MAS and Evo Morales translated their 
electoral victories into egalitarian policies within Bolivia.
The Permitted Left and the Compensatory State
Evo Morales’ 2006 rise to the Presidential seat is the Latin American equiv-
alent of Nelson Mandela’s 1994 Presidential election in South Africa. It has a 
lot to say about liberal identity politics and social justice in a capitalist eco-
nomic system, as well as about social change and the electoral route towards 
achieving it. Just like Mandela, Evo represents the marginalized majority in a 
country administered by the elite minority: Mandela is black in South Africa 
and Evo indigenous in Bolivia. Both were discriminated against, yet both 
managed to reach the Presidential seat in their respective countries, and 
their success had a symbolic meaning as well: it was viewed both at home 
and abroad as an issue of social justice being done. However, Evo’s case – 
just like Mandela’s – off ers us the opportunity to explore this extremely 
important question: is it enough for an indigenous person to govern an in-
digenous-majority country for egalitarian policies to be implemented in it? 
In other words, is it the identity of the mandatario that matters? Is identity 
politics enough when it comes to social justice? And what’s the role of social 
class in all this?
According to the World Bank statistics, the percentage of the Bolivian 
population living below the national poverty line has dropped from 59.6 per 
cent in 2005 to 38.6 per cent in 2015 (accessed on 11 April 2017). Th at is, it 
has dropped by 21 per cent during Morales’ administration, which is defi -
nitely not a minor feat. Offi  cial government statistics present a similar pic-
ture: poverty has fallen from 60.6 per cent in 2005 to 45 per cent in 2011, and 
extreme poverty from 38.2 per cent to 20.9 per cent over the same period. 
Th is is Evo Morales’ achievement and should be granted to his administra-
tion. Literacy rates have also reached 99 per cent according to UNESCO, 
which is also impressive. Compared to past administrations, these are major 
improvements; we should not forget, however, that Bolivia is a country rich 
in natural resources and in which around 40 per cent of the population re-
mains under the national poverty line despite having a left -wing government 
and an indigenous President in offi  ce for the past fourteen years. In addi-
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tion, 10 per cent of the population in 2015 still earned 45.8 times as much as 
the lowest 10 per cent, which means that Bolivia remains a deeply unequal 
country.3 Th e reason behind this is that, from this author’s point of view, 
though Evo’s administration did partly break with the country’s neoliberal 
economic policies (the privatization of natural resources, for example) it did 
it without materializing an anti-capitalist economy, maintaining a liberal, 
capitalist, (neo)extractivist (neo)developmental logic when it comes to eco-
nomic and social policy. Th e diff erence is that Evo’s capitalist economy has 
‘a more human face’ than his neoliberal predecessors’ and a more redistrib-
utive character.
Petras and Veltmeyer defi ne extractivism as ‘economic development 
based on the extraction of natural resources such as fossil and biofuels, 
minerals and agro-food products extracted in a process of “large-scale in-
vestment in land acquisition”’(Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 18). According 
to them, while the Bolivian government’s share of the resource rent in the 
mining sector is only 6 per cent, in the hydrocarbon sector it has been in-
creased to 50 per cent during Evo’s years (18% royalty and 32% tax rate) 
(Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 28). Th e MAS, of course, calls this process ‘na-
tionalization’ and celebrated it with performative ‘occupations’ of foreign 
companies’ drilling sites; however, the truth is that we are talking about a 
generous (compared to past administrations) increase in the government’s 
share of the profi ts, and certainly not of nationalization. In the same book, 
Petras and Veltmeyer identify three types of extractivist states: the imperial, 
the neoliberal and the post-neoliberal. Th e imperial state refers to states that 
actively support local companies’ national interests in their pursuit of re-
sources to export abroad, providing them with diplomatic assistance (politi-
cal pressure) when needed, in order to achieve their geopolitical targets (for 
example, the United States and Canada). Th e neoliberal state is the state that 
privatizes its natural resources to private companies, foreign or domestic, 
according to the dictates of the Washington Consensus and free market cap-
italism. Most of Latin America during the 1990s and early 2000s fell within 
this category. Because of the challenge to neoliberal policies by powerful 
cycles of protest that brought to power ‘progressive regimes’ in Bolivia, Ven-
ezuela, Argentina, Ecuador and other Latin American countries throughout 
the 2000s, however, a new type of equally extractivist state emerged: the 
post-neoliberal state. Th e authors describe the post-neoliberal state as con-
structed on two pillars:
a new development paradigm based on a post-Washington Consensus on the 
need for inclusive development and poverty reduction (the ‘new developmental-
ism’) and a national development strategy (‘the new extractivism’) based on the 
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extraction of natural resources, their export in primary commodity form, and a 
policy of social inclusion in regard to the distribution of the resource rents col-
lected in the development process. (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 7)
Eduardo Gudynas describes neoextractivism as a form of development 
based on the appropriation of nature in which ‘if indeed the state plays a 
more active role, and gives extractivism a greater legitimacy because it re-
distributes some of the surplus to the population, it still repeats the negative 
environmental and social impacts of the old extractivism’ (Gudynas 2010: 
1). He prefers to use the term ‘compensatory state’ instead (Gudynas 2013). 
Jeff ery Webber agrees because this conceptualization of ‘neodevelopmental 
states’ tends to exaggerate the increased role of the state and the diminished 
role of multinational capital while ‘the very reproduction of these political 
economies depends upon states prioritizing the maintenance and security of 
private property rights and juridical environments in which multinationals 
can profi t’ (Webber 2017a: 46). Ben Dangl, discussing the Argentinean ex-
perience and the Kirchnerian compensatory state, put it more blatantly: ‘In 
other words Kirchner was handing out crumbs when what many demanded 
was revolution’ (Dangl 2010: 71).
In any case, whether we prefer the term neoextractivism, neodevelop-
mentalism, or compensatory state, Evo’s Bolivia is viewed by all theorists 
involved in the debate as the paradigmatic example. ‘One redistributive 
channel of rent to the poorest sectors’, notes Webber, ‘has been a series of 
targeted cash-transfer programs, which now reach roughly 33% of the popu-
lation – Bono Juancito Pinto (funds to encourage children to attend school), 
Renta Dignidad (a small monthly payment to the elderly poor), and Bono 
Juana Azurduy (funds to improve healthcare for expectant mothers, as well 
as postnatal medical care)’ (Webber 2017a: 51). Th is type of redistributive 
policy, however, can hardly be described as anti-capitalist or truly egalitar-
ian. From this author’s point of view, it is rather a very intelligent way to im-
prove somehow the conditions of the poorest of the population, ‘securing’ 
in a way their future support for a regime that provided them with ‘some-
thing’ where previous administrations provided nothing, and maintaining 
stable economic and social conditions while following a capitalist develop-
mental logic. Th is way, Evo’s administration has managed to somewhat ease 
the suff ering of the poor without having to disempower the rich.
Th e answer, therefore, to whether having an indigenous president makes 
a diff erence or not, is that what matters is what a President and a govern-
ment actually does, not what he/she looks like. Or, as Alejandro Almaraz 
ex-vice minister of lands and former national director of MAS put it in an 
interview with this author and Tomàs Astelarra back in 2013:
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Have the landowners been displaced from power? No, very partially and second-
arily. Th ey don’t have any ministers but it turns out that the campesina Minister of 
Agriculture does what they want. It is much more comfortable [this way].44
In other words, while Evo’s administration has impressive achievements to 
show when compared to previous neoliberal governments and this should 
be granted to him, we should not, however, exaggerate his egalitarian eff ect 
in Bolivian society, which, when examined critically, is neither as big as was 
hoped for nor as radical as it is believed to be.
Evo and the Iron Law of Oligarchy
Evo’s fi rst cabinet of 2006 was something else! Th e Minister of Justice was an 
indigenous Quechua cholita, as were the Presidents of the two Cámaras. Th e 
Minister of Foreign Aff airs and the Minister of Education were Aymaras. Th e 
cabinet also included those who had been involved with the social move-
ments that had led the cycle protest that preceded the elections and had in a 
way ‘carried’ the MAS on their backs to the government seat: activists and 
spokespersons of the Cochabamba Water War, cocalero leaders, represen-
tatives of unions, neighbourhood assemblies and social organizations, and 
especially the organizations that had formed the MAS (the Six Federations 
of Coca producers of the Tropic of Cochabamba, the FNMCB-BS and the 
CSUTCB). Th ree fourths of the ministerial cabinet were men and one fourth 
women (4/16). Th ere were also a number of experienced technocrats (econ-
omists, lawyers, sociologists), who were not involved with the movements 
but had, however, identifi ed themselves with the MAS. Th ey were called in-
vitees or intellectuals, and they were off ered vice -ministerial positions. Th e 
fi rst ministerial cabinet represented the rise of the popular movements, as 
eleven leaders from diff erent social organizations headed 10 of the 16 minis-
tries. Statistically, the popular movements represented 68.75 per cent of the 
cabinet compared to the 31.25 per cent of the ‘invitees’.5
It is of no surprise, therefore, that the political and economic elites of the 
country felt threatened, especially aft er the proclamation of the Constitu-
tional Assembly that rewrote the country’s Constitution, in which many rep-
resentatives of the popular sectors and the social movements participated 
actively. Allied with the MAS in the Constituent Assembly was the Unity 
Pact, a social movement alliance that consisted of representatives of lowland 
and highland indigenous-peasant popular organizations, including the Con-
federación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous 
Peoples of Bolivia, CIDOB), the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas of Qul-
lasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu, CONAMAQ), 
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the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(Unifi ed Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia, CSUTCB), 
the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias 
de Bolivia ‘Bartolina Sisa’ (‘Bartolina Sisa’ National Confederation of Peas-
ant, Indigenous, and Aboriginal Women of Bolivia, CNMCIOB-BS) and the 
Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (Syn-
dicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia, CSCIB) 
(Webber 2017b: 335).
Th e country’s elites felt threatened and reacted. Since institutionally they 
were defeated and there was no candidate to counter Evo, they focused their 
reactionary project in the Media Luna (Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija) au-
tonomy issue. Institutional eff orts failed: the right-wing referendum to oust 
the government resulted in success for Evo and his vice president (67%) and 
also eventually led to the removal of oppositional prefects in the depart-
ments of Cochabamba and La Paz and their replacement by pro-government 
ones. Ahead of total failure, the opposition opted for extra-parliamentary 
means of action, as Webber (2017b) also emphasizes. From September 9 to 
September 16 2008, a number of right-wing mobilizations took the form of 
marches and occupations of government offi  ces and airports in the Media 
Luna departments. In Porvenir, in the region of Pando, a number of govern-
ment supporters were assassinated by the right-wing opposition. Th at was 
it: the government retook Pando militarily, while a massive mobilization of 
peasant and indigenous organizations surrounded Santa Cruz and started 
participating in street battles in defence of the government. Eventually, the 
autonomist opposition was defeated in the streets as well.
Until 2010, the MAS had been in constant confl ict with the Right but 
without taking any radical measures that would undermine their economic 
privileges. It has governed, as Webber and Carr have put it, as an izquierda 
permitida (permitted left ): ‘Th e new model abandoned features of neolib-
eral orthodoxy but retained its core faith in the capitalist market as the prin-
cipal engine of growth and industrialization. Government revenue spiked, 
but international reserves were accumulated at record levels, while social 
spending decreased as a proportion of GDP’ (Webber and Carr 2013: 169). 
It maintained a capitalist economic logic, managing social protest through 
cooptation (redistribution of income gained from increased hydrocarbon 
royalties) or repression (the indigenous at TIPNIS for example were called 
‘counter-revolutionary’ and were accused of being funded ‘by the gringos’), 
and managed to control the crisis that the oppositional Right had caused in 
2008 without further complications. With time, it also distanced itself from 
its social base. In 2007, a major cabinet replacement of the representatives 
of the popular movements took place: of the sixteen ministers, only seven 
had a social movement background (43.75 %, with 56.25 % being techno-
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crats), while by 2013 only 15 per cent had a social movement background. 
At the same time, even in the cocalero strongholds in the Chapare people 
were complaining of a top-down disciplining of diff erent opinions by the 
party, and the phrase dictadura sindical described the MAS’ attitude towards 
the Chapareño cocaleros. In a way, the case of the MAS once again ratifi ed 
Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels 1999).
By 2010, when the commodity boom that allowed Bolivia’s growth 
(and redistributive state attitude) was over and the fi rst signs of the fi nan-
cial crisis were starting to aff ect the country, Evo Morales’ administration 
changed course towards the right-wing opposition as well (and vice versa). 
Rubén Costas, the governor of Santa Cruz who had led the 2008 anti-gov-
ernment protests was now on visibly better terms with Evo Morales, while 
agro-business organizations that had assisted the 2008 coup eff ort were 
now having regular consultations with the President, notes Jeff ery Web-
ber (Webber 2017b: 338). Starting in 2010, it seems that a pact was made: 
the Right would embrace Evo’s statesmanship, and in return he would of-
fer their agro-businesses (mainly coca, soy and quinoa) a considerable ex-
tension of their cultivated surface area that would triple their exports by 
2025. Th is off er was accompanied by relevant infrastructural extensions and 
energy subsidies (ibid.: 343–44). With the pact, ‘the government of social 
movements’ was now entering a new phase.
Conclusion
Th is chapter tried to evaluate the MAS’ social and political performance af-
ter fourteen years in the Palacio Quemado, as the Bolivian Palace of Govern-
ment is known. Th e MAS entered the Palacio Quemado for the fi rst time in 
2006, riding on a wave of popular protests that toppled two Presidents be-
tween 2000 and 2005 and articulated radical political proposals that evolved 
around: a) horizontal – or communitarian – democratic principles, and b) 
state ownership or social ownership of natural resources, which would re-
verse the until then neoliberal government policies. Evo Morales became 
the fi rst indigenous President of Bolivia, while his fi rst ministerial cabinet 
was characterized by the strong presence of political activists that had been 
involved with the popular protests. Fear and hope was the country’s (and the 
world’s) reaction: fear for the political and economic elites, and hope for the 
indigenous and the poor and marginalized. A new Constitution was negoti-
ated, one that – theoretically at least – safeguards the rights of Pachamama 
(mother earth) and has buén vivir (living well) as its main principle, and an 
autonomist movement on behalf of the Right was successfully countered by 
the MAS and its social bases. Th e MAS did indeed negotiate new royalty 
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regimes with the multinationals that were exploiting the country’s hydrocar-
bons (it called it ‘nationalization’), and it did indeed redistribute the income 
it gained from this negotiation (and the commodity boom until 2010) to the 
least privileged Bolivians. As a result, Bolivia has experienced an impressive 
reduction in poverty rates and an increased GNI per capita over the past 
fourteen years. Th ese are no minor feats.
However, the MAS’ performance remains far from being egalitarian and 
equally far from fulfi lling the expectations it raised with its elections. Demo-
cratic processes within the party have actually deteriorated; the ‘process of 
change’ has been personifi ed in Evo Morales himself, while a pact with the 
Right was negotiated aft er 2010. In short: the MAS did ease the misfortunes 
of the poor without having to disempower the rich. Bolivia remains a deeply 
unequal society; the country’s development model is based on the exploita-
tion (not the protection) of nature, while dissident voices are treated as 
‘counter-revolutionary’. While it is important at a symbolic level to have an 
indigenous person for President, what really matters is the policies he/she 
makes; it is important at the discursive level to have a radical rhetoric, but 
what matters is its materialization. Identity politics became the fl agship of 
MAS and brought it to the government seat, but class politics are still under-
mining political, social and economic dynamics, regardless of how passé they 
may sound.
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NOTES
 1. El Chapare region is the birthplace of the cocalero movement the Six Federations of 
the Tropic of Cochabamba, led by Evo Morales. 
 2. Author’s translation from Spanish.
 3. Th e Bolivian GINI coeffi  cient was at 42 in 1990. It reached 58.5 in 2005 and dropped 
to 45.8 in 2015, according to the World Bank (accessed, April 2017). 
 4. Interview with Alejandro Almaraz, conducted by Leonidas Oikonomakis and 
Tomás Astelarra in Cochabamba, September 9, 2013.
 5. For a detailed analysis of the fi rst ministerial cabinet see Oikonomakis and Espinoza 
(2014).
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CHAPTER 4
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WHAT IS IN THE ‘PEOPLE’S INTEREST’?
Discourses of Egalitarianism and ‘Development 
as Compensation’ in Contemporary Ecuador
Erin Fitz-Henry and Denisse Rodríguez
On Sunday 4 February 2018, President Lenín Moreno continued one of Ec-
uador’s most prominent political rituals of recent times: the consulta popu-
lar. Th e popular consultation is a country-wide survey administered by the 
National Electoral Council (CNE) and intended to gauge the views of citi-
zens on a range of possible constitutional amendments. It requires citizens 
to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to a series of questions pertaining to key 
governance issues – from bureaucratic corruption to indefi nite presidential 
terms. Consultas and referenda have been performed repeatedly over the 
past decade by the country’s ruling left ist party, Alianza País (AP). Th e sur-
vey in February 2018 was the fi rst to be overseen by the new government – a 
government that although formally affi  liated with AP hoped to use the sur-
vey to solidify its distance from some of the more problematic policy tenets 
of former president Rafael Correa.
Th e citizen’s revolution was a thoroughgoing project of socio-economic 
transformation initiated by Correa in 2007. Aft er years of neoliberal rule 
that had driven the country to economic collapse in 1999, the revolution 
aimed to radically reorient the productive matrix of Ecuadorian society, 
reassert national sovereignty in the face of destabilizing foreign infl uences, 
reject unequal terms of trade with the Global North and move decisively 
away from the kind of reliance on oil exports that had marked some of the 
darkest chapters of the country’s history (Sawyer 2004). A key cornerstone 
of the project, as Pablo Andrade (2013) has recently noted, was the substi-
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tution of ‘representative liberal democracy for a participatory democracy’ – 
the latter being most evidenced by direct weekly television broadcasts from 
the former president, signifi cant civil society involvement in the re-writing 
of the 2008 constitution and repeated invitations to the Ecuadorian public 
to vote on key governance questions as part of constitutional referenda like 
that which took place in February. However, as Conaghan and De la Torre 
(2008) have pointed out, this sort of democracy in practice looks more like 
a ‘plebiscitary democracy’ than a participatory one – a form of democracy 
in which the primary aim is to reaffi  rm the government’s legitimacy through 
recurrent popular consultations.
For the fi rst time since AP’s 2007 ascent to power, however, the referen-
dum of February 2018 included questions that asked about the protection of 
ecosystems endangered by mining and oil exploration – extractive activities 
that, as many scholars have noted (Bebbington 2010; Escobar 2010; Gudy-
nas 2009; Acosta and Martínez 2011), underwent signifi cant intensifi cation 
during the administration of Correa and proved to be considerably socially 
destabilizing. During the decade of Correa’s rule (2007–2017), the country 
opened itself to large-scale metal mining for the fi rst time, intensifi ed agri-
business and other large-scale industrial activity, and further deepened its 
engagement with oil extraction in areas of the Amazon previously free of 
drilling. Th e results of the February fourth consulta, however, seemed to 
suggest a promising shift  away from this much-critiqued extractive develop-
ment model. Two questions in particular focused on a possible slowing of 
the country’s hitherto aggressive investment in non-renewable resources.1 
Despite hesitations about the carefully evasive wording of these questions, 
communities who had long been persecuted by Correa endorsed the results 
of the consulta as evidence that Lenín Moreno was no longer ignoring the 
voices of the opponents of extractive development. Despite Correa’s broad 
appeal to large segments of the working and lower-middle classes as an os-
tensibly ‘populist-socialist’ president committed to a wholesale rejection of 
what he famously termed the ‘long dark night of neoliberalism’, many oppo-
nents of his development model had experienced the ten years of the ‘citi-
zen’s revolution’ as actively hostile to the needs of rural, campesino (peasant 
farmers) and indigenous communities directly aff ected by large-scale devel-
opment projects. In fact, Correa was regularly accused by both national and 
international human rights groups of using egalitarian discourses of wealth 
redistribution and poverty reduction to criminalize defenders of ecosystems, 
to divide communities on the frontlines of extractive projects and to other-
wise repress social protest (Becker 2013; Dávalos 2013; Martínez 2013).
If Correa had become synonymous with an oversized state bureau-
cracy, a highly centralized political structure, an authoritarian approach to 
the wielding of executive power, and an aggressive intolerance of dissent, 
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Moreno and his more environmentally friendly consulta seemed to suggest 
a return to a soft er and more centrist position. Even though he was down-
sizing the state bureaucracy in accord with classically neoliberal tenets and 
actively courting international capital investment in mining, aluminium and 
agro-industry – policy moves that by early 2018 were already beginning to 
earn him the title of ‘traitor’ among supporters of AP – Moreno presented 
a signifi cantly calmer and more inclusive public persona. His ‘government 
for everyone’ seemed at least on the surface to pay considerably more lip 
service to broad-based public participation than had that of his predeces-
sor – a transformation welcomed by large numbers of Ecuadorians who had 
regularly experienced their voices demeaned and dismissed by the previous 
administration.
Critically refl ecting on this moment of transition from Correa’s strong-
armed and heavily centralized state to Moreno’s more conciliatory, more 
explicitly participatory but also more classically neoliberal state, in this 
chapter we begin to take stock of the ambiguous legacies of Correa’s ‘citi-
zen’s revolution’ in the context of intensifying extractivism throughout the 
country. More specifi cally, we look back at the regionally uneven ways in 
which Correa’s promises of a more socially and economically egalitarian fu-
ture were imagined, implemented, justifi ed and resisted in two historically, 
culturally and socio-economically distinct regions of Ecuador. Focusing on 
two of the country’s most important development projects – a refi nery and 
petrochemical complex known as the Refi nery of the Pacifi c in the western 
coastal province of Manabí and the Loma Larga gold mine in the southern 
highland province of Azuay (Figure 4.1), we illustrate how the Ecuadorian 
state under Correa’s leadership deployed powerfully egalitarian discourses 
about new forms of material redistribution that would fi nally and fruitfully 
respond to the ‘people’s interests’. Aft er years of neoliberal rule, his self-
consciously egalitarian eff orts to stand up to the power of global fi nancial 
elites – particularly in Washington – represented a sustained assault on en-
trenched political forces in the country that had broken the banking sys-
tem in the late 1990s and left  millions in dire and deepening poverty. At the 
same time, however, in sharp contrast to the powerfully nationalist, anti-
imperialist discourse that characterized all of the government’s major plan-
ning documents (e.g. PNBV 2013–2017), his administration fi nanced his 
‘strategic development’ projects by drawing the country into closer and 
more debt-driven relationships with capital coming from the BRICS (Bra-
zil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), particularly China and Brazil. 
Th e result was a state discourse that repeatedly emphasized the need to pro-
tect the country’s national interest but a practical commitment to capitalist 
modernization that was always signifi cantly oriented toward the interests of 
foreign investors – albeit diff erent investors than those upon whom previ-
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ous neoliberal administrations had relied. How were these contradictions – 
between material redistribution, new forms of social inclusion, deepening 
reliance on Chinese investment and increasingly restricted spaces for pub-
lic contestation of the extractive development paradigm – experienced by 
those living in closest proximity to the ‘strategic projects’ that made the rev-
olution possible?
To answer these questions, we draw on 6–9 months of ethnographic fi eld-
work in each location conducted in 2012–2013 and 2016 respectively. Com-
paring local responses to these projects, we show how communities in their 
direct ‘areas of infl uence’ understood, negotiated and challenged the vision 
of development propagated by the state’s central development agency, 
SENPLADES (the National Secretary of Planning and Development): de-
velopment as compensation. Specifi cally, we show how these communities 
responded to the ‘social compensation’ that Correa made a cornerstone of 
his development policy, supposedly prioritizing communities in regions 
long neglected by the state and those suff ering the direct eff ects of extractive 
activity. A central actor in both projects was Ecuador Estratégico (EE) – a 
public company founded by the government in 2011 and tasked with pro-
viding compensation to communities in the direct ‘areas of infl uence’ of 
strategic projects. Aft er a toxic thirty-year history with companies like Chev-
ron-Texaco, who had extracted oil from the country without providing any 
direct benefi ts to aff ected communities, EE was created with the explicit aim 
of avoiding some of the worst eff ects of the resource curse (Auty 2003). ‘Re-
sources construct happiness’ was its animating slogan – one that appeared 
on banners and billboards across the country intended to showcase the in-
frastructural fruits of extraction. However, in the case of both the Refi nery of 
the Pacifi c and the Loma Larga project, this resource-driven ‘happiness’ has 
yet to materialize. Instead, the story is one of growing disappointment with 
the ‘citizen’s revolution’ and the egalitarian dreams of AP.
Unravelling the diff erent origins, engines and temporalities of this sense 
of disappointment allows us to tease out the regionally uneven ways in which 
Correa’s ‘twenty-fi rst century socialism’ was experienced, embraced, chal-
lenged and, by substantial sectors of the population, ultimately rejected. Our 
argument is that these struggles are driven by ongoing processes of state cor-
poratization that have signifi cant resonances elsewhere in the hemisphere 
(Kapferer and Gold 2017, 2018; Zagato 2018). As the Ecuadorian state re-
confi gured itself in alliance with Chinese capital to address historically 
long-standing inequalities in the world system (particularly vis-à-vis the 
United States) as well as to advance a powerfully materialist vision of wealth 
redistribution, it simultaneously diminished and exacerbated a range of in-
terlinked inequalities, intensifying regional, class and rural/urban cleavages. 
By means of EE, foreign companies from Brazil, Canada and China were 
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provided lucrative investment opportunities that were sold to residents in 
the ‘areas of infl uence’ as evidence of the government’s commitment to so-
cial compensation and buen vivir (good or harmonious living). In Manabí, 
these projects were widely supported until a series of corruption scandals 
began to expose their underlying architecture. In Azuay, on the contrary, 
they were rejected right from the start because they were seen as signs of 
the government’s duplicity and inattention to local demands for diff erent 
forms of egalitarianism, including participation in decision-making and 
self-defi ned development trajectories. Th us, while we do not see in Ecuador 
the ‘constant level of internal warfare’ described by Zagato in his descrip-
tion of processes of state corporatization in Mexico (Zagato this volume), 
we do see sharply intensifying struggles between competing understandings 
of egalitarianism, with campesino and indigenous visions of less hierarchical 
socio-natural relationships still being consistently sidelined in favour of the 
narrow egalitarianism of material redistribution. Th e result has been a con-
siderably polarized political landscape.
To lay the conceptual groundwork for our case studies, we fi rst consider 
Correa’s development paradigm and its articulation at the national level as 
part of major planning documents from SENPLADES and EE.
Extractive Rents and Development as Compensation
Ecuador is one of a number of countries in Latin America currently suff ering 
from what Eduardo Gudynas has called neoextractivism – (Gudynas 2009; 
Gudynas and Acosta 2010) a term used to refer to the wave of large-scale 
natural resource exploitation that has been pursued by progressive govern-
ments throughout the region since the early 2000s. Th e neo- in neoextractiv-
ism is intended to underscore diff erences with the extractivism of previous 
export-oriented administrations, both nationalist and neoliberal. Unlike 
these predecessors, the governments of the so-called Pink Tide have worked 
to ensure considerably stronger state participation in the regulation and 
oversight of extractive projects, with the explicit aim of securing higher 
taxes and royalties. Th ese funds are then earmarked for redistribution to the 
poorest sectors of society via direct cash transfers or investments in health, 
infrastructure and education. Th ese governments – including Bolivia and 
Venezuela – have consistently praised extractive projects as engines of devel-
opment capable of generating signifi cant revenues for the redistribution of 
wealth if overseen by a robust centralized state free of the shackles of Wash-
ington Consensus orthodoxy. Th e aim is not, they insist, to reject extraction 
as a mode of development but instead to engage in ‘responsible’ extraction 
guided by intelligent, state-led insertion into the global market in ways that 
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avoid historically entrenched relationships of subservience to the policy 
whims of the Global North. As the PNBV 2013–2017 puts it: ‘Th e neoliber-
als believed in free trade, while we have sought intelligent insertion in global 
markets. Th ey demanded that political power be concentrated in the hands 
of just a few, while we have imposed the people’s interest as the supreme stan-
dard’. And again, triumphantly: ‘Now social investment is a higher priority 
than servicing the foreign debt’ (SENPLADES 2013).
Th is development strategy – explicitly driven by anti-colonial, anti-impe-
rialist and anti-Washington policy imperatives – is one that has had consid-
erable success, at least by many socio-economic measures. Indeed, though 
the case is not as straightforward in Venezuela, independent economic re-
ports on Bolivia and Ecuador have confi rmed that over the past decade there 
has been both a substantial reduction of extreme poverty and a decline in 
socio-economic inequality. According to Ecuador’s former planning and 
development minister, Pabel Muñoz, between 2007 and 2014 overall pov-
erty rates in Ecuador dropped from 37.5 per cent to 25.5 per cent. Not dis-
similarly, the ECLAC (Economic Commission on Latin America and the 
Caribbean) reports that Ecuador signifi cantly reduced both poverty and 
inequality during the period 2007–2014, with Ecuador assuming the lead-
ing position on both measures among its regional neighbours. According to 
SENPLADES, the Gini coeffi  cient for income declined from .55 in 2014 to 
.46 in 2017. And in addition, under Correa, Ecuador had the highest public 
investment rate in Latin America, at 15 per cent of the GDP.
Th ese represent enormous social gains that we do not want to down-
play. However, particularly in the Ecuadorian case, this highly resource-de-
pendent development strategy has been implemented amidst increasingly 
strong societal demands for a post-extractive economy – one that might bet-
ter incorporate more expansively egalitarian relationships with the natural 
world as well as respect for processes of local decision-making. Long before 
the election of Correa in 2007, indigenous and socio-environmental move-
ments had worked to extend projects of egalitarian transformation both 
across species and into the future, insisting that improved poverty measures 
be formulated always in relation to broader concerns with ecological justice 
and intergenerational wellbeing over the longue durée. In large part because 
of the work of these movements, the now widely diff used notion of buen 
vivir became the conceptual cornerstone of the Ecuadorian development 
model as enshrined in the 2008 national constitution. Along with four land-
mark articles that grant ‘rights’ to nature, buen vivir has animated all of the 
country’s national development plans since.
Despite this explicitly post-colonial and even post-humanist rhetoric, a 
decade later growing numbers of observers have pointed out that the lan-
guage of buen vivir seems to be used most frequently by the government to 
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both justify deepening extractivism and otherwise dismiss the concerns of 
indigenous and environmental organizations – practices widely experienced 
by these movements as ideological betrayals, appropriations and distortions 
of indigenous values (Escobar 2015). While Correa rejected the austere neo-
liberal state that had privileged international debt repayment over social 
welfare, he never seriously questioned the ecologically violent foundations 
of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he saw as necessary to the fi nanc-
ing of the revolutionary project.
‘Accumulation by dispossession’, as Zagato (2018) has recently pointed 
out, has characterized processes of state corporatization in many parts of 
Latin America over the past few decades. In Ecuador, however, this state-
led ‘strategic extractivism’ was repeatedly defended by the administration 
as a necessary intermediary step along the path toward a more genuinely 
post-extractive economy (Acosta and Martínez 2011; Escobar 2010). Th is 
transition is again explained in the PNBV 2013–2017, which outlines the 
temporary strategy to be pursued until 2030, based on:
[A] new model of accumulation, distribution and redistribution . . . that aims 
to turn an economy based on fi nite natural resources into one based on infi nite 
resources . . . Th is transition means that our current dependence on extracting 
non-renewable natural resources will be temporary and decreasing, apace with the 
requirements to fi nance the emergence of a new, sustainable socio-economic 
confi guration, which will assure a steady, sustainable improvement and Good 
Living for all Ecuadorians. (Emphasis in the original, SENPLADES 2013: 37–38)
From the perspective of SENPLADES, extraction was necessary to fi -
nance the poverty alleviation and capacity-building that would eventually 
allow for the creation of a sustainable ‘knowledge economy’. Anyone who 
suggested otherwise, as Correa repeatedly insisted, was a ‘full-belly environ-
mentalist’, a special interest, a reactionary, or an elitist woefully blind to the 
urgent needs of the poor. He consistently rejected more radical visions of 
community self-determination because his commitment to the abolition of 
all privileges – in a sense, his radical economic egalitarianism – meant that 
he most oft en read critics of his regime as representative of dangerous ‘spe-
cial interests’. As again outlined in the PNBV 2013–2017: ‘In an egalitarian, 
equitable society . . . privileges, hierarchies and forms of subordination must be 
eliminated; this will permit more fl uidity in social relations’ (SENPLADES 
2013: 22).
Despite this strong rhetoric about the importance of ‘more fl uidity in so-
cial relations’, social movement eff orts to push for recognition of more egali-
tarian social relationships – particularly relationships that transcend narrow 
species boundaries – were routinely mocked and discounted by Correa, who 
systematically prevented their uptake by the central planning and develop-
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
94 Erin Fitz-Henry and Denisse Rodríguez
ment agencies. As Carlos de la Torre has rightly observed, the Ecuadorian 
administration regularly ‘undermine[d] contestation while simultaneously 
increasing the material inclusion of the poor and the excluded’ (2013: 29). 
And again, as Mudde and Kaltwasser have put it, writing about Latin Amer-
ican populism more generally, these are administrations that ‘increase par-
ticipation by the inclusion of marginalized groups in society, but limit (the 
possibilities for) contestation’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 20).
As the two case studies that follow demonstrate, however, these tensions 
between material inclusion and discursive exclusion were very diff erently 
experienced in diff erent parts of the country. Th ere is no doubt that Cor-
rea’s redistributive project took the primary form of ensuring that profi ts 
from extractive projects were reinvested in highly visible ways in schools, 
hospitals and roads in the direct ‘areas of infl uence’ of those projects. How-
ever, this redistributive strategy sharply intensifi ed core periphery dynamics 
within the country, creating relations of extreme dependence on the state 
(which mirrored those between core and peripheral countries in the world 
system) and actively preventing the penetration of the more expansively 
egalitarian visions of ‘peripheral’ communities into the decision-making 
‘core’ of the central planning agencies (Andrade 2013). Attention to these 
regional dynamics allows us to better understand the uneven ways in which 
the national project of ‘egalitarian transformation’ has played out – inadver-
tently amplifying long-standing regional diff erences and coming into con-
fl ict with diverse understandings of the various dimensions and meanings of 
egalitarianism.
To illustrate these dynamics in greater detail, we now move to our two 
case studies of extractive development projects, the fi rst the Refi nery of the 
Pacifi c and the second the Loma Larga gold project.
Refi nery of the Pacifi c: ‘They Promised Us Houses, 
but We Only See Houses for the Authorities!’
Ecuador has a long history with oil extraction – one that, despite protes-
tations to the contrary (Davidov 2013), continued to intensify under the 
Correa administration, with new concessions opened in the Amazon and 
in indigenous territories previously free of drilling (Flora, Silva and Valdivia 
2016). However, while the country has long been known for exporting oil, 
it has never had suffi  cient refi ning capacity to process its reserves, and as 
a result it has relied on imports of petrochemical products including high-
octane gas, diesel, oil, alcohol and a range of plastics. It was to remedy this 
situation that in 2007 Correa announced plans for the largest investment 
project in the history of the country: the Refi nery of the Pacifi c (RDP). Th e 
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RDP was one of the very fi rst development projects announced by Correa 
aft er his 2006 election – the fi rst complete petrochemical complex in the his-
tory of the country that would refi ne and process more than 300,000 barrels 
of heavy crude a day. It was, Correa frequently noted, a project critical to the 
economic health of the country and one that made considerable economic 
sense. Projected to save the government an estimated USD nine billion dol-
lars annually as it transitioned from being an importer to an exporter of re-
fi ned products, the RDP was envisioned as the most ‘emblematic’ project on 
the road to achieving energy sovereignty (soberanía energética).
Th is focus on energy sovereignty was part of a broader commitment on 
the part of the Correa government to reducing dependence on all kinds of 
imported ‘products’ – whether neoliberal economic prescriptions from 
Western Europe, military installations from the United States, or petro-
chemical products from elsewhere in the world. A key cornerstone of this fo-
cus was the building of South-South links (particularly in terms of fi nancing) 
and regional political solidarity (particularly with Venezuela and Bolivia). 
Towards that end, the project was formally initiated via a memorandum of 
understanding between the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA 
and the Ecuadorian state-owned oil company PetroEcuador on January 7, 
2008. Th e two joined forces in a highly visible demonstration of regional sol-
idarity to form the RDP Eloy Alfaro in 2008 – a mixed company in which 
PDVSA originally held 51 per cent of the interest and PetroEcuador 49 per 
cent. Some six months later, the site planned for the facility was inaugurated 
at a groundbreaking ceremony featuring Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa 
approximately 20 kilometres from the city of Manta in the western coastal 
province of Manabí. Despite the powerfully nationalist rationale for the 
project – Correa talked repeatedly about the importance of energy sover-
eignty for the nation that the refi nery would make possible – he was always 
careful to position it fi rst and foremost as a benefi t to the long-neglected 
province of Manabí. As he explained in 2013: ‘Th is province, the same as 
the other 23, will never again be forgotten by the government of the citizen’s 
revolution.’ And again, in 2016, when support for the project was beginning 
to fl ag: ‘Don’t let anyone steal this historic project from you, this project that 
will change the reality of Manabí, and all of Ecuador . . .’
Th is placement of Manabí before Ecuador in Correa’s 2016 statement was 
not coincidental. Instead, this provincial focus was very much in line with 
the development strategy most clearly articulated by EE – to ensure that 
extractive activities within the ‘strategic’ sectors directly and immediately 
benefi t communities in the ‘areas of infl uence’ of those activities. In Manabí, 
this commitment was felt particularly acutely, and as a result the RDP was 
enthusiastically welcomed – at least in the early days of the ‘citizen’s revolu-
tion’. Manabí is the eleventh poorest province in Ecuador, profoundly arid 
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with periodic droughts and fl ooding associated with El Niño and some of 
the worst infrastructure in the country. According to the latest Housing and 
Population Census, poverty rates hover around 63 per cent in rural areas and 
38 per cent in urban areas. Approximately 26.8 per cent of the population 
receive bonos de desarrollo (conditional cash transfers). By comparison, for 
Azuay, the province in which the Loma Larga project is located, the poverty 
rate is closer to 18 per cent in rural areas and 9 per cent in urban areas (INEC 
2010). It is a part of the country that has long suff ered the neglect of the cen-
tral state and that has felt bitterly left  behind by the concentration of political 
and economic power in the provinces of Pichincha and Guayas, which many 
in Manabí accuse of monopolizing funds that they believe should be distrib-
uted to the rest of the country.
When Correa announced in 2008 that Manabí would become home to 
the largest investment in the country’s history, the RDP was enthusiastically 
welcomed. Despite a few pockets of university and NGO-led resistance con-
cerned about the potential environmental impacts of the complex (water 
contamination, the interruption of migratory pathways, the potential for 
leakages and fi res, and so forth), the majority of residents eagerly awaited 
the arrival of the petrochemical industries Correa promised would fl ourish 
alongside the refi nery. A construction boom ensued as the city prepared to 
house the 22,000 labourers that the government estimated would eventually 
be necessary to run the facility. Apartment complexes built by local and in-
ternational developers began to be built along the coast. Heavily backed by 
Chinese capital, the government improved roads in and out of the area – an 
infrastructural investment that proved an enormous source of excitement to 
locals, who prided themselves on now having ‘world-class’ roads. For once, 
it seemed to residents, Manabí was not only in the government’s sight but 
even central to its most foundational project of recovering national sover-
eignty – in this case, energy sovereignty – aft er decades of ‘the long neolib-
eral night’ (Fitz-Henry 2015).
Th e RDP, however, was widely accepted not just because of its symbolic 
centrality to Correa’s ‘citizen’s revolution’. It was also embraced for more 
pragmatic reasons. Because of the administration’s commitment to prior-
itizing communities in the ‘areas of infl uence’ of large extractive projects, 
services and investments that had never before been priorities to the central 
government came to the foreground (if not always to fruition). Particularly 
notable were the development projects overseen by EE that invested nearly 
a quarter of its overall national funding in Manabí between 2014–2017, 
spending approximately 213 million USD dollars between 2014 and 2017. 
According to EE, in the area of infl uence of the RDP alone a total of 20.1 
million USD dollars on thirty projects have been spent since 2011. Th e most 
important of these have been water treatment plants and potable water proj-
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ects in some of the rural areas in which they were previously lacking; the 
construction of houses as part of a programme called ‘Sí Mi Casa’; and rural 
health centres in El Aromo and Bajos de la Palma. In addition to these ma-
jor investments on the part of EE, the RDP-Eloy Alfaro – like many private 
companies increasingly concerned with corporate social responsibility – has 
directly invested additional funds in organic agriculture projects for elemen-
tary school students, support for Panama hat (paja toquilla) production and 
the training of local agricultural professionals, further fi lling service provi-
sion roles long neglected by the state. By far the most important of these 
projects has been a 93 kilometre aqueduct that brings water from a nearby 
dam (La Esperanza) to the city of Manta. Th e aqueduct carries approxi-
mately 4,000m3 per hour, with 2,000m3 per hour being supplied to Manta 
and neighbouring municipalities. In a province as arid as Manabí, and as his-
torically neglected in terms of urban water infrastructure, such projects are 
read by many as evidence of a dramatic shift  in government policy towards 
attending to those provinces traditionally only attended to during election 
cycles. 
While these projects remain critically important to maintaining the RDP’s 
‘social license to operate’, ten years into the ‘citizen’s revolution’, however, 
local anticipation of the ‘largest investment in the country’s history’ has be-
gun to dwindle. In 2008, Correa famously exalted the project as pivotal to the 
country’s ‘great leap toward industrialization’. However, by 2018, this ‘great 
leap’ looked more like a series of sporadic and desultory jumps. Despite con-
tinuing support for the ‘revolutionary’ project of AP (67% of the presidential 
vote in Manabí went to Lenín Moreno in 2017 – a percentage higher than 
any other province in the country), by 2018 the mood in relation to the re-
fi nery had become one of dim optimism tempered by growing frustration. 
Th ere were three primary reasons for this frustration: 1) impatience with 
the ongoing lack of fi nancing; 2) a sense of deepening anger about how little 
had been rebuilt in Manabí by EE aft er a devastating April 2016 earthquake; 
and 3) worries about corruption scandals involving the Brazilian construc-
tion company Odebrecht, which had been responsible for the building of the 
aqueduct. Th e latter in particular continues to hang over the project as more 
and more public offi  cials affi  liated with the Correa government are charged 
with accepting bribes from Odebrecht.
Despite promising talks in 2012–2013 with CNPC (the China National 
Petroleum Corporation) and the ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China), Ecuador has still been unable to secure suffi  cient investment capital 
for the project. To date, every potential partner has either withdrawn from 
the project or failed to formalize its commitment to it, largely because of 
the massive size of the investment required (over 15 billion USD) as well as 
the slump in crude oil prices that began in 2013. While Correa was much 
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critiqued for looking so heavily to China and other Asian economies for fi -
nancing the refi nery and for thereby intensifying Ecuadorian indebtedness 
to China (he was frequently accused of ‘mortgaging’ the country to China), 
in Manabí, such capital would have been warmly welcomed. Despite grum-
blings about a potential infl ux of Chinese labourers and paranoid jokes about 
‘the Chinese’ more generally, most residents simply wanted the complex to 
be completed and the 22,000 jobs promised by Correa at the start of the ‘cit-
izen’s revolution’ to materialize. Instead, as late as January 2018, President 
Moreno was still trying to consolidate fi nancing by opening the bidding pro-
cess to a wider range of investors. Th e terrain had been cleared and the aq-
ueduct constructed, but none of the actual infrastructure for the facility had 
begun to be built. Perhaps most disappointingly to locals, only ninety people 
still worked on the project, with more appearing to have their contracts ter-
minated by the day.
Th ese facts are only the most recent in a string of accumulating disap-
pointments. On 16 April 2016, the most devastating earthquake in almost 
forty years hit just off  the coast of Pedernales in the northern part of Manabí. 
Registering 7.8 on the Richter scale, it killed 700 people and injured approxi-
mately 16,000 others, causing Correa to immediately declare a state of emer-
gency. In Manta, large sections of the city were demolished. While many 
had welcomed the RDP at least in part because of the development proj-
ects of both the RDP-Eloy Alfaro and EE, in the wake of the earthquake, 
that sentiment began to shift  because of EE’s seeming inability to respond 
to the magnitude of the disaster. It is the objective of EE to invest in both 
zones aff ected by natural disasters and the ‘areas of infl uence’ of strategic 
extractive projects. Although it provided more than 400 houses to some of 
the most aff ected families, many were critical about the inadequacy of the 
overall government response. Some three years on, much of the downtown 
area remains in rubble.
EE’s response to the earthquake was not the only source of local disap-
pointment. Indeed, in the months following the earthquake, corruption 
scandals related to the now notorious Brazilian construction company Ode-
brecht began to rock the Correa administration. As was the case in numer-
ous other Latin American countries, investigations by the Contraloría in 
2017 confi rmed that both the clearing of the terrain for the RDP and the 
building of the aqueduct were authorized via contracts with Odebrecht that 
included substantial irregularities. Whistleblowers from Odebrecht later 
revealed that the company had paid in excess of USD 30 million dollars in 
bribes to Ecuadorian offi  cials for contracts for major infrastructure projects, 
including the RDP. To date, numerous high-ranking public offi  cials from 
Correa’s government have been arrested, including most notoriously the 
vice president from his fi nal term, Jorge Glas, who is currently serving a six-
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year prison term for accepting 14 million USD in bribes. As this news began 
to circulate in Manabí, many began to talk not just about incompetence or 
inadequacy on the part of EE but wide-ranging corruption that had seeped 
into the highest levels of the administration. Th e penetration of foreign cor-
porate interests into the very heart of these development projects began to 
cast a shadow over Correa’s frequent proclamations of commitment to na-
tional sovereignty and ‘the people’s interest’.
Despite these concerns, many residents still hope for the realization of 
Correa’s hyper-modernist vision of the coast as a pre-eminent industrial cen-
tre for the manufacture and export of petrochemical products. Aft er years 
of neglect by the neoliberal administrations that preceded the ‘citizen’s rev-
olution’, they remain hopeful that this ‘great leap toward industrialization’ 
will eventually come to pass, creating unprecedented employment oppor-
tunities for a whole generation of students who trained in petrochemical 
engineering. Unlike around the mining project in the southern highlands, 
which we will explore next, in Manabí there is no substantial resistance to 
the project on environmental grounds. While many recognize the environ-
mental dangers of refi ning oil as well as the economic challenges of excessive 
dependence on fl uctuating oil prices and dwindling supplies, there is little 
coordinated indigenous presence to spearhead a resistance movement based 
around broader and less extractive-focused conceptions of buen vivir. On 
the contrary, there remains powerful support for the transformative project 
initiated by Correa, who is still seen as having begun the work of levelling the 
playing fi eld between provinces historically divided by enormous regional 
inequality. If, however, in Manabí, Correa is seen as a sort of anti-neolib-
eral hero who began the redistributive work long promised by previous gov-
ernments but never delivered, in the southern highland province of Azuay, 
where the Loma Larga gold mine is planned, he looks more like a fascist 
dictator. It is towards this project that we now turn.
Resources that Construct Happiness? Neoextractivism in 
the Areas of Infl uence of the Loma Larga Mining Project
Ecuador has not historically been a mining country. While artisanal min-
ing has been developed since pre-colonial times, large-scale metal min-
ing (that is, industrial mining with daily production volumes of more than 
1,000 tons) has just recently been defi ned as a ‘strategic sector’ for the im-
plementation of the new model of accumulation, distribution and redistri-
bution (SENPLADES 2013). Mining as a strategic sector is articulated to 
the achievement of the PNBV 2013–2017, which states that in the fi rst stage 
(2016–2020) the economy of the country will be sustained principally by 
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extractive activities (Ministerio de Minería 2016). In line with this policy, 
the government has defi ned and supported fi ve strategic mining projects for 
‘development’, all owned by Chinese and Canadian companies: San Carlos 
Panantza, Mirador, Fruta del Norte, Rio Blanco and Loma Larga. Just as in 
Manabí there has been a growing penetration of corporate interests into the 
centre of ostensibly nationalist development projects associated with the 
RDP, so too in Azuay we are witnessing ongoing processes of state corpo-
ratization (Kapferer 2010; Kapferer and Gold 2017, 2018), whereby mining 
projects – highly dependent upon foreign and particularly Chinese capital – 
become fi nancially central to the sociopolitical transformations promised 
by the ‘citizen’s revolution’. While the state has been strengthened to regain 
control over these ‘strategic sectors’, it has at the same time granted unprec-
edented resource extraction rights to foreign companies and interceded to 
off er convenient conditions for the extractive industry. Th ese include en-
hancement of the mining sector, laws and social programmes that provide 
strong support in building community support for mining, legal and fi scal 
incentives to the industry, and operational advantages including invest-
ments in infrastructure and abundant access to water. Th e Ministry of Min-
ing repeatedly emphasizes these advantages as part of its ongoing eff orts to 
demonstrate Ecuador’s commitment to becoming ‘the new mining frontier 
of Latin America’ (as the country was presented in the forum ‘Mines and 
Money – Americas’, held in Toronto in September 2016).
Mining for development is justifi ed through the same redistributive logic 
explored in the case of the RDP. Specifi cally, the mining law establishes that 
‘60% of the royalties will be primarily invested in social projects to cover 
unsatisfi ed basic needs and productive or territorial development . . . in the 
areas directly aff ected by mining activity’. Despite these commitments to 
material redistribution, however, there is – and has been for many years – 
powerful resistance around Loma Larga to the forms, outcomes and inten-
tions behind these ‘local’ investments.
Loma Larga is located in the southern highlands in the province of Azuay, 
approximately 30 kilometres south-west of the country’s third most import-
ant city, Cuenca. Th e Canadian company INV Metals has owned the project 
since 2012, when it acquired it from another Canadian company, IAMGOLD, 
which had held the mining concession since 1999. INV is currently preparing 
the feasibility study prior to signing the exploitation contract with the Minis-
try of Mining. Th e underground mine at Loma Larga will produce 3,000 tons 
per day of gold, silver and copper ore over the twelve years that comprise 
the expected life of the mine (RPA 2016). Th e mine will be constructed in an 
exceptionally sensitive ecosystem – the páramo of Kimsakocha, valued for 
the provision of ecosystem services and as a cultural landscape (Buytaert et 
al. 2006; Hofstede et al. 2014). It supplies thousands of urban and rural water 
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systems and sustains the agro-pastoral livelihoods of the surrounding rural 
parishes of the cantons of San Fernando, Girón and Cuenca.
In contrast to Manabí, Azuay’s poverty rate is 15 per cent – the second 
lowest in the country. Only an estimated 5.76 per cent of the population are 
benefi ciaries of bonos de desarrollo (MIES 2017). In this southern highland 
province, signifi cantly fewer people live within the ‘areas of infl uence’ of the 
project than is the case in Manabí around the RDP. Th eir main economic 
activity is agriculture and cattle breeding for dairy production. For this rea-
son, people throughout the zone primarily identify as campesinos, and the 
vast majority of them strongly believe that mining is not compatible with 
their livelihoods. Based on years of close engagement with these wetlands, 
they fear for the health of the socio-ecosystem of which they are a part, the 
sustainability of their lifeways and the wellbeing of future generations. Th ese 
concerns have fostered a close relationship between local campesinos and 
urban socio-environmental movements, who question the coherence of a 
development model based on the redistribution of extractive rents – a form 
of egalitarianism that is seen by many as perpetuating an inequitable distri-
bution of the burdens and costs of resource extraction.
Th e mining project has been locally resisted since 2003, largely by the 
leaders of a community water system that supplies most households in the 
rural parishes of Cuenca. Open resistance has slowly diminished over time, 
although concerns over the impacts of mining throughout the páramo have 
persisted, with community members exhibiting signifi cant levels of anguish 
and a sense of powerlessness. Th is eff ect is directly related to their experi-
ence of marginalization by the Correa government, which repeatedly proved 
itself unwilling to address local worries about how extractivism might neg-
atively aff ect their lives, their children, their traditions and their futures. 
According to Pablo Ospina, the population’s demands for participation in 
environmental decision-making and broader conversations about post-ex-
tractive futures came into confl ict with Correa’s highly centralized natural 
resource governance structure and his perspective on social protest as an 
attempt to challenge his authority. As explained by two citizens from Girón, 
criminalization of social protest increasingly led to self-censorship:
Woman 1: Almost all the communities here are against [mining], but we have 
gained nothing aft er so many demonstrations! We cannot do anything!
Woman 2: Th e government put in jail a woman that made signs with the fi nger!
W1: Th at is scary! Because we truly are poor mice compared to father Correa 
because he is from the heights doing everything.
W2: He commands alone!
W1: Th en, what for? So he crushes us poor.
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Th is vision of the ex-president as an all-commanding fi gure contrasts 
sharply with the vision of many in Manabí, for whom instead of an all-com-
manding dictator, Correa represented a heroic, even quasi-mythical defender 
of regional equality aft er years of neoliberal neglect. In Azuay, also unlike in 
Manabí, there was extensive questioning of Correa’s vision of development, 
which locals perceived as having been imposed rather than agreed upon in 
consultation with communities (as required by the constitution). Th e cen-
tral points of contention between the communities and the government had 
to do with 1) the persistent lack of support for the local dairy industry; and 
2) the narrow approach to ‘social redistribution’ or ‘development as com-
pensation’ represented by EE.
Th e province of Azuay is the second largest breeder of dairy cattle aft er 
Manabí and the third largest producer by litre of milk (INEC 2016), but it is 
a sector in crisis. For years, dairy farmers have been demanding government 
support to solve ‘el tema lechero’ (the milk problem) through better regula-
tion of the importation of powdered milk, enforcement of a minimum fair 
price per litre of milk so that producers are not forced to sell below market 
price, and exemption from regulations not suited to small-scale livestock 
farming. Nevertheless, through participant observation, we corroborated 
that commissions representing the dairy farmers in several meetings in 
Quito with the Minister of Agriculture (MAGAP) returned without defi nite 
solutions or fi rm commitments to satisfy the populations’ demands. Most 
participants argued that the development approach of the government was 
disengaged from, and inattentive to, local visions of development because 
it did not envision any fi nancial or technical support for the cattle-breeding 
sector. For them, it was obvious that one of the most eff ective ways to pro-
mote local wellbeing (buen vivir) was to ensure their insertion into a fairer 
market and to support agriculture along the specifi c lines demanded by the 
area’s residents. Th e Correa government was not only experienced as hav-
ing failed to support existing economies but it pushed forward with mining 
projects that many feared would irreparably damage the water supplies nec-
essary for farming.
Despite these ongoing concerns, the mining project has continued to ad-
vance, and since 2015 a new actor has been present in the area: Ecuador 
Estratégico. To date, 101 projects have been carried out by EE in Azuay, 
which hosts two ‘strategic projects’: the Chinese-owned Río Blanco mine in 
nearby Molleturo and the Loma Larga mine in Kimsakocha. During the pe-
riod 2012–2017, EE invested some USD 29.5 million – an amount that cor-
responds to only 3 per cent of the total investments of extractive rents across 
the country (EE 2017). During the same period, Manabí received more than 
USD 213 million or approximately 24 per cent of the company’s total invest-
ments. As elsewhere in Ecuador, EE’s investments for local development 
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have been accompanied by a strong marketing campaign that explicitly links 
extractive rents with improvements in local wellbeing (buen vivir). How-
ever, in Azuay, the intensity of this marketing campaign – through banners 
outside of schools, health centres and cyber shops built by EE that boldly 
declare: ‘Th e strategic projects transform your community!’ or ‘Mining 
brings education to your community’ and ‘Mining connects you’ – fostered 
suspicion among many that the communities were not in fact the benefi cia-
ries of a ‘fair redistribution’ of extractive rents. In particular, there are ques-
tions about where the money has come from because the mining companies 
have not yet paid the anticipated royalties that are supposedly responsible 
for these development projects; instead, to date, royalties from other oil ex-
tractive projects in the Amazon have funded them. EE’s marketing of mining 
as the activity that funds these development investments is thus seen as stra-
tegically misleading in ways that it is not in Manabí. As a result, many locals 
increasingly perceive EE as a generator of little more than state propaganda 
used to promote passive acceptance of the project and to facilitate its ‘so-
cial license to operate’ in a situation in which the aff ected communities have 
never been consulted about the project.
Another worry of locals concerning the government’s development vision 
is the approach chosen for the redistribution of extractive rents and the costs 
that have fi gured into those calculations. If employment generated by the 
mine is essentially negligible given the capital but not work-intensive nature 
of the mining industry, the only other option for improving the conditions of 
local inhabitants is the redistribution of rents through social investments. In 
the case of Loma Larga, the most important of these projects is the Unidad 
Educativa del Milenio (UEM) in Victoria del Portete. UEMs are education 
centres built by EE with large investments in infrastructure and advanced 
technology. Paradoxically, a project such as this one that should have sat-
isfi ed the communities was again debated and oft en rejected, with locals 
raising questions about 1) the percentage of funding used for the UEM; 2) 
the government’s motivations behind the funding; and 3) the state’s broader 
approach to education reform, which again seemed to fail to take account of 
local needs.
While some were supportive of the project – any improvement in edu-
cation was welcomed – the amount of funding and the ulterior motives be-
hind the building of the school were widely debated. Th e implementation of 
the UEM alone cost USD 6.8 million – already fully 45 per cent of the ex-
pected advanced royalties from the Loma Larga project.2 More sustained 
resistance – led by the former president of the Autonomous Decentralized 
Government (GAD) of the parish, who identifi es himself as an anti-mining 
‘water guardian’ – tapped into the growing sense among inhabitants that 
by accepting the school they would be giving their implicit consent to the 
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mining project, which they had been resisting since the early 2000s. Th ey 
perceived the decision to build the school in Victoria del Portete to be moti-
vated by nefarious intentions on the part of the government. Residents sug-
gested that a legitimate, good faith project of trying to improve education in 
the area would have focused on building new schools in locations previously 
without schools and increasing quality and coverage by reinforcing the ex-
isting ones. Instead, the previous schools were simply abandoned and the 
students and professors transferred to a better-equipped modern building in 
the middle of the teaching period, without any process of transition.
Rafael Correa inaugurated the school on October 2015. Th e following is 
a fragment of his speech, which summarizes the government’s discourses 
on the urgent need for resources to alleviate poverty and the inevitability of 
resource extraction for the national good.
UEMs are needed in many territories. Why is it the priority to build it in Vic-
toria del Portete? Because here we have an important mining project — ‘Loma 
Larga’— and you will say ‘I do not like mining’. Neither do I but that is not the 
problem. Th e problem is not if we need mining or not, and of course we do need 
it. If our natural resources [are transformed] into colleges, into schools, into 
roads, into health centres, into hospitals, of course we need mining . . . Th ere is 
not a disgrace anymore to live close to a strategic project, now [those people] are 
lucky because they know that the territories of infl uence of the project will be the 
fi rst in receiving the benefi ts!
Despite these triumphant proclamations – not dissimilar to those that ac-
companied the groundbreaking ceremony for the RDP in 2008 – this case 
study has raised questions about whether economic compensations are 
enough to build a more ‘egalitarian’ economy. Th e positions of the inhab-
itants of the surrounding areas of the Loma Larga project have shown that 
these compensations are perceived very diff erently when people feel they are 
fundamentally losing their sources of subsistence and wellbeing. Th is infl u-
ences the trade-off s they are willing to make. As one campesina summarized: 
‘Even if they give us a little help for the town, if it is in exchange for life, I do 
not think it is fair.’ Many of the people in the ‘area of infl uence’ feel similarly, 
arguing that they would prefer to maintain their current conditions – impov-
erished though they may appear – rather than trying to improve their eco-
nomic status through mining in the páramo. For the surrounding residents, it 
is not enough to simply ‘participate’ by receiving economic compensations 
from extractive rents (De Castro, Hogenboom and Baud 2015). More im-
portantly, they demand participation in decision-making about the forms of 
development most appropriate to their region as well as access to spaces in 
which to voice their broader concerns about the long-term impacts of mining 
exploitation. To be heard, the population has increasingly relied on popular 
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consultations promoted by community organizations such as UNAGUA-
Girón, the Union of Community Water Systems of Azuay. Aft er seven years 
of struggles with the National Electoral Council (CNE) described elsewhere 
(Rodríguez and Loginova 2019), a referendum in Girón was conducted in 
the elections of March 2019 with a rotund 86 per cent of responses against 
mining in the hydrological system of Kimsakocha.
What Does this Comparison Allow Us to See?
Read together, our case studies demonstrate a highly fractured regional 
landscape in the face of deepening extractivism that allows us to off er a few 
concluding refl ections about the intersection of diverse meanings, forms 
and practices of egalitarianism in contemporary Ecuador.
While the ostensibly ‘post-neoliberal’ state under Correa privileged one 
important dimension of egalitarianism – the amelioration of historically en-
trenched material inequalities via projects of state-led and extraction-driven 
redistribution – it did so by systematically rejecting other dimensions, 
namely the participation of aff ected communities in determining develop-
ment projects and priorities. By prioritizing economistic forms of redistri-
bution heavily dependent on foreign capital, it both inadvertently and quite 
intentionally sought to curtail the fl ourishing of diff erently egalitarian values 
such as autonomy, self-determination and freedom from state development 
imperatives. Th ere is no doubt that this powerfully concentrated state was 
to some degree necessary aft er years of an austere, anaemic state that main-
tained intimate connections to the banking sector and that lacked the ca-
pacity to stand up to Washington. Th ere is also no doubt that this robust 
bureaucratic state accomplished some of the most historically signifi cant 
transfers of wealth in Ecuadorian history. However, this national-level com-
mitment to egalitarian reform was very diff erently experienced in diff erent 
parts of the country – sometimes as anything but egalitarian.
In Azuay, as we have seen, where mining is a relatively new and particu-
larly anxiety-producing form of extraction that many fear will damage their 
material and cultural subsistence, the rejection of alternative forms of devel-
opment by the central government was experienced as a sustained assault on 
practices of collective water management and local decision-making, which 
have long been the norm throughout the region. Unlike in Manabí, the Loma 
Larga project has been fi ercely resisted since the beginning – even before 
Correa came to power; but that resistance took a more diffi  cult turn under 
his government. Local responsibilities to land, water and other-than-human 
species meant that Correa’s heavily centralized approach to ‘development 
as compensation’ for large-scale extraction was experienced as brutally in-
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attentive to other, less ecologically invasive forms of egalitarianism – forms 
of equality between human and other-than-human communities that were 
regularly derided by Correa as ‘infantile’. Instead of being perceived as a pa-
ternal provider (as he was in Manabí), Correa was rather seen as a semi-
fascist dictator no longer concerned about ‘his children’ and even invested 
in mocking, vilifying and criminalizing those who dared to challenge the 
government’s vision of buen vivir.
Despite signifi cant improvements in poverty rates throughout the coun-
try, for inhabitants of the direct area of infl uence of the Loma Larga project, 
the dimension of egalitarianism that was both most important and most en-
tirely neglected by the state was broader participation in decision-making 
beyond the institutional ‘core’ and ‘semi-periphery’ of Correa’s post-neolib-
eral natural resource governance model – participation in deciding the most 
important development priorities for the region (support for dairy farm-
ers), in determining the best way of addressing educational defi cits (com-
munity schools), and in moving beyond extractivism (through eco-tourism 
and other non-ecologically invasive alternatives to mining). From Correa’s 
perspective, acknowledging these communities as equal interlocutors in 
a broad-ranging conversation about less ecologically and socially disrup-
tive forms of development would have meant falling victim to the whims 
of ‘special interest groups’ and thus betraying the national project of post-
neoliberal economic reform to which his administration had committed itself. 
In other words, his commitment to something like radical material equality 
meant that he simply refused to attend to the needs of local communities if 
they challenged the extractive projects that he saw as necessary to fi nancing 
his national revolution. Th is was because he saw himself and his administra-
tion as the only authentic voice of the Ecuadorian people as a whole.
If in Azuay the desire was for smaller-scale and more ecologically sus-
tainable projects, in Manabí, on the contrary, the desire for large-scale de-
velopment largely resonated with Correa’s modernist visions of industrial 
transformation. Because Manabí was on the receiving end of EE’s largest 
investments anywhere in the country, it saw rapid investment in a range of 
projects – particularly those focused on much-needed infrastructure around 
water – that it did not read as an unfair bribe to generate consent for the 
presence of the RDP. Quite the contrary. Aft er years of neglect by the central 
government, the RDP was enthusiastically embraced because it represented 
a highly visible material investment on the part of the government in Quito 
unlike any they had ever seen before. Both symbolically and materially, the 
RDP was structured to respond to long-standing regional grievances and 
long-simmering wounds generated by the narrow bi-polarity of Ecuadorian 
political and economic power.
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However, aft er nearly ten years of anticipation, the RDP has also come 
to be widely perceived as yet another project for which the community has 
waited and waited, only to be told that it might not materialize for lack of 
foreign investment – an experience that suggests to growing numbers that 
they are as likely to be as disappointed by the promises of AP as they were 
by the previous neoliberal administrations. Just as in Azuay there are ques-
tions about where the funding is coming from to support the local devel-
opment projects that EE says are coming from the mining companies, so, 
too, in Manabí, there are growing questions about where the capital invest-
ment will eventually come from to make their industrial dreams come true. 
Despite signifi cant investment on the part of EE, the visceral experience of 
growing dependence on the whims of Chinese investment banks and the 
corruption scandals that have accompanied Odebrecht have led to a kind of 
quiet discouragement that is further compounded by the dramatically de-
clining number of jobs.
Nevertheless, this is a profoundly diff erent sort of disappointment than 
that in Azuay. Around the Loma Larga project, there is a deep-seated and 
long-running rejection of the government because it has neglected to prop-
erly consult communities and failed to honour local understandings of more 
genuinely egalitarian relationships with a range of ecosystems. Th ere has 
never been such resistance to the RDP, and there is little doubt that if it were 
to receive the foreign investment it requires, it would again be welcomed in 
Manabí, where the need for jobs for a generation of petrochemical engineers 
remains acutely felt. Despite growing frustration that there is never enough 
development, there has never been any widespread questioning of the model 
of development. In Manabí, Correa’s approach to something like egalitarian 
reform – again, his prioritization of areas long neglected by the state and 
outside the narrow orbit of power historically concentrated in Quito and 
Guayaquil – has continued to have very wide resonance.
As Moreno continues his presidency, it will be interesting to watch how 
these intersecting and diff erently egalitarian projects are transformed, 
particularly around the strategic projects overseen by EE, most likely 
generating further regional tensions and urban/rural cleavages. If his fi rst 
year in offi  ce is anything to go by, he may privilege dimensions of egalitar-
ianism long neglected by his predecessor, particularly in terms of citizen 
participation and intercultural dialogue. However, paradoxically, he may 
also represent a disappointing return to precisely the kind of austere state 
that created the socio-economic inequalities Correa did so much to rectify. 
He will likely do little to challenge the anti-democratic architecture of the 
extractive development model, which has for so long defi ned Ecuadorian 
politics.
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NOTES
 1. Question 5 asked voters if they ‘agreed with amending the constitution to prohibit 
without exception metal mining in all of its stages, in protected areas, in intangi-
ble zones, and in urban centers’ and was approved by 68.62 per cent of the vote. 
Question 7 asked whether they agreed with ‘increasing the intangible zone in Yasuni 
National Park at least 50,000 hectares and reducing the area of oil exploitation from 
1,030 hectares to 300 hectares’. It was approved by 67.31 per cent of the vote.  
 2. According to the terms of the exploitation contract agreed by the Ministry of Min-
ing and INV Metals, USD 15 million will be paid as advanced royalties; USD 5 mil-
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CHAPTER 5
zzz
THE NEOLIBERAL STATE AND 
POST-TRANSITION DEMOCRACY IN CHILE
Local Public Action and Indigenous Political Demands
Francisca de la Maza Cabrera
Introduction
Th e corporatization of the state in Chile occurred under a neoliberal eco-
nomic model imposed by the 1973–1990 military dictatorship, which even 
today still transversally aff ects diff erent aspects of people’s lives. By analys-
ing indigenous policies and indigenous tourism, this chapter examines the 
relationship between the corporate state and the country’s indigenous peo-
ples in a bid to gain a deeper understanding of the diff erent forms of expres-
sion of corporatization and the role of the market, both in public and private 
actions.
Indigenous peoples have historically been most disadvantaged by state 
actions, and this is still apparent today. State occupa tion of their territories, 
public policies and the arrival of resource-based companies mean that they 
have lost not only a large part of their traditional lands but also cultural and 
political elements. In addition, poverty rates are higher than among the 
non-indigenous population. According to the Chilean government’s 2017 
CASEN survey, multidimensional poverty1 among indigenous peoples 
reached 30.2 per cent as compared to 19.7 per cent for the non-indigenous 
population (CASEN 2017). Similarly, the region with the highest multi-
dimensional poverty in Chile is the Araucanía Region with 28.5 per cent, 
above the national average of 20.7 per cent. Th is region is also the heart of 
the Mapuche people’s historical territory, and at 34 per cent the percentage 
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of indigenous inhabitants is the second highest in the country, according to 
the 2017 National Census (INE 2018).
Th ese indicators confi rm that, despite the general economic success 
achieved by Chile under the neoliberal model, gaps exist and the develop-
ment of some sectors of society is limited, such as the indigenous popula-
tion. Th ese fi gures are at odds with the numerous policies and programmes 
implemented in the Araucanía Region to improve the living conditions of 
the indigenous population since the restoration of democracy in 1990 and 
the introduction of an Indigenous Law in 1993. Moreover, confl icts in the 
Araucanía Region between Mapuche communities, resource-based compa-
nies and non-indigenous landowners have worsened, and the state has re-
sponded with policies of repression.
Based on several years of ethnographic work on the state in intercultural 
and indigenous contexts, this chapter seeks to illustrate how the neoliberal 
model and the Chilean political system can be permeated by the interests of 
the market and business, using the concept of the common good as opposed 
to the rights of individuals, indigenous peoples and the environment. We as-
sert that the concept of the oligarchic corporate state (Kapferer 2010) can be 
analysed from the perspective of the state as a cultural construction (Das and 
Poole 2004; Gupta 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Nuijten 2003; Sharma 
and Gupta 2006). In this way, it is possible to study the state ethnographi-
cally, denaturalize it and show that it is not a single body but multiple, di-
verse and contextual; its margins are diff use and it aff ects people’s everyday 
life far beyond its territorial jurisdiction. Th is helps us to understand soci-
ety’s forms of containment and the role of the design and implementation of 
public policies and of public agents themselves.
From an ethnographic perspective and that of construction of the state, 
this chapter  examines, in the context of a corporate state, the ways in which 
policy manifests itself, are geared towards indigenous peoples and, in partic-
ular, the Mapuche people of the Araucanía Region of central-southern Chile. 
First, it provides a brief description of the Chilean neoliberal context and 
its relationship with indigenous peoples before moving on to the concept 
of a diff use and contained state, taking specifi cally ethnographic and local 
spheres of indigenous policy. Th is is followed by an analysis of the Mapuche 
people’s use of institutions as a channel for their demands and, fi nally, of 
indigenous tourism as an example of a specifi c public policy.
Chilean Neoliberal Context and Indigenous Peoples
On 11 March 2018, Sebastián Piñera assumed offi  ce as Chile’s president 
for the second time (his fi rst period was between 2010 and 2014). He is a 
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businessman, one of the richest people in Chile and represents the political 
right. His election occurred in a context of political and social criticism of the 
centre-left  coalition, the Concertación por la Democracia, which governed 
Chile for twenty years aft er the restoration of democracy in 1990 (with four 
consecutive presidents: Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos and 
Michelle Bachelet) and for a fi ft h period, as the Nueva Mayoría coalition, 
between 2014 and 2018, under the second government of Michelle Bachelet.
Th e military dictatorship meant the installation, through force and polit-
ical repression, of the ‘laboratory’ of the neoliberal economic model. Th is 
model comprises a set of economic, social and political measures that in-
clude the privatization of state companies, healthcare and education and a 
reduction in public spending, introducing the free market into various as-
pects of national life. Th is neoliberal shift , which began in 1975, foreshad-
owed the model’s installation in other countries such as Great Britain and 
the United States (Espinoza, Barozet and Méndez 2013; Gaudichaud 2016). 
It meant the transformation of Chilean society in favour of a market that still 
aff ects people’s daily lives today as a result of the privatization of the educa-
tion, health and pension systems, the spatial segregation of poorer segments 
of the population from more affl  uent sectors and the installation of depart-
ment stores, aff ecting small industry.
Democratic governments since 1990 have maintained the neoliberal sys-
tem but sought to correct its consequences in terms of poverty and social 
exclusion. Th ey incorporated new concepts such as equity and social protec-
tion, implemented assistentialist public policies and looked to labour market 
insertion as a means of fostering social mobility for the poorest segments 
(Espinoza et al. 2013; Gaudichaud 2016)
Th e model’s maintenance was a forced consequence of the way it had 
been locked in by the dictatorship and the agreements it reached with the 
incoming democratic government, which imposed political restrictions on 
the so-called post-dictatorship democratic transition. Th is resulted in a lim-
ited democracy, which prevented great transformations of the economic and 
social model established by the dictatorship.
Th e concept of corporate state (Kapferer 2005, 2010) is understood by 
the Chilean state as a signifi cant and growing political construction that per-
mits the creation of new confi gurations of power that are related to social 
eff ects, particularly in the most unprotected segments of the population, 
within which political-economic alliances are established transversally.
Th e concept of corporate state helps us to visualize the processes of re-
structuring the social order that allow the market to expand. Th is has re-
sulted in a reordering process that obliges us to rethink the concept of the 
state in the context of a new economic determinism and of globalization, 
generating new sociopolitical forms (Kapferer 2005).
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In this framework of transition from dictatorship to democracy under the 
neoliberal model, spaces emerged for the discussion and incorporation of 
recognition policies (Taylor 1993) or multicultural policies (Boccara and 
Bolados 2010) for the country’s indigenous peoples. Th is resulted in a par-
ticipatory discussion of the Indigenous Law, which was fi nally promulgated 
in 1993 with various limitations compared to what had been proposed by 
indigenous organizations. Under this Indigenous Law N° 19.253, a number 
of policies targeting the indigenous population were promoted and institu-
tionalized in the state apparatus through specifi c actions or transversally.
According to the 2017 National Census, 12.8 per cent of the country’s 
population identifi es as belonging to an indigenous people (INE 2018). Out 
of these, 79.8 per cent are Mapuche, the largest of the nine indigenous peo-
ples recognized in Chile. Th ere is the issue of the so-called ‘Mapuche confl ict’ 
in the Araucanía Region and neighbouring regions, which is due to historical 
territorial disputes, the presence of resource-based and, particularly, for-
estry companies and other projects that aff ect families’ daily lives.
In the early years aft er the restoration of democracy, the indigenous orga-
nizations that had been formed in opposition to the dictatorship (Mariman 
1995) as well as other social and political organizations (such as students, 
shantytown dwellers and political parties) went through a period of less par-
ticipatory intensity, since many of them had been very active in mobilizing 
against the dictatorship.
However, over the years, many factors conspired to foster the emergence 
of new causes of social discontent. Th ey included the expectations of social 
and political transformation created by the return to democracy, mainly as 
regards political reparation and judgment of those involved in human rights 
violations. Along with this, and complementing it, there was also strong crit-
icism of the perpetuation of the neoliberal model and the role of the market 
and the economy as the key factors in decision-making, oft en at the expense 
of people. As well as causing discontent and political and social frustration, 
this had direct consequences for diff erent aspects of people’s daily life (for 
example, as regards education, pension and health systems, environmental 
protection and respect for indigenous rights). It was also refl ected in the 
perpetuation of a well-off  political class with its origins in the dictatorship. 
In some cases, its members were supporters of, or close to, the dictator; in 
other cases, they were opponents, but ties of economic and political power 
were common to all the diff erent democratic governments, cutting across 
the classic left -right binomial.
From a more macro perspective, the forms of contention (Roseberry 
2002) and social mobilization included the emergence of organizations op-
posed to the neoliberal model in, for example, the environmental and indig-
enous spheres (as in the case of hydroelectric plants, mining projects and 
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aquaculture) and among students (the second university student movement) 
(Rifo 2013). Th is led to the appearance of new leaders and organizations that 
became relevant in this context of demands. Some of the leaders, with their 
origin in the student movements of 2006 and 2010, have gone on, along with 
other organizations, to form the Frente Amplio, a new political coalition that 
brings together some of the organizations opposed to the neoliberal model 
and the traditional political class. Th is new more radical body is constituted 
as a political and social movement that aims to democratically change the 
unequal structures of power and comprises fourteen movements and par-
ties. In the past general election, its presidential candidate came third, with 
a high vote, and it obtained important parliamentary representation: one 
senator and twenty deputies.
Opposition to some investment projects has its origin in indigenous ter-
ritories whose organizations appeal to indigenous rights and are joined by 
environmental groups. One such emblematic case was the construction of 
hydroelectric dam in the Alto Bío-Bío area of central-southern Chile. Th e 
original project envisaged the construction of several dams, which would 
have aff ected not only the natural environment of the river and its basin but 
also the historical territory of the Mapuche-Pewenche people,2 involving the 
resettlement of some of its communities. Th is confl ict, known as Ralco and 
Alto Bío-Bío, brought into play both environmental and indigenous demands 
and resulted in the dismissal of three Mapuche directors of the National In-
digenous Development Corporation (CONADI), an institution created by 
the 1993 Indigenous Law to lead public policy for indigenous peoples, aft er 
they refused to approve land swaps permitted under the Indigenous Law. In 
2003, under the government of Ricardo Lagos, an agreement was reached 
with the communities aft er long negotiations and pressure from the govern-
ment and the company; Pewenche land was subsequently fl ooded and fam-
ilies were resettled.
Th ere has been a sustained increase in environmental confl icts associated 
with indigenous peoples, including confl icts in regard to mining projects 
in northern Chile, such as Pascua Lama (Yañez 2005) and Pampa Colorada 
(Bolados 2014), and the hydroelectric plants in the south. In these, environ-
mental or ecological movements make common cause with the indigenous 
population and their territorial demands.
Th is meeting of ecologists and indigenous peoples is interesting because 
this interaction of opposition movements brings conceptions of indigenous 
society into play in an oft en external and decontextualized struggle, giving 
rise to disputes for power, protagonism and imagery about the relationship 
with nature and the territory. In the case of territorial confl ict and the in-
stallation of companies in indigenous territories, organizations oft en come 
under strong pressure to negotiate with business agents and state interests, 
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leading to fatigue and internal confl icts in the organization that can culmi-
nate in negotiations with  companies. Th e discourse of ecological struggles 
is oft en based on essentialist narratives of indigenous life, which have more 
prominence than the indigenous people themselves. In these negotiation 
processes, mediators, usually hired by the company, or environmental lead-
ers, with important networks of infl uence in both the political and business 
worlds, play a key role.
Th is opposition to the ways in which the public and private spheres oper-
ate, with policies favouring the privatization of services and social rights and 
the installation of resource-based companies, without taking into account 
living or natural conditions in the territories deepens the idea of a crisis of 
the resource-based or neoliberal model. However, there is another import-
ant aspect of this discussion.
A post-transition political crisis, related to corruption, which had histor-
ically been invisible, aggravated discontent with the neoliberal model. In 
recent years, revelations about the management of money for election cam-
paigns or its personal use by politicians and government offi  cials of diff erent 
political colours, at diff erent levels and in diff erent parts of the public admin-
istration, have provided evidence of institutionalized corrupt practices. Th is 
led to a new way of problematizing the public discourse about corruption, 
relativizing and calling into question the picture of Chile as a non-corrupt 
country.
Established common practices such as the use of infl uence in appoint-
ments to certain positions, political contributions by companies and lob-
bying began to be seen as corrupt, deepening the concept of the corporate 
state. Th e concept of corruption at the state level permits closer examination 
of how the state itself, together with the market in a context of globalization, 
can generate its own mechanisms of containment, transformation and dyna-
mism of its activities. We understand corruption as forms of political prac-
tice that are at the limit of the norms defi ned as institutionalized but which, 
nevertheless, form part of the political game of the state. Th ese are exercized 
from the margins and diff use spaces, which allow diff erent agents with some 
power over their context to promote actions that benefi t certain sectors, of-
ten politically. Th ese practices, which can be termed corrupt, are subtle and 
hidden but are accepted by diff erent actors. Although they are usually indi-
vidual, they should be understood as an institutionalized practice that forms 
part of the power relations within the society (Anders and Nuijten 2007).
It follows that the role of the economy and the market has transformed the 
very concept of the nation-state and the public sphere, even beyond its own 
jurisdiction and the limits of its action. It is, therefore, key to understand 
that the construction of the corporate state occurs within the nation-state; it 
depends on local contingencies and takes diff erent forms, but it has reduced 
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its presence and increased that of other actors. In light of this, it is necessary 
to ask whether this loss of presence and control could also be a way in which 
the state reformulates itself in the current neoliberal and mercantilist con-
text. Here, this chapter takes the idea of Mosse (2004; 2005), who examines 
development programmes and shows how unwanted forms are also part of 
the machinery of development agencies. Th is is demonstrated, for example, 
by the fact that more fundamental transformations, such as those proposed 
by Bachelet’s second government, were limited and resisted by diff erent sec-
tors, including within her own coalition.
Following Kapferer (2010), it is impossible for the nation-state to be the 
only entity of control and social order, leading to the emergence of autono-
mous citizen movements that become institutionalized, in this case through 
parliamentary positions or positions of representation.
Diff use and Contained State: Construction of Chile’s Indigenous Policy
Th e Indigenous Law N° 19.253 came into force in 1993, shortly aft er the 
restoration of democracy. It has limited weight because, depending on the 
case, other laws can take precedence. It is, in other words, a ‘second level’ 
law compared to others of ‘national interest’ or that appeal to the ‘common 
good’. Th is was evident in the Ralco confl ict and other local projects where 
the opposition of indigenous communities, their demands and history were 
not respected on the grounds of national interest. Th is indicates a hierarchy 
within which indigenous people are subordinated. Although the law is val-
ued as an achievement of the indigenous organizations that actively partici-
pated in eff orts to restore democracy, it must be viewed in its context. One of 
the demands of the organizations that participated was constitutional recog-
nition as peoples, something they have yet to obtain. One sector of Congress 
opposed the incorporation of the concept of people in the indigenous law 
(reducing it to ‘ethnic groups’) and has, indeed, resisted various attempts 
to give the country’s indigenous peoples constitutional recognition. Th is re -
inforces the political hierarchy of Chile’s unitary national project. Nowa-
days, demand for constitutional recognition goes further in that a number 
of sectors are claiming plurinational recognition. While, on the one hand, 
rights were denied at a certain historical moment, indigenous peoples have, 
on the other, advanced in their demands, creating a lag between legislation 
and demand for rights backed by international legal instruments.
Generally speaking, the policies implemented on the basis of the Indig-
enous Law varied over time and according to the territory of the country’s 
diff erent indigenous peoples. Th is refl ected factors that included contexts, 
environmental and political confl icts, negotiations and diversity in the de-
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mands of the indigenous peoples themselves. In other words, despite being 
unidirectional, policies were developed on the basis of a relationship with 
the indigenous peoples (De la Maza, de Cea and Rubilar 2018). Th e fi rst 
four Concertación governments diff ered in their focus but all brought both 
progress and setbacks. Th eir measures included the introduction of specifi c 
intercultural health and education programmes from 1995, the creation of 
diff erent instances of dialogue and participation and, in general, the imple-
mentation of indigenous policies in the diff erent territories of the country.
Little by little, an offi  cial discourse of recognition of the indigenous peo-
ples was established from the restoration of democracy, infl uenced by the 
demands and political actions of the indigenous peoples themselves, who 
today are viewed as important actors in this process of democratization 
and participation (Boccara and Bolados 2010; Richards 2013), but also by 
sources of confl ict and the possible destabilization of some territories such 
as the Araucanía Region and neighbouring regions, where the processes 
of political vindication and territorial demands are concentrated. In these 
areas, some sectors, which are attacked and questioned by radical Mapu-
che organizations, maintain that the state has lost control, making decisions 
that are at odds with the common good, economic development and the 
promotion of investments, and failing to ensure the safety of part of the 
population.
However, CONADI has also shown itself to be dependent on central 
government interests, with its directors having to accept presidential deci-
sions without the right to dissent. Indigenous demands are becoming ever 
stronger. One of the issues faced by governments was the application of the 
anti-terrorist law to Mapuches involved in acts of protest, such as the oc-
cupation of private property and attacks on it, in the context of territorial 
confl icts.
Th e use of this law was clearly disproportionate for prosecuting crimes – 
mostly against property – that the Mapuche may have committed in this 
context. Its use intensifi ed in 2002 when a Senate Commission declared that, 
as a result of the action of the Mapuche in the south of Chile, the rule of law 
had ceased to prevail, and called for the application of the maximum rigor of 
the law against the Mapuche (Aylwin 2010). Since the latter part of the sec-
ond Bachelet government and now under the Piñera government, the issue 
of security has continued to be a key issue in addressing the confl ict in the 
Araucanía Region and the surrounding area. In this context, the construc-
tion of indigenous policy continues its course.
Policies of recognition have been geared to the ‘development’ of indig-
enous peoples. Th ey include the Orígenes Program fi nanced by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB 2001–2012). It has had an impact on 
public policy by helping to establish the concept of interculturality transver-
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sally across diff erent institutions and levels, focusing on actions for indige-
nous people.
Anti-poverty programmes constitute a new way of disciplining and creat-
ing dependence (Foucault 1991), with their application and nature depend-
ing on the particular government in power. In the case of the indigenous 
population, they can inject important resources for investment and devel-
opment, but as strategies they fail to take account of the political variable, 
resulting in policies that some authors have defi ned as neoliberal multicul-
turalism (Boccara 2007; Hale 2002; Richards 2013).
Th e power of the state is increasingly hidden, and the boundaries be-
tween the state and private world are ever more diff use, since, as seen in the 
Chilean case, both are closely interwoven, and there is not a clear distinction 
between state and private actions. An important milestone occurred in 2008, 
when, aft er almost twenty years of demands, Chile ratifi ed ILO Convention 
169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, positioning indigenous rights 
as a matter to be considered in the defi nition of public policies and in busi-
ness expansion within indigenous territories.
Aft er more than twenty-fi ve years of policies for the indigenous popula-
tion, a number of actors, including indigenous intellectuals, leaders and gov-
ernment offi  cials had strengthened their position and were to play a key role 
in implementation of this policy, which reproduces the vision of a neoliberal 
state but also permits identifi cation of contentious spaces.
Th e state’s corporatization also produced new ways in which the state at-
tempted to control the most radical Mapuche demands. A key example of 
this occurred in the second half of 2017, under the second Bachelet govern-
ment, when the intelligence unit of the uniformed police carried out ‘Oper-
ation Hurricane’. Th is consisted in the coordinated and simultaneous arrest, 
on 23 September 2017, of eight Mapuche community members for illicit ter-
rorist association on the grounds of their alleged responsibility for a series 
of recent arson attacks in southern Chile. Th is included the leader of the 
Arauco Malleco Corporation (CAM), one of the most visible organizations 
associated with radical political demands. Th e arrest was widely reported in 
the media. Th e evidence presented included intercepted telephone calls and 
WhatsApp messages. A number of sectors, including business associations 
in the Araucanía Region, applauded the arrest. However, on 19 October the 
Supreme Court ordered the release of the eight accused, who had been re-
manded in custody for alleged terrorist off enses, because it had been dis-
covered that the supposed evidence against them was false (Sepúlveda and 
González 2018). Th is cost the head of the police service and the director of 
its intelligence unit their jobs.
Th e operation was intended to demonstrate the state’s power to control 
dissidence and the radical movement, but its failure and false basis triggered 
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a crisis in the institutions involved and, in fact, undermined the vision of 
a strong and non-corrupt state. However, in recent months, the current 
government has maintained this national security approach, increasing the 
number of police specialized in combatting terrorism assigned to the ‘Ma-
puche confl ict’. Analysis of this policy clearly reveals communications and 
political weaknesses that make the situation worse rather than calming it.
Institutional Option for Mapuche Protest in the Araucanía Region
Historically, Mapuche leaders have opted to make their demands heard 
through institutional channels (Foerster and Montecino 1988). For example, 
the fi rst Mapuche deputy was elected in 1924, only a few years aft er the end 
of the military occupation of the Mapuche territory and its absorption by 
the Chilean state. In other words, their option has been to use the system 
and become part of it as a means of establishing their identity seals and as a 
mechanism of resistance.
Th e Mapuche people’s strategies are diverse, ranging from the most rad-
ical to the most institutionalized, but together form an active vision of the 
Mapuche movement or movements.
Th ese diff erent strategies were seen soon aft er the restoration of democ-
racy, when a number of indigenous leaders joined traditional political par-
ties and took positions in CONADI or political posts at the regional and local 
levels, though some organizations refused to participate in discussion of the 
Indigenous Law or other bodies convened by the diff erent Concertación 
governments. A milestone in the Mapuche movement of the late twentieth 
century occurred in 1997, when forestry trucks were burned in the Lumaco 
sector in the north of the Araucanía Region (Pairican 2014) in protest against 
forestry companies practising monoculture of pine and eucalyptus on vast 
tracts of land in the region (and neighbouring regions) to the detriment 
of the diversity of the area’s native woodland. Th ese plantations of exotic 
trees successively harm the environment, directly aff ecting soil quality and 
the availability of surface and groundwater as well as creating conditions of 
payroll employment. Th e business logic and the economic ‘interests’ of the 
country took precedence over the agreements and projections of the indig-
enous policy defi ned aft er the restoration of democracy. It is in this context 
of forestry industry expansion that the most radical Mapuche organizations 
emerged, associated with recovery of their territory; Mapuche lands are 
small and of poor quality as a consequence of the historical process of in-
digenous resettlement in which the Chilean state distributed land unequally, 
giving priority to foreign and national colonists and confi ning the Mapuche 
to reservations.
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Other Mapuche leaders and organizations have nonetheless opted for in-
stitutional channels. Over the past two decades, in a demand related to the 
processes of democratization and recognition policies, the Mapuche have 
sought spaces of power and political representation at the municipal level. 
Indigenous candidates have participated in municipal elections, some stand-
ing for traditional parties and others for more emerging organizations, and 
some have been elected as mayors and councillors. In these positions, not all 
focus on ethnic claims, but in one way or another, most have generated local 
mechanisms of Mapuche power that have been important for their continu-
ity as local representatives (Espinoza 2017).
Th e Wallmapuwen Party was founded in 2005 as a political movement. 
Th is Mapuche party, which has a nationalist and regionalist stamp, seeks to 
use institutional channels to obtain local and regional power. However, due 
to the nature of the Chilean electoral system, it was only able to register as a 
political party in 2006, and in 2017 it did not achieve suffi  cient signatures to 
maintain its registration. It has, however, joined with other parties, whose 
members have obtained positions as mayors or councillors. In the 2012 elec-
tion, one of its candidates was elected as mayor of a municipal district in the 
Araucanía Region where the Mapuche language was co-offi  cialized. Th is is 
important for indigenous demands because indigenous languages have not 
been recognized at the national level; with a Mapuche mayor, however, this 
was possible at the local level. Bureaucratic obstacles have, however, im-
peded the larger changes demanded by indigenous organizations, and this 
has caused discontent among the Mapuche with their own elected authori-
ties. Th e political work of this mayor was strongly infl uenced by the partici-
pation of members of the Wallmapuwen Party, but some local organizations 
strongly questioned his management of the role of municipal offi  cials. Th ese 
factors, together with others, meant that he was not re-elected in 2016.
In this framework of indigenous institutionalization at the local level, in-
digenous offi  cials play a key role as the principal implementers of public pol-
icy. In general, they have a strong sense of belonging to their people, with an 
important history of leadership in their communities. Many were also oppo-
nents of the military dictatorship and actively participated in organizations 
in support of the restoration of democracy and, therefore, identify with the 
governments of the centre-left  coalition.
Th rough their role in the implementation of development programmes 
and the containment of resource-based projects, these offi  cials serve as 
important cultural and political mediators. Trust, acceptance, support and 
help are crucial for advancing social relations and for the state to project 
a cohesive and pro-active image (De la Maza 2012). Th e conduct of these 
offi  cials is fundamental for establishing positive relationships between both 
sides. However, this balance is precarious and depends on the political and 
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social context at the time and on the establishment of new resources or pro-
grammes that can be accessed. Th e role of these offi  cials has been discussed 
in the framework of the focus of neoliberal multiculturalism (Boccara 2007; 
Hale 2002; Richards 2013) as regards their capacity for action and state con-
trol and manipulation. Ethnographic information shows that this black and 
white vision does not refl ect the complexity of the role of the indigenous 
offi  cial. Spaces for state interaction are complex and are also spheres of re-
sistance. As a result, the offi  cial’s dual role, as representative of the state and 
belonging to an indigenous people, generates constant tension – the man-
agement of which depends on personal experience and capabilities.
Other relevant actors include the leaders and direct participants of pro-
grammes (referred to as ‘users’ in public policy terms) or, in other words, 
the indigenous counterparts of public policy. Some mechanisms, such as the 
working or coordination groups in which the diff erent actors involved in a 
programme participate, have been institutionalized while others are created 
or develop in response to them. Undoubtedly, the temptation for the state 
is to generate clientelistic and assistentialist relations of dependency, which 
are diffi  cult to resist or protest against. As indicated, this is a form of devel-
opmentalist policy, but there are certainly also margins of the policy, which 
by means of a more assertive response is possible to negotiate, modifying 
these institutionalized practices.
Th ird actors are the consultants or persons to whom the state outsources 
implementation of policy in the local, regional or national space. Th eir role 
has become ever more important since the restoration of democracy in the 
context of an agreement-based transition and the neoliberal model, which 
the democratic governments sought to temper with equity. Consultancy 
companies manage the resources allocated to the policy, and some now em-
ploy Mapuche professionals, who can access these funds and put their own 
stamp on the work, which can go beyond what is strictly necessary.
State practices associated with indigenous policies have not been able to 
eradicate poverty in some indigenous sectors. In their programmes, they 
reproduce representations of the Mapuche as small subsistence producers, 
failing to consider that many Mapuche live in towns and cities in the south 
of Chile or in Santiago.
Th e state is viewed as an autonomous being that must negotiate in the 
face of confl ict and with the most radical organizations and that must, there-
fore, recognize the indigenous people and give back what it took from them. 
Th is is embodied in mechanisms of state control through both the promo-
tion of development programmes and security measures, which leave po-
rous spaces where offi  cials and other actors can resist and incorporate their 
own imprint.
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Transferring Development to Private Entities: 
The Case of Indigenous Tourism
Tourism in indigenous territories has expanded in recent years, particularly 
in the case of special interest tourism, with the resulting adaptation of the 
territories to these new demands. Th is has brought diff erent actors into play, 
such as private agents, who see these spaces (with their landscapes, natural 
resources and even their culture) as a business opportunity. Th e installation 
of tourism companies without state control and with little input from the 
local participation has put some sectors under great pressure.
However, under the model of multicultural or recognition policies and 
the transversal installation of interculturality at the level of public policy, a 
policy to strengthen indigenous tourism has been implemented in recent 
years. Today, indigenous tourism is defi ned by the state as tourist services of-
fered by indigenous persons, families or organizations that incorporate part 
of the indigenous culture (Programa Orígenes 2003). Th is incorporation of 
indigenous culture as a tourist value is not only practised by indigenous en-
trepreneurs but appropriated by external agents (De la Maza 2018).
Th e development of tourism by Mapuche people has its origin primarily 
in rural tourism initiatives promoted by the state but also in other initiatives 
more geared towards indigenous identity promoted by non-governmental 
organizations. Since 2007, however, its development in the Araucanía Re-
gion has been fostered more explicitly through incentives for related stud-
ies and contributions to the development of what is referred to as Mapuche 
tourism (SERNATUR 2011).
Th e concept of the indigenous entrepreneur is key to understanding the 
insertion of tourism. It is resisted by more fundamentalist sectors, both 
Mapuche and non-Mapuche, who reject the capitalist model and refuse to 
use neoliberal words in the context of indigenous-related matters. Other 
Mapuche sectors have, however, accepted and adopted the concept as part 
of their ability to move forward and achieve insertion in the market like any 
person, albeit with respect for their identity and a diff erent proposal.
Since 2015, this regional phenomenon has acquired relevance at the na-
tional level as an inter-ministerial concern, and the government plans to 
defi ne an agenda for the development of indigenous tourism, led by the Un-
dersecretariat for Tourism. Th is concern arose in 2014–15 at the beginning 
of the second Bachelet administration, due to a combination of situations 
under which the interests of certain offi  cials coincided with those of private 
organizations. Offi  cials at the Undersecretariat for Tourism and the National 
Tourism Service, who were sensitive to the indigenous issue and had ties 
with civil society actors also interested in it, were key to this process of 
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bringing together their personal interests and those of external agents and 
installing the concept of indigenous tourism as a national policy.
Th ese offi  cials-mediators sensitized the agents or bureaucrats to this type 
of indigenous tourism, proposing the preparation of studies. A private or-
ganization close to these experts was commissioned to carry them out. Th e 
initial studies revealed a need for more in-depth and applied studies, which 
were again tendered to the same organization. As well as being a consul-
tancy company, this organization also acts as an operator, off ering indige-
nous tourism experiences to overseas visitors.
In this way, state-fi nanced studies strengthened a sector of indigenous en-
trepreneurs, a group that already had experience and was able to develop as 
a result of processes to promote leadership in indigenous tourism through 
training, tours and the provision of resources, which are, at the same time, 
the experiences that the organization will off er privately. In addition, the na-
tional institution that defi nes tourism policies incorporated the concept of 
indigenous tourism, and its offi  cials appropriated it.
A relevant point to analyse is the fact that indigenous tourism as a public 
policy seems remote from the indigenous political confl ict. It seems to cor-
respond to another sphere of reality in which indigenous peoples live their 
‘ancestral’ culture quietly and profoundly and about whom a narrative and 
tourism product are promoted to attract a special type of tourist. Th is tour-
ist, interested in the indigenous culture and way of life, will approach the ex-
perience with expectations related to an imagery of the indigenous and oft en 
mediated by the tour operators that would adapt to demand. Th is situation 
of a quest for indigenous peoples, accompanied with great admiration and 
respect, can invisibilize their social and cultural conditions.
In the Araucanía Region, this national policy of development of indige-
nous tourism appears to be moving in a diff erent direction. In contrast to the 
central level, the confl ict and the diffi  culties of coexistence between Mapu-
che and non-Mapuche are evident there and form part of daily public life, 
meaning that the dynamics are totally diff erent. One example of this involves 
a Mapuche offi  cial who is the regional head of tourism development at an ag-
ricultural development institution. Th is offi  cial’s work is carried out in a con-
text in which indigenous tourism has grown in the region and is also geared 
to all the rural population, both indigenous and non-indigenous.
Th is indigenous offi  cial has a political and professional commitment to 
his people that is refl ected in the particular attention he pays to indigenous 
tourism, fostering initiatives and focusing resources. His particular ap-
proach is not to the liking of non-indigenous entrepreneurs or other non-
indigenous offi  cials from institutions that are not particularly concerned 
with indigenous economic development. Th is has caused problems that re-
veal the tensions that can arise between an indigenous offi  cial, committed to 
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his people and in a position not exclusively related to indigenous aff airs, and 
other non-indigenous offi  cials not focusing on indigenous matters.
Th ese tensions have led to rumours among other non-indigenous offi  cials 
about the role of this offi  cial, along the lines of ‘you work only for indig-
enous people’ and ‘we (non-indigenous entrepreneurs) get less attention 
and resources’. Th e rumours put pressure on the indigenous offi  cial, who 
defends himself and argues that he works for all equally. Rumours can serve 
as a means of social control and bring to light practices that, for some agents, 
can be considered corrupt. However, they oft en refl ect disputes over power 
and political projects within the institutions themselves.
According to a non-indigenous offi  cial, the indigenous offi  cial has focused 
resources on specifi c territories and entrepreneurs, taking advantage of his 
position to off er/sell privately and make a profi t with these entrepreneurs. 
In other words, he not only gives priority to his own interests but also takes 
advantage of the entrepreneurs.
Th is indigenous offi  cial had already been stigmatized as confl ictive and 
working mainly in the interests of indigenous people. Now, corruption is 
added to the charges. As in the case of any rumour, what matters more than 
if it is true or false is to understand the ways in which a type of state action 
can generate a story that discredits the role of an indigenous offi  cial. Th is 
interpretation may be based on discrimination on both sides as well as forms 
of resistance imposed by the indigenous offi  cial in the margins of the state or 
abusive practices.
Finally, a case at the municipal level reveals a third dimension. In a munic-
ipal district where Mapuche tourism had become important, the authorities 
decided to create a new position: head of municipal indigenous tourism. An 
indigenous entrepreneur, with experience in indigenous tourism, was ap-
pointed, becoming an indigenous offi  cial-expert. At the beginning, his work 
was well evaluated because he was someone whom ‘everyone knows’, with 
good relations with the district’s inhabitants. He was proactive in his work, 
establishing ties with the district’s indigenous tourism entrepreneurs and 
seeking to promote this economic, but above all, cultural activity.
A female indigenous entrepreneur from the district reports that this in-
digenous offi  cial had to leave his position. In a bid for funding for indigenous 
tourism entrepreneurs, several applied on the advice and encouragement of 
the indigenous offi  cial, but when the results were announced, this offi  cial, 
who had also participated in the bid, was declared the winner. Th is caused 
many problems and distrust because the other entrepreneurs felt he had 
cheated by concealing his participation from them. Th is caused divisions 
among the entrepreneurs, and the offi  cial fi nally had to leave his job.
Th e problems arose because the indigenous offi  cial did not inform the rest 
of the applicants that he would also participate in the bid, implying a lack of 
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transparency and potentially the use of inside information to the advantage 
of his own personal business. Transparency is a corporate mechanism that 
has penetrated the state apparatus. Like rumour, it serves to exercise con-
trol and, today, is a central principle of public policy under which diff erent 
agents can access information and, if necessary, ‘control’ or supervise state 
practices. However, transparency is also subject to the agents’ role. Not ev-
eryone can access these sources of information, and this once again repro-
duces relationships of power, communication and access.
Th e indigenous offi  cial returned to being an entrepreneur. Aft er a time, 
social ties between the actors were rebuilt and many have again formed part-
nerships. Th e former indigenous offi  cial is, indeed, an outstanding entrepre-
neur at the municipal level.
Th ese cases of indigenous and Mapuche tourism illustrate institution-
alized forms of state practice. None has operated outside the law. Many of 
them are judged from the perspective of non-indigenous and indigenous re-
lations or relations between indigenous persons. Th e judgements are moral 
at diff erent levels and depending on the case. At all levels, internal power 
disputes within institutions are apparent and within the community itself. 
Th e cases also illustrate the role of decision-making. Offi  cials can focus re-
sources on their own groups of interest, internalize concepts at a public level 
and generate private and personal programmes from public institutions.
In this particular analysis of indigenous tourism as public policy, the corpo-
rate state is seen in profound and complex terms. Private actors infl uence pol-
icy design and foster a kind of relationship with the state and with leaders of 
the state. In addition, regional and local offi  cials have the power to make deci-
sions and promote diff erent interests through, for example, the use of rumour 
and access to information in their role as mediators of public policy. Under 
the neoliberal model, these policy margins exist and are controlled not only 
by the state but also by citizens and citizen-offi  cials involved in the process.
Conclusions
Th is chapter sought  to analyse the Chilean case from the perspective of the 
corporate state by identifying areas where it manifests itself with force, oft en 
in a hidden and subtle way but revealing key characteristics of the Chilean 
neoliberal model.
It fi rst examined the concept of political crisis associated with the neo-
liberal model and the post-dictatorship political period when protest move-
ments against the institutional framework emerged, installing a vision of the 
overrunning of state control in areas such as education, the environment, 
indigenous peoples and, recently, political corruption.
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A key actor for this analysis were the indigenous peoples, particularly the 
Mapuche, as one of the most disadvantaged sectors of society, due to sys-
tematic state occupation of their territory and a generation of specifi c pol-
icies that when combined with a history of resistance and confrontation of 
some sectors against the state and companies reinforce the idea of instabil-
ity, especially in the Araucanía Region. One of the key factors in deepening 
this confl ict was the introduction of a resource-based economic model that 
permeated indigenous territories through companies that put pressure on 
natural resources, which directly aff ected the quality of life of communities.
In addition, the promotion of indigenous tourism illustrates in depth the 
way in which the state operates from the perspective of both public agents 
and indigenous organizations. Diff erent agents, including private mediators 
and indigenous leaders as well as agents of the state itself, are involved in the 
installation of the concept of indigenous tourism. Control no longer takes 
only the institutionalized form of policies but also includes the margins of 
policies, led by offi  cials and, oft en, indigenous offi  cials with their own agen-
das and interests.
Finally, corporatization is seen not only in the relationships built between 
the state and society in general but also among indigenous groups them-
selves. Th e neoliberal model permeates the way in which citizens, as well as 
the state and its offi  cials, act. Th e company-state transforms daily and polit-
ical relations, whose limits are resisted at diff erent times by movements that 
also become institutionalized. Th eir capacity to corporatize their actions 
means that the limits of resistance are diff use.
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NOTES
Th is chapter was written in the framework of the Center for Intercultural and Indigenous 
Research-CIIR CONICYT/FONDAP Nº 15110006 and FONDECYT Regular 1170236.
 1. Th is measures fi ve dimensions of poverty: education, health, work and social secu-
rity, housing and surroundings, and networks and social cohesion.
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 2. Pewenche is the name given to the indigenous inhabitants of the area’s Andes Moun-
tains because of the central role of the pewen or araucaria in their way of life.
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On Authority and the Conditions 
for Egalitarianism in Venezuela
Luis Angosto-Ferrández
‘Th ere is no government!’ Th e taxi driver whispered it, as if talking to him-
self. We were stuck in La Libertador, one of the main communication arteries 
in Ciudad Bolívar. Th is road has two lanes for each direction, and traffi  c is 
generally fl uid. But not that day. Ahead of us, a funeral rally blocked the way, 
occupying both lanes. No one used the horn to complain – no one dared. A 
malandro was being buried,1 one close to the powerful chief-in-command at 
Vista Alegre, the local jail. Th e coffi  n, surrounded by family and friends, was 
placed on top of an uncovered truck, and cars paraded slowly at its fl anks and 
rear, marking the occasion with solemnity. While the taxi driver did not ele-
vate the tone of his voice, you could tell something boiled inside him. ‘When 
someone honest dies, no one gives a damn, and look at this!’ I was upset too. 
I had lived long enough in Ciudad Bolívar not to be surprised by the display 
we came across that aft ernoon, but the sensation that we were obliged to pay 
compulsory tribute to the malandro was strong. I joined the driver in lament-
ing the state of aff airs, but of course it did not make a diff erence. It took us 
ages to get to my place, which was right at the other side of the cemetery.
Th at episode took place in mid 2011, but in some respects it is far from 
exceptional: the expression ‘there is no government!’ is quite common in 
Venezuela as a form of conclusive statement. For instance, let me recall the 
case of another taxi ride I had taken also in Ciudad Bolívar, just a few months 
before the one described above. I picked that taxi close to 6PM at Paseo 
Orinoco, a commercial area in the city. Th at time of the day, when the sun 
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expires, buses, vans and the so-called perreras were all packed,2 with kids 
and young men literally hanging out from them. Th e scene is typical, condi-
tioned by last-chance urges. As soon as it gets dark, drivers take their vehicles 
(which are theirs, not ‘public’) home. No ‘public’ transport will be found un-
til the next day. Th e evening I took that taxi was particularly busy. It was early 
December, and many people were already doing Christmas shopping. I had 
been lucky getting that lift , and once in the taxi I relaxed chatting away with 
the driver. When the conversation came to ‘there is no government!’ we had 
been talking about transport for a while. Initially, it was light talk spurred by 
the sights of packed buses and perreras. But what triggered the driver’s ex-
clamation was talk about Christmas plans and intercity transport. I planned 
on travelling to the town of my in-laws in Sucre in a few days, and the taxi 
driver had relatives travelling to Valencia (Carabobo). Th at time of the year, 
bus lines and por puesto cars increase fares by a quarter or more over the reg-
ular price.3 Th ey call it aguinaldo, as the (voluntary) Christmas gift , but it is 
a compulsory fee: either you pay it or you don’t get into the vehicle. ‘Th ere 
is no government!’ was the taxi driver’s summary evaluation of the situation, 
projecting a form of indignant sympathy for those who, like his relatives or 
myself, had to rely on intercity transport on those days around Christmas.
Th e expression is no exclusive verbal patrimony of those who drive taxis. 
Nor is it a localism from Ciudad Bolívar. ‘Th ere is no government!’ is uttered 
in any region and from people positioned quite diff erently in social terms. 
A third example registered in the country’s capital in mid 2015 further il-
lustrates the point. It came from Toni, a man in his sixties who lives in the 
working class neighbourhood of Lomas de Urdaneta (Catia). Th ese days he 
makes do with a pension and the stipend he gets as a member of a band of 
musicians hired through the Central Bank for cultural activities. Toni was 
hosting Marco, an old friend from Puerto Ordaz, and me for a few days. 
When we arrived in Caracas, Toni came to meet us at the metro station near 
his place, and aft er cheerful greetings and some shopping we headed north 
towards the stop where busetas (small urban buses) take passengers to go up 
Las Lomas. Bachaqueros were scattered along the way,4 selling products that 
by then were quite scarce – that is, scarce at regulated prices, for if you were 
willing to pay fi vefold that price or more, you could get them through diff er-
ent channels. Marco asked Toni about the price bachaqueros sold the coff ee 
there, to compare it with the prices in Puerto Ordaz. Th e price was very 
much the same, but the question led Toni to tell us about a recent episode in 
which police had removed a group of bachaqueros from the area we had just 
walked past, only for the bachaqueros to come back the next day with the 
same range of products. ‘Th ere is no government, chico!’ Marco remarked. 
His quarrel was not with street vending or specifi cally with the bachaqueros 
we saw on the street. He was giving out about the process that the notion of 
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‘bachaquero’ encapsulates. For Marco, as for many others, the street vendor 
appeared as a weak link in a long chain of smuggling that translates in the 
(re)selling of products oft en produced in state-owned companies and sold 
or distributed with state sponsorship.
* * *
In this chapter I will engage with debates on egalitarianism by discussing 
what the protagonists of these episodes refer to when they speak of (a miss-
ing) ‘government’. Th ose episodes are diverse in their constitutive elements, 
but they all comparably make an appeal to a public authority and refl ect in-
tersubjective conceptions of injustice. Th e sense of injustice runs parallel to 
the acknowledgement that factual powers impinge on one’s basic wellbeing. 
Th ose factual powers take diff erent shapes, as we have seen: in (latent) coer-
cive capacities, for instance, as elicited in the observance of respect towards 
participants in the funeral of the malandro; but they can also, as our last 
episode illustrated, manifest themselves in market mechanisms that end up 
excluding some people from access to basic goods or services (such as foods 
or transport), or making that access undignifi ed. Th e experiential acknowl-
edgment of the existence of those powers, in tandem with the sense of injus-
tice they triggered, is what made people appeal to ‘government’.
‘Government’ here operates as a signifi er in which people condense no-
tions of justice and the aspiration that a particular form of authority can 
guarantee the conditions for it – at the expense of other actually existing 
forms. Engaging classical debates of Enlightenment political theorists, I 
contend that such authority is ‘the state’ and will argue that understanding 
people’s aspiration to recover or install it sheds light on political positioning 
and mobilization in a country like Venezuela. In relation to the episodes I de-
scribed above, I will discuss the extent to which the emergence and shaping 
of the so-called Bolivarian state can be considered to be a response to peo-
ple’s demands for ‘state’, tout court, particularly in the areas of security and 
socio-economic enfranchisement.
To ground these arguments, I will start by elaborating on the concepts of 
authority and the state, aiming to clarify which takes on those concepts are 
misguided when trying to formulate theoretically the aspirations of people 
who call for ‘government’ along the lines that the protagonists of the epi-
sodes I discussed do.
Authority, Authoritarianism and the State
Th e episodes I recall above have at their core an appeal to a form of authority 
that is reclaimed in the mediation of social relations. It is therefore a public 
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authority, and those who were calling for it expected that it would impose 
itself upon other forms of authority that eff ectively mediate social relations – 
but in a way considered unjust. Th ose appeals to a (strong) public authority 
should not be understood as calls for authoritarian government. Th is ques-
tion begs additional commentary, given the loaded connotations that calls 
for authority have in political theory in general and in contemporary Vene-
zuela in particular – where opinions about the alleged benefi ts of an author-
itarian corrective to the current political scenario are publicly circulated by 
some people.
Authoritarianism has been central to political debates in Venezuela for 
over a century, at the very least. When the concept was not brought to the 
forefront, it remained as a shadow contender with which theorists wrestled 
when characterizing the confi guration of Venezuelan society and its politics. 
Even when from the 1970s onwards analysts penned the theory of excep-
tionalism that singled out Venezuela as a unique model of democratic cul-
ture and institutionality in the continent (Ellner and Tinker-Salas 2005), the 
question of authoritarianism remained as an absent presence – as it were, it 
was the opaque background against which the new democratic institutions 
shined with singular, and to some extent unexpected, splendour. Venezuela 
was free of the military dictatorships that from the 1960s to the 1980s lac-
erated the peoples of many countries in the continent, and this was indeed 
remarkable because of the minimal signs for optimism that the fi rst half of 
the century had off ered.
For twenty-eight years (1908–1935), Juan Vicente Gómez had imprinted 
Venezuela’s oil-bound transition into modernization and developmentalism 
with an authoritarian bent (Tinker-Salas 2009). Th e only (and fl eeting) in-
terlude that during the fi rst half of the century promised to open up national 
politics to democratic institutionality (the so-called ‘trienio democrático’ of 
1945–1948) was cut abruptly by a coup that installed another military fi gure, 
Delgado Chalbaud, as head of government. Assassinated in 1950, his replace-
ment was temporarily covered by Germán Suárez Flamerich, while a com-
manding Junta Militar paved the way for a return to an openly authoritarian 
regime: the (not so distant) dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958). No-
tably, Pérez Jiménez justifi ed his disdain for pluralism and party politics by 
his belief in the benefi ts that concentration of power, in tandem with his per-
sonal eff orts and guidance, would have for the progress of the country. From 
then on, the country entered a period of continuing, if tightly demarcated, 
democratic competition,5 but the shadows cast by the authoritarian models 
of the past remained too close to be ignored.
Figures such as Pérez Jiménez, and before him Gómez, had incarnated the 
idea that dictatorship was the only political system capable of making Ven-
ezuela fl ourish and of bringing forth its potential for progress. Such an idea 
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had been brought to its maximum organic expression by prominent intellec-
tual Vallenilla Lanz (1870–1936), who developed it in the form of a scientifi c 
thesis in his infl uential ‘Cesarismo democrático’ (1991 [1919]). Vallenilla 
Lanz became an active supporter of Gómez’s regime on the grounds that the 
latter had come to meet the historical necessities of the Venezuelan society. 
In his view, a strong visionary leader who could impose its force upon other 
competing caudillos was necessary to guarantee a degree of security and co-
hesion in a country in which instability and fragmentation were presented as 
historically determined conditions, exacerbated by the independence wars 
and subsequent factional warfare during the early decades of the Republic. 
Vallenilla Lanz presented his thesis as the outcome of an ideologically neu-
tral positivist approach that placed normative political discussion and ab-
stracted principles of government in a secondary plane. Venezuela, as any 
other country, was seen as dependent on an ‘organic constitution’ that did 
not necessarily match the ‘paper constitutions’ sanctioned in accord with 
the principles of liberalism or any other political ideology. From that per-
spective, abstracted principles of democracy and division of powers and the 
like were impotent, and misguided, for the transformation of society.
Nonetheless, Vallenilla Lanz did not advocate ahistorical support for au-
thoritarian forms of government. He saw in the latter a scientifi cally mo-
tivated response to specifi c social conditions: it was the positive organic 
constitution of the country that made caudillos a ‘social necessity’. In Val-
lenilla Lanz’s view, such a conclusion was to be actively supported by those 
who aspired to transform the political conditions of the country and facili-
tate their betterment. With adequate political intervention, Venezuela would 
evolve towards diff erent organic forms that in turn would require new, more 
modern political institutions.
Th e proposals made by Vallenilla Lanz, and the premises that sustained 
them, had a lasting impact on Venezuelan political debates. Th ey generated 
repulsion among progressive and liberal sectors of the Venezuelan society6 
but also underpinned the views of some elites and the middle classes that 
were keen to stop any sign of potential alteration of the status quo – open 
democratic competition appeared as too much of a risk in the face of what 
they interpreted as the immature character of the masses. At present, the 
ideas that ‘Cesarismo Democrático’ articulated in scholarly form can still be 
identifi ed in a variety of publicly expressed manifestations, more or less up-
rooted from its original theoretical terrain.
Let us recall that the governments of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) mechan-
ically evoked among its liberal critics the image of the authoritarian caudillo, 
regardless of the democratic source of his legitimacy. His military back-
ground, polarizing style and charismatic profi le resuscitated among some 
analysts theories about the immature character of the Venezuelan democ-
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racy and its people – specifi cally the people who had brought Chávez to the 
presidency with their votes and those who subsequently re-elected him three 
times as president. Today, and exacerbated by the profound socio-economic 
crisis that strikes the country, fatalist evaluations of the ‘national character’ 
spring up in everyday conversations, encapsulated in statements along the 
lines of ‘nothing will ever change in Venezuela’. Th is type of evaluation is, of 
course, contested: many people situate in structural economic factors, and 
primarily in the political realm (domestic and international), the source of 
problems to be overcome, and they give names to those they consider re-
sponsible for the current state of aff airs (be they members of the Executive, 
opposition leaders or foreign governments interfering in national politics). 
Yet for fatalists and conservative ‘cesaristas’ alike, it is the unchanged or-
ganic substance of national society that is the root of the problem, and hard-
line ‘cesarista’ resolutions continue to appeal to them. Sometimes those 
inclinations are overtly expressed in amazingly normalized calls for a coup 
or an external military intervention against Maduro’s government. Th ese are 
made by a variety of people, ranging from right-wing politicians declaring 
to international media to politically disaff ected youngsters sharing through 
twitter such opinions in a rather casual form (calls for a coup come amidst 
comments on the latest videos of favourite YouTubers, expressions of ro-
mantic expectation and fun memes). In the recent past – that is, in January 
2019 – when Juan Guaidó (then quite an anonymous political fi gure) ap-
pointed himself as ‘interim’ president of Venezuela, declarations calling for 
foreign military intervention seem to have become even more common and 
normalized among radical sectors of the opposition bloc.
While those commentaries are generally made in the name of democracy 
and freedom, they hardly disguise conceptualizations of those terms under 
a ‘law and order’ frame whose realization would require mano dura (iron 
fi st) governmental approaches,7 and not only to address crime (Antillano 
and Ávila 2017): at present, that frame also rests on the idea that mano dura 
measures would be needed to control those sectors of the popular classes 
that up to this day, despite the aggravation of the economic crisis that goes 
in tandem with the draconian sanctions that the US and a handful of gov-
ernments have imposed on the country’s fi nancial structures, remain mo-
bilized in support of Bolivarian governments. Comments along the lines of 
‘we ought to terminate chavistas’ or ‘I wish all chavistas were dead’, which 
can frequently be read in social media, are worryingly telling of predisposi-
tions in that respect.
It is, however, important to clearly separate that type of ‘cesarista’ prop-
osition from the appeals to ‘government’ made by the protagonists of the 
episodes portrayed at the outset of this chapter. Th e contextualized signifi -
cation of those appeals to government reveals what one could characterize 
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as Rousseaunean inclinations among those who made them. Th e ‘govern-
ment’ was missed in the face of the imposition of a malandro order, and the 
‘government’ that was found absent from the process that tips out with the 
street sale of products such as coff ee or milk at an exorbitant price for poor 
citizens, is an authority people conceive as something located above them 
but in a way that could (and in their view should) protect them from abusive 
conditions. In other words, people were reclaiming the eff ective presence of 
a public authority that is conceived as superior to and more legitimate than 
the rest and that was also expected to have the capacity to impose itself upon 
others in order to prevent situations of social injustice. Such public authority 
is not conceived as an erosion of individual autonomies or rights but on the 
contrary as the guarantor of conditions for them.
Th ose claims thus echo what Rousseau classically described in Th e Social 
Contract (1762) as the public power that legitimately results from civic asso-
ciation. Rousseau, as concerned with the problem of political subjugation 
and authoritarian ruling as he was with consolidating a notion of republican 
liberties, put his eff orts into arguing why freedom remains guaranteed, and 
in fact is made possible, by the voluntary concessions that people make for 
the creation of a political community cemented upon a general will and with 
organs that express such will through norms. Th e existence of that general 
will makes it possible that people remain free when giving themselves to the 
political community, and when thereby becoming subjected to the media-
tions of a public authority. Legitimate norms of that authority are conceived 
as the normative emanation of the general will, and thus, as the riddle-like 
expression had it: people will be obeying themselves when obeying the law.
In the dedicatory of his famous Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
Among Men (1923 [1755]), Rousseau fi guratively equated the submission 
to legitimate republican authority and its law to the weight produced by a 
‘smooth and benefi cial’ yoke. In his view, such yoke could be carried with 
(citizen) pride, since it was suited for those who are not willing to bear any 
other yoke.
Rousseau’s propositions, as we know, were developed into a form of uni-
versal abstraction consonant with the formation of an idealized political 
subject of Enlightened modernity, and they are debatable and revisable in 
many respects – not least for the way in which they contributed to facilitat-
ing the subordination of women in the political realm of modernity (Cobo 
1995). Yet it is nevertheless worth refl ecting on why echoes of such prop-
ositions can be found in the evaluations that people like the protagonists 
of my episodes make about the contemporary polity and the character and 
legitimacy of public authorities. Th ese evaluations are not produced against 
speculative reconstructions of the human condition and the changes it may 
have experienced in a transition from a state of nature to a civil state; on the 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 On Authority and the Conditions for Egalitarianism in Venezuela 137
contrary, they emerge as political readings of personal experience against 
situated historical scenarios. And what currently seems to emerge in these 
scenarios (and with distinctive crudity in regions like Latin America) in the 
absence of the ‘yoke of the state’ is not a return to an idyllic state of nature or 
a transition into any of those realms of freedom that, under diff erent prem-
ises and with more or less appreciation of egalitarian ideals, utopians of all 
ideological leanings envisaged (from liberals to anarchists to communists).
So What Is There When There Is No State, and Why Should People Care?
Th e contention that the functioning of political institutions and systems 
ought to be studied beyond their formal and normative aspects has been 
the absorbing orientation of much political anthropology, and certainly so 
during the period in which the modern state develops in a frame demarcated 
by the normative horizons of liberal democracy and the contextual forces of 
global capitalism. A methodological focus on institutions and bureaucracies 
has been complemented, when not displaced, by studies with a poststruc-
turalist perspective in which the state is also seen as produced through prac-
tices, imagination and aff ects, and through what, in very general terms, one 
may denominate culturally conditioned predispositions. Th is focus runs the 
risk of overlooking the analysis of the material processes that structure prac-
tices and even infl uence the shaping of aff ects and imaginations, but in turn 
enables the emergence of new insights into the study of state formations. 
One is thus invited to consider discursive elements in the formation of ex-
pectations about the state; for instance, along the lines of what Akhil Gupta 
proposed in his work on the Indian state (1995). Th e state can be approached 
as an imagined entity, shaped in public culture. Against this general back-
ground, we can resume the discussion of my opening ethnographic vignettes 
and of an expression such as ‘there is no government!’, aiming to identify 
discursive constructions of what the state is and can be and also shedding 
light on Venezuelan politics and of diff erent positions within them.
Th e modern state form, detached from its Enlightened principles and un-
evenly developed with the expansion of capitalism, has become central to 
the reproduction of capital, the reinforcement of core and peripheries in the 
world system and the consolidation of hierarchical class-based orders inside 
nations. It is in that sense not surprising that antistatism has become the 
driving force of a variety of political groups, and also that at discursive lev-
els ‘state’ has become a shortcut signifi er to name the source of (any) social 
inequality. But it is also important not to overlook that much of the political 
mobilization that has emerged over the past three decades in Latin Amer-
ica (and other parts of the world) can be precisely read as a call to recover 
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the state, both as the apparatus that can guarantee the materialization of 
socio-economic rights and as that public authority that can guarantee the 
materialization of the common will. For these mobilized Latin Americans 
citizens (as for many others elsewhere), the realization is that, in the absence 
of the state, what appears in a world of globalized and volatile capitalism is 
not a realm of freedom and egalitarianism, but one shaped by the power of 
groups that, in service of particularistic ends, tend to augment inequalities 
and oft en directly take on some of the capacities and monopolies that polit-
ical theory attributed to the state.
To refl ect on these processes of reorganization of power and the mush-
rooming of non-state orders, looking at what happens in Venezuelan jails 
becomes, somewhat paradoxically, illuminating. Andrés Antillano (2017) 
has described what he denominates carceral self-rule: groups of organized 
prisoners replace the role of bureaucratic organization within prisons, in the 
process claiming for themselves that monopoly of legitimate violence that 
characterized the power of the state in the famous Webberian theorization. 
Prisoners’ self-rule in a space originally conceived to facilitate the exercise 
of strict surveillance by state agents is just a localized, but telling, expression 
of broader social processes in which illegal organizations aim to install sov-
ereign control over demarcated territories, in many respects openly replicat-
ing forms of representation of state public authority and ceremony Th e case 
of the funeral I described at the beginning contains some of its ingredients. 
Indeed, one could read that event as a state funeral, small scale: attendants 
occupied public space as only public authorities do. Yet the degree to which 
exercises of power like this represent a political will that, in essence, seeks 
to replace the (nation-)state is best illustrated by episodes in which protago-
nists resort to national symbols to project meaning on their actions. Let me 
recall one such episode I learnt about in Ciudad Bolívar’s jail, Vista Alegre.
I visited Vista Alegre jail several times during late 2006 and early 2007. 
A friend I have known since 2004, and who used to work for a small tourist 
operator in the frontier town of Santa Elena, had been indirectly embroiled 
in a drug smuggling case and ended up in Vista Alegre while awaiting trial.8 
During one of my visits, I was told about a funeral that had recently taken 
place there. Like the one in the vignette I described earlier, it was the funeral 
of a malandro linked to the pran (the president-like fi gure of the state-like 
entity that is reproduced there). On that occasion, the funeral rally, on its 
way to the cemetery, made a stop in the adjacencies of the jail, close to the 
main entrance area. Th e pran had organized a special ceremony for his for-
mer high-ranking aid. Th e inmates were congregated by the pran and his 
aids on one of the jail’s roofed areas from where they could see the funeral 
attendants and, once in formation, were asked to intonate the national an-
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them in honour of the deceased. Before the rally departed, gun salutes were 
fi red by members of the pran’s guard.
Vista Alegre is a typical Venezuelan jail in key respects. Inside its walls 
there is literally no presence of state agents – they have been expelled and 
are not given access unless it is specifi cally granted by the inmates governing 
body, and only under certain conditions. Self-rule is thus absolute, and a 
proto-state form grows in that scenario. Yet such replication of a state order 
and the (adapted to circumstances) adoption of its symbols and ritual forms 
does not only take place inside the prison, where the three elements that in-
ternational law uses to defi ne the potential for sovereign statehood are pres-
ent in a manageable scale: there is a (limited and well demarcated) territory, 
a population and a government. It also occurs on a larger scale and oft en in 
synergies with the authorities that control rule inside prisons.
Th e groups that end up exercising carceral government oft en precede 
their carceral existence (Antillano 2017: 26), and other times they start an 
inverse sequence that connects them with the ‘outside’: that is, groups that 
are formed through in-prison governance experiences end up constituting 
the core of larger organized groups outside it. In either case, the capacities 
of government that those in charge of carceral self-rule exercise oft en go be-
yond the walls of prisons in a way that blurs the inside-outside boundary of 
these spaces.9 Th is is of course further complicated by the fact that, as John 
Gledhill (2015) has shown for the cases of Mexico and Brazil, the private in-
terests of organized crime can infi ltrate the state apparatus to a large extent, 
and also by the fact that actually existing states can facilitate the conditions 
for the expansion of organized crime. At any rate, what appears as a result is 
a social landscape of competing (if partially overlapping) sovereign orders.
Gledhill has conceptualized a model of parastate governance in Barrio da 
Paz, a poor neighbourhood of Bahia (Brazil), as an ‘order of crime’ (2015: 
67–76). Th e concept is stimulating in capturing the way a local gang imposes 
its own norms of security under the zones it controls while in parallel replac-
ing the (precarious) ‘order of the state’ that preceded it. In Barrio da Paz, the 
latter order had generated widespread animosity among residents because 
of the behaviour of agents in the police post that off ered ‘state security’ to 
the community – and also because the coercive branches of the state are 
the only ones that gain prominence there, despite residents’ demands for 
enhanced access to social services and citizenship rights in general. Police 
acts of racism and arbitrariness were recurrent and denounced by residents, 
something that is even better understood in relation to broader contextual 
factors: the community’s lands are a tempting ground for city developers 
and their political allies, and the potential (city government-backed) evic-
tion of residents has been a continuing threat.
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Th e police post removed, a new order was imposed by a drug lord-led 
group that with its one ‘law of crime’ administered justice against petty delin-
quents and mediated in neighbourhood disputes while facilitating a smooth 
continuation for the business of drug-traffi  cking in the community. Many of 
the residents aff ected by this new order expressed their conformity with it 
and the opinion that it provided more safety than the order of the state under 
the (abusive) supervision of police forces. While not a view shared by every-
one in the community, such an experience of ambivalence towards, or open 
preference for, an ‘order of crime’ has been identifi ed in neighbourhoods of 
Venezuela that have been targeted by special police operatives in the fi ght 
against crime.10 Given the indiscriminate and oft en uncontrolled implemen-
tation of operations in poor neighbourhoods that at times murder citizens 
not involved in criminal activity while failing to capture those who are, some 
residents in these areas fear and distrust the police more than the gangs that 
develop among them.11
Th e ‘orders of crime’, however, and regardless of the legitimacy they 
might generate in the view of those subjected to them, tend to be precarious, 
as much or more imperfect or fl awed than ‘orders of the state’. Gledhill noted 
that even those who were positive about the benefi ts that the order of crime 
had initially brought to the community of Barrio da Paz in terms of safety 
started to question that assumption as soon as confl ict re-emerged over con-
trol of drug-traffi  c in the area (2015: 71–72). Th is phenomenon seems to 
be recurrent: ‘orders of crime’ are generally constituted upon foundational 
violence, once a particular faction forcefully imposes itself upon rival ones, 
and it is generally never too long before another faction tries to contest the 
existing order. Returning to my previous example, cyclical changes in head-
ship of carceral self-rule illustrate it. Th e ruling order of Ciudad Bolívar’s 
jail when I visited it had resulted from the imposition of a single pran who 
imposed himself in an open war. It was widely seen by inmates of the time 
as an improvement from the pre-existing situation, when inside the jail op-
erated little chieft aincies with various leaders in continuing tension. But fac-
tions contested power with some regularity, in rebellions that always caused 
casualties and punishments and that, expectedly, recurred until a replace-
ment of the governing headship arrived. Th ese replacements sometimes oc-
cur through a constrained attack on a pran and perhaps some of his close 
aids, but other times involve large-scale violent confrontations between rival 
groups of inmates.
One possible avenue to explain this precariousness of orders is that they 
most oft en originate to facilitate the realization of particularistic interests 
even when they also articulate aspects of the general will. Forms of redis-
tribution and service provision are oft en undertaken in these orders too, 
though they tend to be limited in scope and selective in terms of the selec-
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tion of benefi ciaries, rather than universal: people with whom the leaders 
of these orders have more personal or political connection receive more 
benefi ts than the rest (e.g. Penglase 2009). Of course, the existence of those 
particularistic interests cannot be explained through tropes about the moral 
character of the subjects who articulate them (‘criminals’ are in such a light 
always treated as ‘naturally’ deviant subjects). In many cases, those particu-
laristic interests are the outcome of the conditions under which those who 
develop these orders operate in their search for wealth and status (main-
stream driving goals in our capitalist societies). With no access to productive 
sources or property that enables them to accumulate capital and/or obtain 
rent, business models and rent-seeking among people from structurally poor 
social sectors rapidly lead to particular niches of illegal activity – what one 
could call ‘blue-collar’ illegal activities, to distinguish them from the type 
of illegal activity that some economic and political elites cultivate (oft en 
lumped under the category of ‘corruption’), and which could be adjectivized 
as ‘white-collar’. So such conditions of structural exclusion are to be taken 
into account in analysing the emergence of these orders and the legitima-
cies they may generate, particularly when fl uid connections and interdepen-
dence are identifi ed between crime and state orders and the way in which 
they overlap in the promotion of particularistic interests. Yet, still, a linger-
ing question remains unanswered: why in this scenario of consolidating or-
ders of crime and the erosion of the legitimacy of the actually existing orders 
of the state do people keep on expressing aspirations to recover the latter (as 
an order in which a public authority eff ectively mediates social relations)? 
Th e ethnographic vignettes that opened this chapter exemplify the resil-
ience of that aspiration among some Venezuelans, and such examples gain 
additional weight when read in conjunction with larger expressions of the 
‘politics of state recovery’ that have received mass support in Venezuela and 
other parts of Latin America. Indeed, the emergence of the so-called Pink 
Tide can be read against a widespread citizen demand for state recovery, as 
is well known. And such recovery, in addition to its focus on socio-economic 
enfranchisement, has also found expression in the area of security policy to a 
considerable extent in response to citizen demands.
State Recovery and Security
When it comes to discussing security, the aspiration that a state authority is 
recovered as the public authority that prevails in the mediation of a variety 
of social relations is of course not a naïve belief in the ‘sweet and benefi cial’ 
yoke of a state apparatus that, in many cases, has rather become rough and 
pernicious – particularly for populations that are defi ned as a threat to se-
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curity under the paradigm of neoliberal capitalism, with ensuing insecurity 
co-produced by state agents and criminal organizations in more or less vol-
untary synergies (Gledhill 2015).
Yet in countries like Venezuela, the perception that behind growing in-
security there are groups that contest the state (as the authority that they 
would like to see mediating social relations) has become a source of po-
tential legitimacy for mano dura approaches to combat crime across class 
lines – that is, not only as an elite-fostered political strategy. Th is is far from 
precluding increasing distrust in police forces, oft en as distrusted or feared 
as malandros by those who consider themselves to be good citizens. As a 
matter of fact, evidence of connections between members of police forces 
and criminal gangs is strong (ranging from the provision of weapons that the 
former guarantee to the latter or direct participation in extortion of diff er-
ent kinds). Th is question has been publicly presented by experts in security 
studies, revealed by regular news of arrests of police offi  cers involved in il-
legal activities and also incorporated into general public knowledge. Stories 
about exposure to petty acts of police corruption are common in conversa-
tions at family or friends reunions, oft en shared in tones that combine hu-
mour and indignation. ‘Whenever I’m stopped by a police offi  cer, the fi rst 
thing I say is “how much do you want?”’ Th is statement, a contribution by 
an acquaintance I made at a small restaurant in Ciudad Bolívar’s fi sh market, 
can be used to illustrate that public lore.
Popular and government concerns with increasing erosion of trust in 
police forces were behind an ambitious attempt at reforming the police 
forces that was initiated in 2006. A National Commission for Police Reform 
(CONAREPOL by its Spanish acronym) was created that year, linked to the 
Ministry of Home Aff airs and Justice (El Achkar 2010). Evaluations of its 
limited results have been off ered by a variety of specialists and would di-
vert us away from our current discussion; here I want to highlight how this 
project fi ts with the politics of state recovery. Th at Commission was pre-
cisely launched in a period in which the idea of ‘the state’ was being strongly 
recovered in the country, with ‘Bolivarian socialism’ already situated by 
Chávez’s government as a driving goal, and with the widening of redistribu-
tive policies on full display in part thanks to a favourable international eco-
nomic context for oil exports. Th is period marked a peak in electoral results 
for chavismo: in December 2006, Chávez would capture nearly two thirds 
(62.84%) of the national vote.
I of course do not suggest that this convergence at a time of a peak in 
electoral results and a peak in the development of government-led policies 
of state recovery results from a direct relation of causality, but I do contend 
that it is worth consideration when trying to shed light on political process 
and electoral behaviour. Th e Venezuelan process of reform replicated to a 
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large extent global agendas of police reform at the time, and one of the rea-
sons why this occurred is because police forces nowadays have gained a type 
of symbolic value (Antillano 2016): particularly in scenarios in which there 
is an increasing demand of security from all social classes, politicians and 
elites become interested in ‘police intervention’ as a form of increasing and 
managing political capital. I suggest that this ‘symbolic value’ operates also 
in other types of state intervention in security policy; it is generally easy to 
frame it discursively as responsive to the general will.
In the face of this reality and the fact that governments of diff erent ideo-
logical leanings develop such policies, it is not simple to identify the polit-
ical orientation of those who support a recovery of the state in the area of 
security provision. Only when complemented with analyses of the orienta-
tion of policies of state recovery in other areas, and particularly in terms of 
socio-economic enfranchisement, can one attempt to discern the overall po-
litical directionality of those politics of state recovery. So let me try to do so 
for the case of Venezuela, and more broadly against the background estab-
lished by the so-called Pink Tide in Latin America.
State Recovery and Socio-economic Enfranchisement
Th e characterizations of the left ist governments that came to be identifi ed 
under the ‘Pink Tide’ label are quite diverse and oft en diverging (Ellner 
2019), but among them there is generally a common acknowledgement: 
they brought ‘the state back’ into the shaping of Latin American societies 
aft er the peak of the neoliberal revolution had destabilized the social con-
tracts in most of them. In the late 1980s and 1990s, peripheral states such 
as the Latin American ones lost sovereignty at fast pace, privatization of 
public assets accelerated and, in the countries in which a welfare state had 
started to take shape, provision of social services fell dramatically as a result 
of the austerity policies that came to be imposed by supranational donors in 
exchange for fi nancial support. All or most of these manifestations of neo-
liberal governance were aff ected by a reversing political impulse when the 
governments of the Pink Tide, and particularly those in the orbit of the so-
called socialisms of the twenty-fi rst century, came to power.
An important question tends to be overlooked in the evaluations of this 
process, particularly now that there seems to be a widespread consensus 
around the idea that the Pink Tide is over or in irreversible decline. Th e 
governments in the orbit of this Tide succeeded in giving form to a type of 
collective subject that, even when removed from power, remains as a realis-
tic alternative for progressive post-neoliberal governance in the continent.12 
Th ese subjects, constituted as national-popular blocs, have fl uctuated in size 
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since their emergence, but at any rate they have electorally sustained gov-
ernments even in periods of strong crisis, such as in Venezuela, and in other 
cases, when defeated in the ballot box, they have nevertheless showed up as 
a realistic contender for government. Recall that the 2015 victory of Macri 
in Argentina, which was rapidly used as evidence of the decline of the Pink 
Tide, was narrow, and also that other cases generally presented as evidence 
for that decline have all been tight victories of rightist forces: Evo Morales’ 
bloc was defeated in the Bolivian referendum for constitutional reform in 
February 2016 by a very thin margin, for instance. Furthermore, in yet other 
cases used to certify the alleged historical defeat of the Pink Tide, such as 
Brazil, rightist forces continue to do their best to sidestep an open electoral 
confrontation with left ist rivals – not only did they remove Dilma Rousseff  
in a parliamentary coup, but they also manoeuvred to avoid that Lula could 
become a presidential candidate again, eventually placing him in jail through 
a judicial process plagued by irregularities.
Th e consolidation of these blocs deserves more than superfi cial attention, 
particularly in a global conjuncture in which there is evidence of a revolt 
against neoliberal governance in many diff erent countries. Because, with 
the exception of Latin America, where the Pink Tide succeeded in cement-
ing this collective subject I refer to, this is a revolt in which emerging post-
neoliberal collective subjects are generally taking shape under the leadership 
of proto-fascist parties or of anarchic extreme right-wingers (current exam-
ples in Europe are myriad, and the one in the USA is indicative of the range 
of forms that discontent with neoliberal business-as-usual can produce in 
the absence of organized progressive options).
Th ere are at least two central questions to be considered in the consolida-
tion of these blocs. Firstly, as collective subjects they were primarily amal-
gamated by demands for socio-economic enfranchisement that involved 
‘state recovery’. Second, Pink Tide governments, which to diff erential de-
grees facilitated that enfranchisement, were actively supported by mass 
state-supporting movements – that is, the orientation of government policy 
was thus generative of supportive social mobilization. I have elsewhere exam-
ined and characterized the constitution of such state-supporting movements 
in Venezuela (Angosto-Ferrández 2015), remarking that their collective 
action has been channelled through the electoral arena (a space generally 
neglected by social movement analysts) but also through a variety of other 
institutional and extra-institutional channels. Th ose movements have been 
fundamentally oriented towards supporting a state structure (expression of 
a public authority) that could eff ectively guarantee socio-economic and po-
litical enfranchisement in relation to the forces that have historically ignored 
it or broken it up, and thus actively supported governments that facilitated 
that enfranchisement. Th ey have done so under a Rousseaunean frame, as it 
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were, considering that in the realm of economic transactions the lack of state 
presence can lead to exclusion and injustice (the vignette I presented from 
the ‘there is no government, chico!’ lament in Catia can be read against that 
background).
Th e functioning of those state-supporting movements undermines wide-
spread preconceptions about social movement activity, and particularly 
conceptions of the ‘state’ and ‘society’ as ontologically separated entities. 
Not only do the members of these state-supporting social movements oper-
ate on both sides of that alleged ontological divide, but their activity reveals 
them as drivers of a state-supporting collective action that destabilizes the 
oft en taken for granted antagonism between social movements and the state.
I suggest that when reading the support for strong intervention against 
perceived ‘orders of crime’ in conjunction with this other type of state-
supporting mobilization, we fi nd that the overarching spirit of such interven-
tion is primarily shaped by concerns with justice and general will, and not 
with the (class-biased) punishment of the poorer sectors of society in which 
the implementation of those interventions have oft en been transformed.
Conclusion
I opened this chapter with vignettes in which a variety of people lamented 
that there is no government (‘state’), and I closed it recalling that much of 
the political mobilization that has taken place in Venezuela and other parts 
of Latin America over the past few decades can be read as state-supporting 
mobilization. In between, I discussed the social landscapes that, in this pe-
riod of globalized and volatile capitalism, emerge in the absence of the state 
(as a public authority that can eff ectively mediate social relations). It is my 
suggestion that against this background we can learn about how people, to-
day, pursue the constructions of conditions for egalitarianism. For a variety 
of reasons that include the way in which neoliberal hegemony led to a load-
ing of key political concepts with particular (neoliberally oriented) conno-
tations, ‘the state’ has ended up in the margins of theoretical discussions of 
egalitarianism – or at the front, but as the principal enemy to defeat. Th is is 
a pity, and perhaps not inconsequential. Such displacement may be condi-
tioned by the diffi  culties of translating conceptually people’s evaluations of 
their own social environments and also by associations of ‘the state’ with its 
corporate and authoritarian forms, but in any case it sets rigid boundaries 
to our capacities to think about contemporary politics and their potential 
developments. Given the worrying symptoms that contemporary politics 
project in many parts of the world, with authoritarianism and proto-fascism 
re-emerging in some countries as electorally backed responses to capitalist 
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crisis, setting such boundaries to the analysis of political attitudes and pro-
posals may be costly. So it might not be a bad idea to listen to people who ask 
for ‘more state’ in search for justice and egalitarian social conditions, as a fi rst 
step towards an understanding what that means and how it can be realized.
Luis Angosto-Ferrández is a Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Spanish 
and Latin American Studies at the University of Sydney. He is author of Ven-
ezuela Refr amed (Zed Books, 2015) and co-editor of Anthropologies of Value 
(Pluto Press, 2016) and Th e Politics of Identity in Latin American Censuses 
(Routledge, 2016).
NOTES
 1. ‘Malandro’ is a term used in Venezuela to refer generically to people involved in 
criminal or outlawed activities.
 2. ‘Perreras’ literally translates as ‘dog transporters’. It is used to name a type of van 
that has been adapted by its owner to carry passengers for a fee. Th e name is telling 
of the degradation that many users of ‘public transport’ experience on a daily basis.
 3. ‘Por puesto’ is the name given to cars that take passengers covering a given route 
(whether inside a city or between cities). Th ey charge each passenger the same fee.
 4. Th e term ‘bachaquero’ (a colloquial derivation from ‘bachaco’, the name given to 
a type of ant) is used to refer to street vendors dealing with generally black-marke-
teered products.
 5. Th e so-called Fourth Republic that was born out of the agreement of Punto Fijo 
(1958) established from the outset ideological limits to political participation. Th e 
Communist Party was excluded from the emerging arena of electoral competition, 
and over the years the regime eff ectively turned into a bi-partisan regime imprinted 
by repression of minority sectors of left ist dissidence.
 6. Illustratively, in the late 1920s and from exile, the leader of Acción Democrática and 
future president of Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt, described Vallenilla Lanz as a 
‘Tropical Machiavelli cast in toilet paper’ (Harwich Vallenilla 1991).
 7. Th ough focused on another case (specifi cally, El Salvador), the work of Sonja Wolf 
(2017) describes compellingly how this type of approach against gang crime, which 
on the one hand generally receives social support, is used by the country’s elites to 
consolidate political power.
 8. Santa Elena, located right by the border with Brazil, is the capital of Gran Sabana 
municipal unit, in the south of Bolívar state. Behind the case of my friend were two 
Spanish fake tourists who had hired a tourist service with the agency my friend 
worked for. Th ose tourists were given permission to leave their luggage in the 
agency offi  ce while they were (allegedly) going on another tour on Pacaraima, right 
at the other side of the national border. Th ey said that once they fi nished that other 
tour they would arrange collection of the luggage, and so they did a few days later. A 
taxi driver came to pick up the luggage, and when he was crossing the international 
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border the luggage was inspected by Venezuelan custom agents. Eight kilograms 
of cocaine were found there, and both taxi driver and my friend from the tourist 
agency (a man in his late fi ft ies, married and with two teenage kids) were considered 
potentially complicit by one attorney and became formally charged.
 9. In Ciudad Bolívar, it was common knowledge that a group that specialized in rob-
bery of cars was commanded from inside the jail of Vista Alegre, just to provide an 
example relevant to my discussion. 
10. Gledhill notes that oft en older people consider that the only possible legitimate au-
thority is that of the police and the judiciary system.
11. See comments by Andrés Antillano in this regard (Bujanda 2015).
12. In this section, I draw from a piece previously published at the Progress in Political 
Economy (PPE) blog: ‘Th e Hidden Victory of Chavismo – and Another Twist on the 
Pink Tide’, 9 August 2017.
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CHAPTER 7
zzz
EGALITARIAN AND HIERARCHICAL TENSIONS 
IN CUBAN SELF-EMPLOYED VENTURES
Marina Gold
Historically, Cuba has been exposed to diff erent state models. From the 
Spanish colonial extractivist state, Cuba became a neo-colony of the US, 
inextricably linked to US industrial and corporate capital. Property and re-
sources were either owned by North American magnates or in the hands 
of Cuban elites that responded  to US interests. Aft er the 1959 Revolution, 
and particularly since the mid 1960s, Cuba became integrated into the So-
viet economy and was under the infl uence of state corporatism of the USSR, 
where the Soviet Party controlled both economic and political processes. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has developed economic ven-
tures with China, Spain, Canada and various partners within the region, 
such as Venezuela and Argentina. During the decade of the Pink Tide, the 
regional political confi guration of left -leaning governments that supported 
alternative views to the North American neoliberal model provided a friend-
lier economic and ideological network for Cuba.
Th e recent move to the right in Latin American governments and the in-
creasing antagonism of the Trump administration present a radical regional 
shift . Th e corporatization of the state in Latin America and elsewhere, more 
than an economic force, transforms personhood and reconfi gures peo-
ple-state relationships. In the 1960s and 1970s, the left ist projects in Latin 
America (the Cuban Revolution, Allende’s Chile, the Nicaraguan Sandinista 
Revolution) proposed alternatives to the imperial capitalist North American 
model. At the core of these ideologies, strongly infl uenced by Marxism and 
Anarchism, was the radical challenge to capitalist American hegemony – 
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an anti-colonialist agenda. Aft er the Cold War, and particularly in the new 
millennium, the rise of ‘el socialismo del siglo xxi’ in Latin America saw 
the emergence of egalitarian ideologies that were less infl uenced by Soviet 
and Anarchist thought. A multiplicity of ‘alternatives’ to the neoliberal way 
emerged. Indigenous ontologies (Viveiros de Castro 1998), environmen-
tal principles (Carneiro da Cunha and De Alemida 2000) and urban social 
movements (Castells 2012) not only contest US hegemony; they are also in-
corporated into state projects, such as Bolivia, Chávez’s Venezuela and for 
a time in Ecuador. Th e content, interests and confi guration of anti-colonial 
resistance diversifi ed and in the process became somewhat disaggregated 
and atomized, to the detriment of the more international class-based strug-
gle of the 60s and 70s (see Oikonomakis this volume for an example of this 
in Bolivia).
Alternative movements in Latin America – social movements – dissat-
isfi ed with centralized socialist governments must contend with a diff er-
ent emergent form of statehood (see Introduction) to that of the twentieth 
century. No longer the military regime of the 1960s and 70s, and exceeding 
the traditional distinctions between left  and right, the state is being trans-
muted into a more corporate confi guration: Mauricio Macri in Argentina 
perhaps represents this move the clearest, although Chile and Mexico are 
also strongly corporatized states (see Introduction and respective chapters). 
Th e apparent demise of the Pink Tide and the emergence of the corporate 
state with neoliberal discourse as its modus operandi are eff ecting change in 
Cuban revolutionary conceptions at a time when centralized left ist govern-
ments and colonial struggles (though still relevant) are being transformed, 
and class relations reconfi gured. While Cuba is equally exposed to global 
corporatizing forces – particularly in its relation to the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industry and its close dependence on Venezuela’s oil – this 
takes diff erent forms, given the centrality of the Cuban state in economic 
and political processes. Th e penetration of state-transforming corporatizing 
processes is perhaps most clearly seen in the tensions between emerging 
forms of non-state employment reconfi guring labour relations.
Th e corporatization of state structures in Latin America aff ects Cuba both 
through regional and international political and economic relations with 
other (more corporatized) states such as China or Spain, as well as through 
the internal transformations of state-people relations by shift ing labour 
structures (the development of biotechnology, self-employment, tourism), 
the growing popularity of the internet, and transformations in the under-
standing of revolution. Diff erent hierarchies of value emerge, challenging 
revolutionary ideologies: the atomization of the social, a reduction of the 
collective subject of the 1960s, a reinvigoration of the family and increased 
individualism. Paradoxically, while the family – a bourgeois institution par 
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excellence (Engels 1993 [1884]) – can have oppressive and hierarchical ef-
fects, Cuban matrifocally organized kinship structures serve to redistribute 
resources (particularly in times of scarcity) and are more recently being 
harnessed to reconfi gure political and economic processes outside spaces 
of state control.
In this chapter, I analyse the tensions within emerging forms of labour 
in the process of redefi ning revolutionary value and reconstituting social 
relations. Th is is crucial at a time when regional state structures are being 
transformed and the Cuban state is undergoing its own generational shift s, 
with the assumption of the new president Miguel Díaz-Canel in April 2018. 
Tensions exist between diff erent forms of labour: self-employment, state-
centralized labour organizations (unions, state employees, taxation offi  ces) 
and cooperative ventures. Th ese tensions are not merely economic (capi-
talism versus communism, or the possible penetration of neoliberal poli-
cies). Th ey bring to the fore a diff erent crisis: one of the hierarchies of value 
and egalitarian processes. Self-employed ventures – their interactions with 
other forms of labour and their structural confi guration – reveal egalitarian 
spaces that partially disrupt established hierarchies (centralized state struc-
tures, male-dominated activities, oligarchic groups), contesting them and 
momentarily subverting them. However, these spaces are also amenable 
to be co-opted by regional corporatizing dynamics, such as international 
NGO funding, microcredit fi nancial institutions, émigré Cubans, interna-
tional corporations and foreign political interests, thus becoming spaces 
of contestation of competing hierarchies of value. I consider the origins of 
Cuban egalitarian ideas and argue that other forms of egalitarian processes, 
not always recognized as such (matrifocality, ‘sociolismo’, self-employed 
ventures), are eff ecting social transformation and disrupting established 
hierarchies.
Egalitarian Ideas in the Cuban Revolution
Egalitarian ideology in Cuba has not only been shaped by Marxist and Soviet 
thought. While the initial ideologies of the guerrilleros were more strongly 
infl uenced by the experiences and ideas of the Russian Revolution, the 
strong anti-colonial character of the struggle demanded a Latin American 
perspective. Anti-colonial thinkers, such as Simón Bolívar, José Martí, José 
Carlos Mariátegui, Rubén Martínez Villena or Julio Antonio Mella have been 
cornerstones of the Cuban Revolution, and their ideas are periodically re-
considered and given a current spin (Cantón Navarro 2008; Estrade 2006; 
Hart Dávalos 2009a, 2009b, 2010), and their words are regularly published 
in offi  cial media (see for example Granma 2018). Th e incorporation of other 
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discourses aft er the collapse of Soviet communism has redefi ned egalitarian 
thought in a radically transformed region. Th e fi rst marked shift  was given 
by the recourse to environmental and ecological ideas, which were widely 
incorporated in support of urban agricultural programmes in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (see Gold 2014a). Th is helped the Cuban revolution posi-
tion itself in opposition to the increasingly evident ecologically disastrous 
consequences of Soviet agriculture (Doyon 2005; González 2003). Changes 
in emigration policies initiated in the 1990s also shift ed political discourse 
regarding the constitution of the revolutionary person. Th e family replaced 
‘the people’ as an undiff erentiated mass, with massive implications for the 
scale of revolutionary action, as an activity that had the family at its core – 
once considered a counter-revolutionary individualist action – it would in-
creasingly become defi ned as politically acceptable (see Gold 2015). In the 
context of a redefi ned revolutionary nucleus, kinship relations gained new 
potency to express revolutionary commitment, but the importance of kin-
ship is not new.
Matrifocality is deeply rooted in historic processes that shaped the Carib-
bean (slavery and the structures of plantations, colonial settlements, racial 
inequalities and seasonal migration) (see Safa 2009 for an overview). Struc-
tural transformations in Cuba in the 1960s enabled the further development 
of matrifocal families, such as an increased participation of women in the 
workplace, a de-stigmatization of divorce, the levelling of inequalities (es-
pecially in terms of race and class hierarchies) and the increased role of the 
welfare state as basic provider. In the anthropological literature, matrifocal-
ity has been observed to contest the aggregation of male patrilineal groups 
into centres of control of resources (land, social capital, money). It is signif-
icant that matrifocal networks become relevant again in times of economic 
scarcity, when the reorganization of domestic activities for economic sub-
sistence becomes important and at a particularly relevant moment in Cuban 
history when property is once more subjected to accumulation. At a time 
when property again obtains exchange value, the concentration of property 
along female lines can serve as a counter-mechanism to male-dominated 
activities (such as construction, mechanic cooperatives etc.) that are more 
lucrative than female-based activities in the home. Th is is particularly im-
portant when property enters the chain of value through marriage of a Cuban 
woman with a foreigner. In the context of regional transformations of state 
structures that undermine both the centralized economy of the Cuban state 
and eff ect transformations at the very level of individual life, historically rel-
evant egalitarian forces that aim to counteract hierarchical structures (male 
chauvinism, centralized state power, corporatization through cooperative 
activities and international development funding) are revalued. Matrifocal 
networks contribute to the revaluing of property and the economic activ-
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ities that take place in the home when labour relations are changing with 
the strengthening of cooperatives into (oft en male-dominated) corporate 
groups that compete with the state in the provision of services, and (cru-
cially) do not have the public interest as central motivation.
Matrifocality in Caribbean Anthropology
Th e concern with matrifocality in the Caribbean is a classic anthropological 
interest stemming from kinship studies in African societies. Inspired by the 
likes of Meyer Fortes and his work in the Ashanti area of Ghana, anthropol-
ogists like Raymond Smith (1996) applied socio-spatial theories developed 
through the study of diff erent African groups to understand the lifeworlds 
of black communities in the Caribbean. Matrifocality was observed in many 
parts of the Caribbean, particularly among the black and poor (oft en over-
lapping categories). Helen Safa (1998, 2005) recognized the historic roots of 
matrifocality, extending back to slave populations, and the impact of the sep-
aration of slave conjugal unions but not of mother-child bonds, making con-
sanguineal bonds stronger than conjugal ones. Th is was also supported by 
interracial mixing during the colonial period, as female-headed households 
were oft en the product of consensual or visiting unions between white men 
and slaves or free women of colour (Safa 1998: 205). Th e mulatto children 
born of these unions were able to better incorporate themselves into white 
society. Th e dual marriage system, which only allowed legal marriage be-
tween white elites, confi ning the rest of the population to consensual unions, 
contributed to the widespread acceptance of alternative forms of domestic 
organization (Safa 2009: 43). Labour migrations also weakened the conjugal 
bond and gave pre-eminence to the mother-child tie.
Matrifocality implies two elements: local organization of the kinship group 
and the articulation of resources along female kin. Th erefore, the organiza-
tion of the household, the habitation patterns of off spring and the power to 
make decisions relies on the female head of the household (Miller 1988; So-
lien 1965). In Cuba, it is the woman in her role of mother that lies at the cen-
tre of family relations (Härkönen 2010). Th is does not exclude the possibility 
of a male breadwinner, but his presence is more contingent. With the high 
index of divorce, women form more stable members of households, while 
men move in and out and have children scattered in diff erent locations. In 
Cuba, matrifocality presents itself in contrast to the patriarchal image of the 
revolutionary leadership: Fidel as the ‘father’ of the revolution and the Cu-
ban nation (Härkönen 2010: 60). Th e female-focused family unit – increas-
ingly the locus of economic activities at the micro-level – stands in tension 
with the male-dominated political group (el pueblo). Th is tension did not go 
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unnoticed by Fidel in his youth, as he initiated many programmes for the in-
corporation of women into the political project: the retraining of prostitutes, 
the implementation of child-care services to incorporate women sooner to 
the workforce and the creation of the Federation of Cuban Women.
Matrifocality became a topic of interest in the 1970s; in many Carib-
bean locations (Guyana, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Cuba) it was 
a practice on the rise. Governments and scholars interpreted it as an in-
dication of an aberrant practice that responded to the breakdown of the 
social fabric (Blackwood 2005), a traditional evolutionist view of the family 
identifi ed by Engels, Marx and Lewis Henry Morgan, who saw the male-
headed household as the more evolved and modern form. As matrifocality 
increased in many locations across the Caribbean, anthropological studies 
showed that it was not a symptom of crisis but had instead clear roots in 
slave history and was simultaneously infl uenced by race, class and labour 
relations. Matrifocality could potentially redistribute resources and chal-
lenge male-dominated land tenure systems.
In a longitudinal study of family constitutions and females in the work-
force, Safa (1995, 1998, 2008, 2009) observed that the presence of matri-
focality in diff erent Caribbean locations responds to women’s increased 
participation in the workforce, the prevalence of consensual unions and the 
erosion of the status of legal marriage. In Cuba, particularly, the acceptance 
of divorce due to antireligious policies, the shortage of houses and the race 
and gender equality policies, while not completely successful, contributed 
to the increase of female-headed households. Th is gave rise to a structural 
tension between the hierarchical, male-dominated centralized state and the 
female control over the private domestic sphere.
Matrifocality is not confi ned to black or poor populations in Cuba, and 
the extended family, crucial for the sustenance of households before the 
Revolution, has gained renewed importance since the Special Period. Lack 
of available housing sees the cohabitation of three generations, useful in the 
rearing of children, the concentration of government-provided goods and 
money and the redistribution of duties. Grandmothers take care of children 
while mothers work, grandfathers queue at the bodega (distribution depot) 
for rations of rice, eggs, nappies or milk, making the maternal grandparents 
(particularly the grandmother) a person’s most important kin (Härkönen 
2010: 62). In my fi eldwork observations (2009–2016), it was common for 
adult unmarried daughters to live with their mothers, while unmarried sons 
moved in with their maternal grandmother, in the instances where she had 
her own house.
Matrifocal structures have remained strongly active in the reorganiza-
tion of labour in times of crisis and the capitalization of the female-centred 
labour power into self-employed ventures. Th e division of labour between 
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calle/casa (Pertierra 2008) – between the public and private spaces – per-
meates the emergence of new forms of employment, such as self-employed 
ventures. Ventures predominantly organized from within the household are 
a source of labour for women. In parallel, however, self-employed activities 
are also mechanisms by which men can harness what is a female space and 
capitalize on women’s labour for profi t. Th erefore, the tensions that plague 
gender relations within social ties are also present in the articulation of eco-
nomic activities emerging aft er the Special Period: at once hierarchical and 
centralized as they are regulated by the state, while simultaneously breaking 
up hierarchical orders into new confi gurations of social, political and eco-
nomic units.
Forms of Employment and Revolutionary Value
Non-state employment existed in Cuba throughout the history of the revo-
lutionary process but was sometimes exposed to stricter control, such as in 
the Soviet period between the mid 1960s to the late 1970s. Aft er the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, an increase in self-employed ventures (le-
gal and illegal) represented spontaneous expressions of grass-roots subsis-
tence mechanisms aiming to cover the gaps left  by a contracting central state. 
Th e disappearance of CAME (Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Economica and 
COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) cost Cuba 47 per 
cent of its exports, its subsidies from the USSR, and a 70 per cent reduction 
of imports (Sacchetti 2011). Th e family became the central locus of produc-
tion and provision, replacing the state’s incapacity to cover all the needs of 
daily life. People became responsible for their own subsistence, selling the 
subsidized products of the libretas (state ration booklet), fi nding ways to 
make a living out of tourism, provisioning from state goods, selling services 
not regulated by the state, and from remittances.
Th e fi rst self-employed businesses started as exchange networks be-
tween the city and the country: food for consumer products (soap, sham-
poo, cosmetics), but in the IV Party Congress in 1991 the emergence of 
self-employment was offi  cially discussed, and the constitution was changed 
to contemplate the possibility of some forms of private property and small 
businesses. Th ere are today various types of non-state employment in Cuba 
that have reconfi gured people-state relations within the revolutionary proj-
ect. No longer the sole provider, the state is relegated to the role of supervi-
sor as cooperatives and cuentapropistas take over many economic activities. 
Th ere are legal and structural diff erences between the constitution of co-
operatives (and there are diff erent types of cooperatives) and other small-
scale ventures, such as houses for rent and private restaurants, generically 
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referred to as cuentapropistas. Th ere are three types of agricultural coopera-
tives, described by EcuRed as follows:
1) Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa (UBPC) Basic units of cooperative 
production: these constitute a socio-economic community where production 
is conducted communally and land is communally owned from state land used 
in usufruct. Th ey are constituted by workers from the state sector and means of 
production (raw materials) must be purchased from the state. Th ey must focus 
on specifi c crops (sugar, citruses, fruit, coff ee, tobacco and animal husbandry).
2) Cooperativas de Creditos y Servicios (CCS) Credit and services cooperative: 
Th ese are voluntary organizations of farmers who retain private ownership of 
their land but share common use of certain means of production (watering in-
stallations, services and credits). Th is organization of individual producers facil-
itates the provision of credits and fi nancial assistance by the state to a communal 
rather than individual entity. Infrastructure (tractors and tools) and production 
are, however, private.
3) Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria (CPA) Agricultural production coop-
erative: Th ese constitute a collective form of social property resulting from the 
decision of farmers to join lands and means of production in collective owner-
ship. It is seen as an advanced and effi  cient socialist economic entity.
Th ere is a fourth non-agricultural cooperative:
4) Cooperativa no Agropecuaria (CnoA) Non-agricultural cooperatives: Th ese are 
constituted by people working as partners (socios) in non-agricultural activities. 
Th ese emerged in 2013. Ex. Mechanics, construction workers, hospitality work-
ers etc.
A diff erent type of non-state employment includes that of Trabajadores 
por cuenta propia (TPCP workers ‘on their own account’, cuentapropistas 
for short). Th ese are workers that may or may not be the owners of the 
means of production but are not subjected to a labour contract with juridical 
entities and do not receive a salary. Th is group includes craft smen, writers, 
intellectuals, rental property owners, hairdressers, classic-car drivers (and a 
list of at least 178 activities described in resolution No. 32/2010). Th ey must 
be registered and obtain a licence from the Ofi cina Nacional de Adminis-
tración Tributaria (ONAT), pay for a monthly licence and pay taxes on their 
income. Th e numbers of CNoA have dramatically increased from 2013 (the 
year of their legalization) from 196 to 367 in 2015, with 192 existing in Ha-
vana. Out of the total number of CNoA, 131 of them are within the com-
merce and repair of personal objects; 91 in hotels and restaurants, 61 within 
the construction industry and 49 in the manufacturing industry (Anuario 
Estadístico de Cuba 2016). Th e reason for this increase is that CNoA off er a 
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tributary advantage over TPCP, as they are taxed less over their income be-
cause the government assumes that a cooperative ownership will contribute 
to the redistribution of earnings, while cuentapropistas (TPCP) are assumed 
to benefi t individuals.
Th ese are not easy distinctions to make in practice, as CNoA are oft en 
constituted by kin, concentrating earnings in family groups, and cuenta-
propistas rely on (and support) a broad network of other cuentapropistas in 
what Armengol (2013) labels as competitive solidarity, which guarantees the 
redistribution of income from cuentapropista ventures throughout vast net-
works of the informal economy: plumbers, painters, construction workers, 
food preparation services, car services, tourist services and other cuenta-
propistas that help to ensure that paladares and casas particulares function 
properly (see Gold 2016 for example).
One of the most signifi cant changes in the last decade in Cuba has been 
the boom of self-employment. Th is phenomenon has attracted much schol-
arly attention prompting questions regarding the possible emergence of a 
new middle class (Feinberg 2013), the penetration of the market into a so-
cialist centrally planned economy (Catá Backer 2012) and the role of cuen-
tapropistas as a possible site for civil society in the redefi nition of the state 
(Bye 2012). While there is validity in all these observations, these oft en re-
main at an economistic level, addressing the impacts of self-employment for 
the larger economic survival of the political project of the Cuban economy. 
However, these ventures also embed tensions that point to the contradic-
tions permeating revolutionary values within shift ing hierarchies of power.
Self-Employment: Hierarchical and Egalitarian Tensions
Th e 1990s saw the proliferation of tourism through mixed ventures between 
the Cuban state and Canadian and Spanish companies. Fidel Castro’s bet on 
biotechnology has international partners within the pharmaceutical busi-
ness, and China has gained prominence within the Cuban economy, invest-
ing in biotechnology, mining and tourism. International NGOs settled in 
Cuba in the 90s in order to promote the growth of civil society and other 
developmental discourses that attract donors, and since 2011 individuals 
can receive bank credits. Th ese NGOs have aimed to expand liberal values 
(of equality, respect for human rights, entrepreneurial ethics), thus encour-
aging the penetration of neoliberal ideology into internationally funded 
projects. However, while people have partially incorporated these in order 
to receive funding in environmental projects as well as health-related and 
religious ventures (see Gold 2014a, 2014b), these have not completely sub-
verted revolutionary ideology. Th is is partially due to the close relation of 
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the non-governmental sphere with the Cuban state, but it also emerges as 
a reaction against corporatizing processes that are oft en associated with the 
antagonisms of the powerful émigré Cuban community in Miami.
Furthermore, since the new millennium, the Internet has become more 
accessible, and while not everybody might have access at home (although 
more and more people do) they can access all North American and Latin 
American television, news and series through a uniquely Cuban product 
called el paquete1 (the package). Th at is, Cuba has been exposed to the pen-
etration of western-style corporatizing processes since the 90s, both from 
within the region as well as from European and Chinese relations.
Th e economic crisis and a radically transformed political situation af-
ter the fall of the Socialist Bloc disaggregated economic power beyond the 
purely political space of the Party or the state into other forms of association 
previously relevant but subjugated to the political project of the revolution 
for thirty years. What Cubans refer to as ‘sociolismo’ – understood by schol-
ars as the social networks underpinning the informal economy and insuffi  -
ciently glossed as nepotism – has historical roots in kinship ties and ought to 
be conceived as more than a response to the economic hardships of the Spe-
cial Period. ‘Sociolist’ networks and matrifocal structures have the potential 
to experience the horizontalization of relations opposing the accumulation 
of resources vertically, under foreign oligarchic power (such as transnational 
corporations), but they also have the capacity to enable further corporati-
zation by contesting the state and potentially accumulating resources and 
infl uence along kinship ties and in successful business groups, giving rise to 
local oligarchies and emerging social classes, oft en drawn along racial lines.
Th e term sociolismo emerged in the 1990s to refer to the ambiguous and 
ubiquitous type of corruption that many Cubans engage with in order to 
meet their daily needs. It cannot easily be divided between dichotomies of 
legal and illegal, moral and immoral behaviour or public and private rela-
tions, and it exceeds bureaucratic structures. Sociolismo is on the one hand a 
state-based tactic of tolerating illegalities that emerge in times of economic 
crisis, and on the other, a network of social ties, sometimes superimposed 
on kinship networks and articulated in opposition to the centralization of 
power by the state (and other state-like institutions, such as international 
NGOs). Th erefore sociolismo, which operates along ties of kinship, race 
and locality, is an egalitarianizing force aiming to wrest power away from 
the centralizing structures of the state and other hierarchical groups, like 
foreign companies or powerful cooperatives. Diff erent from smaller-scale 
household ventures like paladares, rental properties and other gastronomic 
cuentapropistas, cooperatives, particularly those of construction workers, 
are burgeoning corporate groups that position themselves in competition 
with the state but rely on the private market of cuentapropistas as customers. 
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However, simultaneously, sociolist/kinship structures have hierarchical ten-
dencies and harness kin with a centralizing and exploitative eff ect.
Cooperatives, encouraged by the state already in the 80s in order to create 
more autonomous economic units that would nonetheless function against 
the accumulation of resources in the hands of possible emergent oligarchic 
capitalist groups – egalitarian mechanisms for the distribution of capital and 
power – have simultaneously enabled the emergence of more individualist 
projects within the revolutionary spectrum of participation. Paradoxically, 
while acting as centres for the accumulation of capital and power in pri-
vate hands, their particular kinship-oriented structures also contest power 
from oligarchic groups, such as foreign investors (particularly émigré Cu-
bans from Miami). An analysis of the interactions between cooperatives and 
other self-employed ventures such as paladares (home-run restaurants) and 
casas particulares (rental properties) – oft en divided along gender lines – 
reveals the tensions between egalitarian practices that challenge a centrally 
planned economy and an emerging corporate hierarchy.
Recent studies on cuentapropistas report gender divisions that corre-
spond to domestic life roles: women cuentapropistas tend to rent out houses, 
mend clothes, provide make-up and hairdressing services, make jewellery 
and fl ower arrangements and prepare fast food and pastries. Men drive taxis, 
have craft  stalls, fi x home appliances and carry out other activities outside 
the home (Ferragut and Piza Nicolau 2016; Pañellas Álvarez and Torralbas 
Oslé 2016). While some argue that these divisions reproduce historic struc-
tures of domination circumscribing women to the domestic sphere (Andaya 
2013), in practice, women have been attending to domestic duties through-
out the Revolution, even while they received at times more support from the 
state in matters of child care and job opportunities. Th e possibility of making 
a profi t from the domestic sphere has its economic attractiveness, especially 
for retired women.
Th e male predominance of lucrative cooperatives such as construction 
and agriculture needs to be situated within relations between other self-em-
ployed ventures, such as rental properties and small-scale food ventures, 
located in the household (e.g. paladares, bakeries). Th e female predomi-
nance of household activities means that self-employed ventures run from 
the private spaces of the home are oft en administered by women, especially 
when focused on food preparation. Th e strong interdependence between 
the diff erent sectors of the emerging (legal and illegal) private economy, un-
derlined by sociolist networks, demands cuentapropistas to cooperate in the 
interests of their businesses.
However, there are tensions between diff erent self-employed activities. 
While matrifocal networks strengthen the cuentapropista activity of rental 
houses and grant women access to landed property, other more profi table 
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self-employed ventures (e.g. construction cooperatives and paladares) 
tend to be male-dominated, making access to capital, contacts and much 
coveted construction materials more readily available. While men concen-
trate power and resources through cooperative activities, the centrality of 
matrifocal networks grants women access to capital, for which the domes-
tic sphere and kinship relations have become key resources. Th e tensions 
played out throughout these economic activities are a symptom of the in-
trinsic dynamics within egalitarian and hierarchical processes, more visible 
in times of intensifi cation of crisis and always constitutive of one another 
(see Introduction for more details).
Matrifocality, Corporatism and Cooperativism
Th e diff erent sectors (agricultural, non-agricultural cooperatives, cuenta-
propistas) are in constant tension. Cuentapropistas can act as control mech-
anisms against the increasing power of cooperatives. Th e organization of 
self-employed activities within the household strengthens the ability of 
matrifocal kin to counteract male control over earnings, and sociolist net-
works that underpin all non-state and state employment provide another 
form of social organization that sometimes coincides with matrifocal kin-
ship ties but at other times contests them (santería kin is an example, see 
Crahan 2003).
Casas particulares are usually female businesses. It is the grandmothers 
who run the rental houses. Th e daughter, married or more oft en divorced, 
and the grandchildren move in with the grandmother and rent the daugh-
ter’s house. While the daughter generally works in a state job, the grand-
mother manages the rental property. In some cases, it is the grandchildren 
that manage the business, and the mother continues to work in the state job. 
In cases when mothers emigrate, the grandchildren remain with the grand-
mother and rent their mother’s property.
Th is is compatible with Helen Safa’s analysis of matrifocality as a mech-
anism of resisting not only the dominant patriarchal culture but also the 
conservative Catholic traditions inherited from the colonial era, where le-
gal marriage was a mechanism of control, a legacy of the Republic era and 
North American infl uence (Stoner 1991). Th e extended family was always 
important in Cuba before the revolution and then gained importance again 
in the Special Period. Th e high incidence of extended families cohabiting is 
due to the austerity of the 90s and lack of availability of housing, but consan-
guineal ties also determine the spatial organization of families, the economic 
activities in which they are involved and the relations through which they 
cooperate. Despite a slight predominance of households with a male head 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 Egalitarian and Hierarchical Tensions in Cuban Self-Employed Ventures 161
of 53.8 per cent (ONE 2016), since 2002 non-nuclear households have in-
creased to 32 per cent in 2008 – that is, more and more households are made 
up of members other than the spouses and dependents (Del Carmen Franco 
Suárze and Alfonso 2008).
Matrifocality remains an important aspect in the constitution of the home 
in Cuba, continuing the trend observed by Nancy Solien de González (1965) 
and Raymond Smith (1973). Solien de González argued that broader con-
sanguineous links are as important as those of mother-son to understand 
kinship in Cuba. In addition, it was the women who sustained the house and 
the family, even if the man was recognized as the ‘head of the household’ 
(Smith 1973). Th e father tends to position himself marginally in relation to 
the rest of the household group and to the network of relationships and do-
mestic activities (Smith 1996). Pertierra (2008) observed similar patterns: 
men tend to move more frequently, occupying the homes of their partners 
(and the divorce rate in Cuba in 2015 was 2.9 – i.e. 56% of all marriages end 
in divorce2). Th erefore men are less reliable resources in the social bonds 
necessary to maintain the home. Sons tend to move more than daughters, 
who usually stay in their mother’s house, even aft er they are married (Per-
tierra 2008: 748). Th is is clearly observed in casas particulares, when three 
matrilineal generations are usually grouped together in one house to be able 
to dispose of the other house for rent (Gold 2016).
Although the man is identifi ed as head of the household, women articu-
late the mechanisms necessary for the home to function, as demonstrated 
by Pertierra (2008) in her study of homes in Santiago de Cuba. It is women 
who play the central role in the casa, and men should contribute to calle ac-
tivities; for example, getting parts to fi x household appliances, seeking out 
socios (business partner) for home improvements (such as adding a fl oor, 
window or fence). Th is gender orientation between the house and the street 
goes back to periods before the revolution, during the Spanish colonial rule 
among the urban mestizos (Pertierra 2008: 747). Anthropological studies 
of Cuba throughout history have shown that it has remained fairly stable 
(Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon 1977; Rosendahl 1997; Stoner 1991). While men 
can harness a more extensive network of socios in important male-dominated 
sectors such as the construction sphere, women have a stronger infl uence in 
the activities localized in the home.
Th e links that articulate both men and women are essential to maintain-
ing a home. Matrifocality represents horizontal relations that oppose the 
accumulation of power and resources vertically in the hands of possible 
patriarchal and oligarchic groups. In times of change, when the state with-
draws from the private space, kinship becomes relevant in articulating re-
sources and infl uence. Self-employment has allowed women to obtain more 
independence from state employment; it provides a higher income, more 
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autonomous hours and less government control when granting travel au-
thorization (without which people cannot leave the country), for example. 
Even while state employment can be valued for being more socially mean-
ingful and having less responsibilities (Gordy 2015), self-employment is of-
ten sought (sometimes in parallel) as a form of income. Cooperatives and 
self-employed businesses are more than expressions of emerging capital-
ism and neoliberal entrepreneurship. Th eir kinship patterns indicate other 
mechanisms at play that go beyond market rules. At times, these networks 
serve to challenge established hierarchies (the Party, the state, male-domi-
nated groups), even while their egalitarian potential can also be harnessed 
by hierarchical structures that co-opt sociolist networks and matrifocal eco-
nomic activities for corporate interests.
Sociolismo: A Logic of Social Relations
Th e term sociolism is a combination of ‘partner’ and socialism; it is an ironic 
and critical commentary on the state’s offi  cial policy. Socios (business part-
ners) solve problems of all kinds, ranging from something as innocuous as 
obtaining fl our (an oft en scarce resource), photocopying a book, printing a 
document or sending an e-mail, if one does not have the means to, to more 
important issues such as arranging employment or travel documents. Th at 
is, the favours that are asked of a socio belong to daily life and transcendental 
issues alike. Th e sociolist network becomes a resource: in a process of de-
layed reciprocity, helping a socio sets an expectation that at some point the 
socio will repay.
Paladares are particularly reliant on sociolist ties because they depend 
on the contingency of resource availability. Paladar owners, who tend to 
be men, must have contacts in construction cooperatives (to refurbish and 
extend houses); in agricultural cooperatives3 (to obtain the best produce); 
in mechanical cooperatives and especially the cooperative of tourist guides 
(to ensure a regular clientele). In addition, they must maintain good rela-
tions with casas particulares, as a source of clients both foreign and Cuban 
with increasing purchasing power – and with neighbours, in order to avoid 
complaints due to potential excessive noise or increased traffi  c, or jealousy. 
Th erefore, the owner of a paladar needs many socios because setting up a 
business in Cuba is not easy, with the state being the central provider.
In Playa, a paladar opened in the basement of a residential building. 
Th e basement used to be a shed where the sellers of the local agricultural 
market stored their products. Predicting that the neighbours would not be 
happy with a venture that would bring more noise to the neighbourhood, 
the owner organized a free dinner before the paladar opened. He met all the 
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neighbours and by off ering free meals he established personal relationships 
with them that would encourage them to bring complaints straight to him 
and not to the municipal inspectors. Paladares are still mostly family-run 
enterprises. In this way they have the eff ect of wresting economic power 
from the state, as it no longer is the sole provider of food, jobs and labour. 
Th e owner of the venture is the father or the mother, and the children work 
as waiters, cooks, suppliers, accountants etc. Th us profi t remains within the 
family. Aft er 2011, self-employed ventures were allowed to hire contractual 
labour, but employees are paid less, sometimes work without a valid con-
tract and are therefore unprotected by the law. In this way, self-employed 
ventures can become corporate groups and sources of exploitation. In 2016, 
people demanded the state to intervene in price control of private transport 
cuentapropistas, who increased costs of transport when petrol became more 
expensive because of Venezuela’s oil crisis. In similar ways to that described 
by Angosto-Ferrández (this volume), people demanded the state to uphold 
its role of protector and redistributor in times when corporate groups are 
seen to conspire against the interests of the social.
Sociolism exists in both public and private spaces – that is, it occurs in 
self-employment as well as state work because they are mutually dependent. 
For example, construction cooperatives, some of the most successful, must 
buy their materials from state suppliers, where the items are overpriced due 
to state monopoly. Th erefore, to make a profi t, people must obtain them por 
la izquierda (illegally). Th is usually implies that a state employee who works 
for the state-monopolized supplier salva (saves, appropriates illegally) the 
materials to resell, or a member of the cooperative has a socio who works 
for the state construction company and through exchange of favours, money 
or work obtains the necessary materials. An employee of a state research 
centre explained they were renovating the centre’s buildings, and the work 
was being carried out by a state-owned construction company. As soon as 
the company fi nished building the cement fence along the perimeter, and 
even though the renovations were not completed, more than half the build-
ers resigned, as once the fence was built it was no longer possible to easily 
take construction materials to resell or use in self-employment projects, and 
it was more profi table to use the time in self-employed projects.
Th e embezzlement of goods does not only take place between individu-
als and the state but also between individuals and cooperatives. Th e decree 
law number 305 ‘of non-agricultural cooperatives’ determines in Article 4 
point c) that cooperatives have to be created and directed in a democratic 
and egalitarian way: ‘Th e acts that govern the economic and social life of 
the cooperative are analysed and decided upon in a democratic way by the 
partners, who participate in decision-making practices with equal rights.’ 
Although cooperatives are conceived as egalitarian institutions where the 
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profi ts are equally distributed, in practice these are oft en constituted by a 
person who calls himself the president – an inappropriate hierarchical title – 
earns more than others, and has the power to hire and fi re employees. Alter-
natively, cooperatives are built around family units, with diff erent members 
(mother, father, father-in-law, wife etc.) as associates, which then hire em-
ployees, concentrating profi ts within a family group. Th e role of paladares is 
particularly interesting in revealing the tensions between the domestic space 
and gendered labour, as these restaurants must be set up in the home. Taking 
over the space of the home – a woman’s domain – enables the hierarchical 
power of corporate groups to engulf the egalitarian potential of matrifocal 
networks that aim to contest the centralization of resources in the hands of a 
(usually male-dominated) group.
Th e importance of kinship networks in accruing resources and social cap-
ital in Cuba is not common to all of Latin America. A study on the articula-
tion of the formal and informal sector in Bogotá reveals that, in the case of 
the construction industry, relations of kinship or camaraderie only serve to 
obtain the lowest paid and riskier jobs within a project (Lanzetta de Pardo 
et al. 1989). In Cuba, the opposite occurs; kinship relations are central to the 
organization of many cooperatives and paladares. Th e economic structures 
of these enterprises cannot be dissociated from the family, since the family 
is fundamental to the development of the activity, and the household is a 
central location for most of them.
Th e most productive sociolist links are not random, nor are they purely 
circumscribed to business. Th ere must be a relationship of kinship, friend-
ship, work, school, neighbourhood, religion or in some cases gender and 
race for someone to demand a favour. However, sociolist ties are not circum-
scribed to Cubans. Given the changes of 2011 that enabled the buying and 
selling of houses, many foreigners are buying houses in the name of Cubans. 
A foreigner can buy property in Cuba but is strictly curtailed by state control 
on the type of house and use given to it. In order to subvert these limitations, 
foreigners marry Cuban women (it tends to happen that a foreign man mar-
ries a Cuban woman, and less frequently the reverse4) to obtain residency 
and be able to buy a house. Th is inserts foreigners into the complex kinship 
networks that regulate the transactions of sociolism. Th e case of Spaniard 
Alberto with the Cuban Yaneli illustrates this trend.
Th ey have known each other for many years, since Alberto travels to 
Cuba every European winter to take advantage of the sex tourism that 
fl ourished in the 90s. Alberto used to stay in the same private house where 
Yaneli cleaned. Th ey are good friends; she is of his generation but not his 
sexual partner; Alberto goes to Cuba in search for younger women. Aft er 
many years, and thanks to the new policies in 2011, Alberto decided to buy 
a house in Yaneli’s name for his personal use. Th ey got married and made a 
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prenuptial contract that leaves her the house in the event of his death, and 
while he is in Spain she takes care of the house. For Yaneli, having Alberto 
as a socio is priceless: a cell phone, the excess building materials she gets 
when Alberto fi xes his house, and she eventually gets to inherit it as her 
own. Yaneli has a daughter – who lived with her until she left  for the US 
illegally in 2015 – and a son living and working in Cuba. She has her own 
one-room apartment and is extending it upwards with the help she receives 
from Alberto. Kinship networks serve as economic resources both inside 
Cuba and across borders.
Conclusion
Th e complexities of sociolist relations reveal the tensions underpinning the 
diff erent modes of employment emerging in Cuba, particularly since 2011. 
Many elements contribute to unpacking this complexity:
1)  Location and genre of the venture: a household-run activity like a 
rental property is dominated by women in the family, while construc-
tion or mechanic cooperatives are run outside the domestic sphere 
and dominated by men;
2)  State-private relations: the overlapping of state and private employ-
ment becomes evident through the sociolist networks that underpin 
and interconnect both extremes in the complex scale of employment 
opportunities in Cuba.
Th ese activities are interdependent; they generate clientele and resources 
for each other. While male-dominated calle activities are oft en more profi t-
able and accrue more political power, they are kept in check by matrifocal 
kinship networks that control an important bulk of tourist activities and de-
termine the functioning of household and family life. In a reversal of what 
was intended by the state, non-agricultural cooperatives have the potential 
to function as oligarchic corporate groups, while cuentapropistas (oft en de-
monized as individuals seeking private profi t) interact with other coopera-
tives and counteract the hierarchies of emerging corporate groups.
Th ese activities do not just reveal an increasing variety of employment 
opportunities and the – to a certain extent – disaggregation of state control 
over the economy. More importantly, the re-emergence of the importance of 
matrifocality in the contestation of male power and accumulation of control 
over resources reveals the endurance of certain forms of social relations even 
beyond the project of social engineering that state socialism represents. An-
other important implication of matrifocality in Cuba at this particular mo-
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ment of the intensifi cation of transformations in the region is that diff erent 
forms of power do not necessarily come from traditional political spheres 
(political parties and ideologies, social movements, state structures). Pat-
terns of social organization in Cuba – and matrifocality is an egalitarian form 
of organization, as it contests patriarchal hierarchies – have played a key role 
in the reconfi guration of activities that generate value (monetary, social or 
political) in the process of redefi ning revolutionary personhood.
Marina Gold is an associated researcher at the University of Zurich. She was a 
research fellow in the department of Social Anthropology at the University 
of Bergen, part of the ERC Advanced Grant project ‘Egalitarianism: Forms, 
Processes, Comparisons’ (project code 340673) that ran from 2014 to 2019 
and was led by Bruce Kapferer. She holds a PhD from Deakin University. 
Her research topics and recent publications include a political anthropol-
ogy analysis of the Cuban Revolution (People and State in Socialist Cuba: 
Ideas and Practices of Revolution, Palgrave, 2015), the ‘refugee crisis’ and hu-
man rights discourse in Switzerland (‘Liminality and the Asylum Process 
in Switzerland’, Anthropology Today) and a critical review of the moral turn 
in anthropology (Moral Anthropology: A Critique, ed. with Bruce Kapferer, 
Berghahn Books, 2018).
NOTES
 1. A young Cuban with informal access to the internet at home (perhaps the son or 
nephew of a member of the FARC, Armed Forces) downloads a collection of media 
tailor-made for each client and delivers it in a hard drive each week. Th e cost varies 
according to the size of the drive. 
 2. http://www.one.cu/publicaciones/cepde/anuario_2014/11_capitulo_V.pdf.
 3. In March 2018, wholesale markets opened in Havana to cover the demand for bulk 
orders by paladares and other cuentapropistas. Th is new measure is intended to ad-
dress complaints by the non-state employment sector that provisions are scarce and 
oft en obtained at whimsical prices. 
 4. In reverse cases, when Cuban men marry foreign women, the result is usually the 
emigration of the Cuban man, which in many cases is the intended purpose of the 
marriage. 
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CHAPTER 8
zzz
SOCIAL BANDITRY AND THE LEGAL 
IN THE CORPORATE STATE OF PERU
Cecilie Vindal Ødegaard
Peru is sometimes described as a neoliberal experiment, especially due to 
the reforms initiated by Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, sharing several traits 
of similarity with the austerity measures later introduced in European coun-
tries due to the fi nancial crisis. Governments aft er Fujimori have more or less 
followed in his footsteps in terms of economic policy, thus setting Peru apart 
from the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America. During these decades, the 
numbers of Peruvians involved in informal economic activities, especially 
through diff erent forms of small-scale trade, have increased. Th is expansion 
of economic activities at the margins of the formal economy1 is oft en con-
sidered a response to economic crisis and neoliberal reforms in Peru and 
beyond, due to privatization and reductions of public spending, unemploy-
ment and the promotion of entrepreneurship by the state and NGOs. Th ese 
transformations of state structures have made vending and self-employment 
the only alternative for many Peruvians. In the streets and markets of Peru-
vian cities, the creativity and street smartness of vendors may even give an 
impression of successfully created ‘neoliberal subjects’, hard-working and 
‘self-made’, and accommodating their own quest for a livelihood to increas-
ing demands of growth, fl ow and consumption.
Yet the Peruvian vendors at the margins of the formal economy must 
be seen to refl ect long-standing structural inequalities in Peruvian society 
(Ødegaard 2018). Th ey seek to develop their economic strategizing and tac-
tics on their own terms (Ødegaard 2018, 2008) and in ways that challenge the 
hierarchical and centralizing workings of the nation-state. In this chapter, 
I show that the importance of vending and border-trade for many Peruvi-
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ans can throw light not only on the eff ects of neoliberal reforms or austerity 
policies but refl ects the resurgence of social networks and socialities that 
are embedded in long-standing socio-spatial practices in the Peruvian Andes 
(see Gold, this volume, for a related argument in the case of Cuba). Th ese 
networks and practices are part of Peruvian history and identity that the 
modernizing nation-state has seemingly left  behind in the name of moder-
nity, progress and a universalized mestizo identity. Th ey are the networks 
and practices of bilingual Spanish and Quechua- or Aymara-speaking mi-
grants who move between the highlands and coastal cities, oft en referred 
to with a negative undertone as cholos (-as). Being somewhat ambiguously 
positioned and envisioned in-between racialized and class-based categories 
such as indigenous and mestizo, rural and urban, private and public, these 
migrants can be seen both to convey and resist the intersections between 
class, race and gender in Peruvian society (Ødegaard 2010). Living the life 
of the urban poor, they oft en maintain their rural ways and relations while 
making a living through vending or cross-border trade. Although these ven-
dors’ activities may appear as complicit with the state’s capitalist ethos of 
commodity fl ow and wealth accumulation, I will argue that there is a resis-
tant and egalitarian potential to their practices, as they continually criticize 
and circumvent offi  cial interference and claim urban spaces from which they 
have been excluded. Th ey work to redirect global commodities and wealth 
away from offi  cial circuits and reconfi gure wealth to other socio-spatial rela-
tions of redistribution.
By focusing on these dynamics, I uncover the relationships, practices 
and understandings that shape vendors’ relations with the state and market 
structures, and how they, by redirecting commodities and wealth away from 
offi  cial circuits, can be seen to convert and translate wealth from one form 
of value accumulation to another (Ødegaard 2019; Tsing 2015). I explore 
also recent shift s in state and market structures, by discussing policies of 
regulation through formalization and free trade. First I show that the ven-
dors’ reconfi guration and translation of wealth are embedded in a particular 
moral ethos of exchange and redistribution; a moral ethos that shapes their 
relations with the state and market structures. Second, and based on the 
experiences of vendors with recent changes of state and economic policy, 
I show how the market liberalization instigated by Peruvian governments 
entails a particular emphasis on the formal and the legal, a point that is oft en 
overlooked in studies of the ‘neoliberal’. My argument is that the emphasis 
on formality and the legal in Peruvian policymaking in recent years point 
to some crucial dimensions of the corporate state, regarding its instigation 
of market liberalization through formality and juridicalization. By juridi-
calization, I refer to the intervention of legal and juridical structures in the 
organization of political and economic life. While policies promoting for-
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malization and juridicalization of economic operations are framed within a 
democratic and egalitarian idealism, I illustrate how they may nonetheless 
reinforce exclusion and dispossession. In doing so, I explore Peru’s neolib-
eral experiment from the perspective of those gaining a living at the margins 
of the formal economy; small-scale vendors and contrabandistas.
Neoliberalism, Subjectifi cation – and the Corporate State
As noted, Peru was not part of the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America 
but opted for deepening its neoliberal orientation initiated with Fujimori 
in the 1990s. Since then, governments have envisioned modernization and 
progress through an emphasis on market liberalization, and implemented 
tax, royalty and policy regimes accommodating for privatization and foreign 
investments. Alongside these developments, small-scale businesses among 
the poor were increasingly encouraged by the state, NGOs and commercial 
enterprises, through the provision of microcredit arrangements and train-
ing in marketing skills. With this expansion of neoliberal rationality, gov-
ernments have aimed to instigate ‘development’ through the promotion of 
entrepreneurship also among the poor. Initiated during the presidency of 
Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), Peru signed several free trade agreements 
facilitating overseas, bilateral trade, intended to eliminate trade obstacles, 
consolidate access to goods and services, and foster private and interna-
tional investments. Inequalities have persisted during these decades, and 
under presidential campaigns in 2006 and 2011, Ollanta Humala built his 
political platform by promising a more equitable framework for distributing 
wealth from the country’s natural resources. Humala was thus affi  liated with 
other ‘Pink Tide’ leaders, although his time in offi  ce (2011–2016) resulted in 
political continuity rather than change, as was also the case with Peru’s sub-
sequent presidents. Due in part to the boom of primary materials from the 
turn of the millennium onwards, Peru has experienced signifi cant economic 
growth. Hundreds of thousands Peruvians still struggle to fi nd a way out of 
poverty though, oft en relying on precarious forms of work at the margins of 
the formal economy.
Issues related to neoliberalism, state and governance have represented 
central lines of enquiry in anthropological studies in recent decades. Many 
of these studies are infl uenced by the governmentality approach, drawing 
on Foucault and focusing on the techniques, technologies and discourses of 
neoliberal governance and its production of particular kinds of ideal subjects 
(Hilgers 2010). As noted by Kipnis, the governmentality approach tends to 
create, however, ‘a sense that neoliberal governance functions, that it has 
successfully produced responsible and governable but alienated subjects’ 
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(2007: 385). In other words, there is a tendency to assume that the artic-
ulation of ideal subjects results in the actual creation of these selves, while 
the process by which this subjectifi cation might occur is left  unexamined 
(see also Winkler-Reid 2017). In eff ect, the assumption of a ‘successful end-
product’ obscures the more complex, ambiguous and particularistic aspects 
of processes of creating so-called ‘neoliberal subjects’ (Winkler-Reid 2017). 
Studies of ‘neoliberal governance’, therefore, are oft en restricted by an in-
herent methodological fl aw, in that they take the ‘atomized individual’ as 
their conceptual and methodological point of departure (see Graeber 2001). 
A one-sided focus on governmentality and subjectifi cation may even con-
tribute to overlooking other important aspects of the neoliberal state, such 
as labour conditions, inequalities and accompanying changes of regulations 
or laws, and lead attention away from subjectivities and forms of sociality 
that escape, exceed or simply fall outside the techniques and technologies 
of ‘neoliberal rule’ – or are further externalized by such measures. Consid-
ering that vendors are only occasionally involved in state programmes (i.e. 
of microcredit) and let alone the fact that most of them have few years of 
school studies, my intention in this chapter is not to make a contribution to 
studies of governmentality. Rather, I seek to explore forms of sociality that 
have exceeded or escaped state rule but that increasingly are being external-
ized by state policies intended to ensure market liberalization.
Kapferer and Gold (2017) importantly discuss the ways in which neolib-
eralism has gained ideological force by claiming a democratic and egalitarian 
idealism while accommodating for policies and arrangements that under-
mine these values and increase social inequalities. Th ey at the same time 
aim to problematize how the ongoing and worldwide crisis of exacerbated 
inequalities, accompanied by a failure of democratic values, is oft en glossed 
over as an ideological eff ect of neoliberalism. Th is emphasis on neoliberal-
ism entails a risk of overlooking the role of the state in market reforms and 
may make the neoliberal achievement of political force through egalitarian 
rhetoric into a blind spot (2017: 31–32). To avoid this, they instead refer to 
the ‘corporate state’ to emphasize how the crisis (oft en explained by neolib-
eralism) relates to the reconfi gurations and ruptures brought about by de-
velopments of the nation-state. Kapferer and Gold thus fi nd it vital to stress 
the rise of the corporate state from out of, or from within, the frame of the 
nation-state. On the one hand, they underline how the corporate state con-
stitutes the fl inging aside of constraints that the nation-state earlier placed 
on many of the potentials of capital; involving the further realization of cap-
italist potential through radical changes or transformations of the orders and 
relations of the social landscape, including the values that are integral to it 
(2017: 31–32). Simultaneously, they emphasize that we need to pay atten-
tion to how the corporate state’s market liberalization also entails or even 
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requires particular forms of regulation (international trade agreements, trans-
parency in taxation, increasing accountability etc.). While these and other 
regulations may serve to guide or limit capitalist extractions, they can also 
enable capital fl ows of particular kinds, or be at the service of economic and 
political interests that respond to transnational economic pressures, lobbies 
and agendas. Along these lines, I argue that the emphasis on formality and 
the legal in Peruvian policymaking in recent years point to some crucial di-
mensions of the corporate state. It shows how policies for market liberal-
ization are developed by and through the structures of the nation- state (i.e. 
legal reforms, regulation), being framed within a democratic and egalitarian 
idealism, and promoted as an advancement of democratic freedoms but of-
ten having rather contradictory eff ects. I will therefore point to some of the 
ways in which the corporate state accommodates for market liberalization 
through forms of regulation and juridicalization that may appear to univer-
salize but in practice work to diff erentiate and exclude. Diff erent forms of 
regulation, then, may entail particular constraints for economic actors with-
out the means, contacts or competence to use regulatory measures for their 
own interests. We may thus gain important insight into the development of 
the corporate state by considering the perspective of particular actors, such 
as informally working vendors, who oft en go beyond the radar.
Th e chapter builds upon several periods of fi eldwork since 1997, espe-
cially the fi eldwork I conducted in 2016, 2011 and 2007, when I worked with 
vendors and contrabandistas at marketplaces in Arequipa, combined with re-
search visits to marketplaces in Lima. In 2007, I followed the dramatic events 
at the market Santa Anita in Lima, and I will briefl y refer to these events to 
illustrate Peruvian authorities’ emphasis on formality – and some changes in 
the form and intensity of state interference in vending activities. In addition 
to research stints in Lima, I have worked with vendors and contrabandistas 
associated with the marketplace La Feria Altiplano2 in Arequipa. Most ven-
dors at the Feria (like at the Santa Anita market) are women and bilingual 
Quechua- or Aymara- and Spanish-speakers. Th e Feria was established aft er 
several years during which a group of vendors had occupied land in diff erent 
areas of the city for purposes of vending. Since they initiated these unautho-
rized markets in the 1980s, the vendors were repeatedly fi ned or removed 
by the police. Th ese diffi  culties resulted in the creation of an association of 
vendors and fi nally their acquisition of an area that they formally bought in 
1999. While the association has acquired land titles – at least in part – and 
most members pay for a licence, the vendors do not pay taxes, and many also 
bring undocumented merchandise, or contrabando, from across the borders. 
Th e goods off ered at the Feria are agricultural products, textiles and artisan 
craft s, pirate CDs and computer soft ware, as well as industrial and electronic 
articles. Many of these goods are smuggled from Bolivia or Chile, oft en pro-
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duced in China. Some of the contrabandistas have also been involved in the 
smuggling of fuels from Bolivia, due to lower prices there. Leaders of the 
Feria take responsibility for paperwork and communication with the mu-
nicipality and are expected to promote the interests of members. Although 
some leadership positions are held by women, most are held by men, despite 
the fact that members are primarily women. Th is refl ects not only the more 
general tendency for politically important positions in Peruvian society to 
be held by men but also that many of the women at this market have limited 
reading and writing skills – generally a requirement for leadership positions 
(Ødegaard 2010).
Among vendors at the Feria, the fl ow of money, people and commodities 
is considered essential for survival and for ensuring at least a basic source 
of income. A common saying if people are unsuccessful in business is that 
‘money does not stop in my hands’. Th is is sometimes attributed to brujería, 
or magical acts performed to harm other people. Th e saying indicates that 
the ‘natural’ state of money is to fl ow, and not be accumulated, although 
trade is considered a way to get access to some money at least. As my friend 
and interlocutor Aurelia said: ‘I gain almost nothing by selling these little 
things, but at least there is some money circulating through my hands.’ In 
recent decades, vendors at the Feria have become attractive clients for loan 
agents, and surrounding the market, private loan agencies abound. Th ese 
ventures off er vendors loans and credit, although the informal/semi-formal 
nature of their businesses makes such loans a risky venture. Aurelia has 
taken several loans both from loan agents and kin. She cannot read and write 
though, and oft en has a limited overview of how much she owes, and when 
payments are due. On days when a loan agent comes to approach her at her 
pitch, she oft en tries to make excuses, asking for an extension of the payment 
due. In contrast to kin and colleagues though, Aurelia emphasized that ‘the 
bank does not forgive’.
‘Cultures of Informality?’
In Peru, informal economic activities like street-peddling, vending and con-
traband gained increased importance with the 1980s economic downturn 
and became a source of livelihood especially for rising numbers of urban 
poor. Since the 1950s, the boost of urban migration and the land occupations 
that followed signifi cantly changed Peruvian cities’ demographic set-up 
and aroused anxiety over delinquency and social breakdown among urban 
elites. Migrants from the Andes were considered ‘matter out of place’ in the 
perspective of the upper and middle class, and their presence disturbed the 
racialized spatial dichotomies of rural-urban, indigenous-mestizo. Urban 
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infl ux continued during the 1980s, also due to the war between the guer-
rilla movement Sendero Luminoso and the military, as thousands of people 
were forced to fl ee from rural areas to the cities. Th e existing labour surplus 
was augmented with Fujimori’s austerity measures3 (oft en referred to as the 
‘Fuji-shock’) in the 1990s, further exacerbating the need for alternatives to 
waged labour. Th e economic setback was to aff ect Peruvian society severely, 
while other Latin American countries experiencing similar challenges tried 
to soft en the negative eff ects of adjustments through the introduction of 
safety nets (Ewig 2010). In Peru, social reforms took the form of ‘liberal-in-
formal’ regimes based on (partial or total) privatization of the fi nancing and 
provision of services, as well as state-fi nanced social programmes targeting 
particular segments of the population (Rousseau 2007: 97). In the shanty-
towns of Peruvian cities, both men and women turned to diff erent forms 
of self-employment; men combining taxi driving with short-term employ-
ment in construction, and women to vending. Among my interlocutors in 
Arequipa’s shantytowns, many women fi rst started their working careers as 
domestic servants, in textile factories or as day labourers at farms surround-
ing Arequipa. Later, many of them turned to vending due to low payment 
and oft en strict labour regimes in other forms of low-skilled work. Many 
vendors take pride in their work and in the forms of autonomy that it re-
quires; they fi nd creative ways to evade offi  cial interferences, although also 
stressing the hardships of vending. For most, vending has been and contin-
ues to be a precarious means of making ends meet; such as in the case of 
Aurelia. Others – especially contrabandistas – may earn more than the mini-
mum salary, and some have managed to expand and make new investments, 
for instance in land, houses, buses – or even trucks for the transportation 
of goods. As I will illustrate, they also make ‘investments’ in relations with 
kin, earth beings and saints.
From the perspective of social scientists in Peru as elsewhere in Latin 
America, informal economic ventures and use of land have been seen to in-
volve new claims for citizenship among the urban poor (Roberts 1995); and 
to represent a form of ‘insurgent citizenship’ with the potential to alter the 
poor’s terms and conditions for citizenship (Holston 2008). People’s initia-
tives at the margins of the formal economy have thus been seen as herald-
ing a new era of contestation against the legal institutional apparatus, which 
has given rise to what is oft en referred to as ‘cultures of informality’ (Matos 
Mar 1984). In a study of Lima’s contraband markets, Gandolfo (2013) de-
scribes how vendors explicitly evade formality and resist attempts by state 
bureaucracies to draw them into regimes of regulation. Although the ven-
dors’ resistance carries costs and risks, they nonetheless value more highly 
the freedom and autonomy that informality aff ords. Th is valuation of infor-
mality’s freedom and autonomy is part of many vendors’ resistance to being 
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low-paid workforce employees. Among vendors, there is a continual con-
testation and questioning of offi  cial regulations, interventions and border 
control regimes. Th ey even consider these interferences to be immoral and 
illegitimate, and they question the right of the offi  cials to interfere in peo-
ple’s eff orts to make a living (see also Ødegaard 2008, 2016). In cases when 
authorities interfere in vendors’ activities, there is a common phrase that 
vendors use with great contempt: ‘Th ey prevent people from working.’ Th is 
phrase illustrates the value people ascribe to this kind of work independently 
of its degree of formalization.
For instance, regarding a fellow vendor who had her contraband goods 
confi scated, my interlocutor Rosaria4 said:
Th ey ought not to confi scate if this is how she works. It is not that they [contra-
bandistas] steal or anything, since they buy with their own money. Some even 
with borrowed money. Th is is the only kind of work there is . . . As if they were 
the authorities? [i.e. those who confi scate goods]. And who stays with the goods? 
Well, they share it between themselves of course! [that is, the offi  cials].
Even Aurelia – who is a small-scale vendor and contrabandista and gener-
ally earns very little, barely enough to feed the family – has been quite explicit 
in her criticism of offi  cial functionaries interfering with people’s businesses. 
We were discussing vendors’ protests before a contested dislocation at the 
Santa Anita market in Lima, which I will describe below, when she said: 
‘Well, they are fi ghting of course. Where are they supposed to work? Th ey 
say they have arms and explosives, but they have to defend themselves!’ As I 
will show towards the end of the chapter though, Aurelia’s critical attitude to 
offi  cial interferences later changed.
Most studies of vendors in the Andean countries have, however, treated 
these ‘cultures of informalities’ as originating from some kind of ‘empty 
space’, by not dealing with the moral ethos and socialities from which these 
forms of critique originate and evolve. For instance, and despite their strong 
Aymara and Quechua origins, the vendors have usually been addressed by 
ethnographies more interested in economic ‘informality’ in South America 
(Goldstein 2016) than in Amerindian worldviews. Instead, I argue that ven-
dors’ critique of offi  cial intervention gains voice and legitimacy from their 
particular moral ethos of exchange and redistribution. Th is is not to say that 
the Quechua and Aymara have a moral ethos to work informally but that they 
conceptualize and deal with commodity fl ow and exchange in ways that for 
them legitimize economic activities independently of their informal dimen-
sions. I suggest that we need to consider the particularities of such a moral 
ethos if we are to understand how informalities evolve in diff erent contexts.
Although the extension of informal economic activities increased from the 
1980s onwards, as mentioned, it is worth noting that the cross-border trad-
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ing routes of contemporary vendors follow the same routes as trade during 
the colonial period; along the routes of mule drivers who carried goods be-
tween highland towns such as La Paz, Puno and Arequipa and towns along 
the Pacifi c coast. People’s involvement in contemporary cross-border trade 
thus builds on historically established trading routes, which in some cases re-
placed precolonial practices of barter across ecological zones (Murra 1980). 
Th e border areas where contemporary smuggling takes place are oft en re-
ferred to as tierras de nadie (no man’s land), referring to places characterized 
by a history of marginalization, a strong sense of local autonomy, conten-
tious state boundaries and the ambiguous presence of state actors (see also 
Langer 2018). Th ese are areas where trade is already institutionalized in the 
absence of state control, through its embeddedness in social relations and 
forms of circulation and exchange long established by vendors and commu-
nity inhabitants. Th ese relationships along trading routes may provide, for 
example, information and supply or storage of goods (see also Babb 2001; 
Ødegaard 2016; Seligmann 2001; Smith 1989). Especially at the border be-
tween Peru and Bolivia, this trade has historically been dominated by indig-
enous community members and small-scale smugglers (Langer 2018). Th e 
social and spatial embeddedness of trade is thus central to the practices of 
smuggling, which are based in networks of household and kinship relations 
that extend from rural to urban areas.
Th e moral ethos of vendors entails a sense of, and claim to, autonomy in 
dealing with commodity fl ow and redistribution. While vendors thus con-
test some of the hierarchical and centralizing workings of the nation-state, 
it should be noted that people in these areas have paid tribute to various au-
thorities since the Inca empire, sometimes also taking pride in their payment 
of communal tribute, and continuing this practice even aft er its abolishment, 
as an act of communal identity and autonomy (Platt 1982). Th e moral ethos 
I seek to pinpoint here is therefore a question of the emphasis and value that 
people ascribe to material exchange; as a claim simultaneously to autonomy 
and interdependence. Offi  cial interference is considered illegitimate when 
denying or undermining such exchange.
It is worth noting that there are also long traditions in the Andes for wom-
en’s involvement in barter and trade, so trading is not necessarily something 
they fi rst learn in the city, or by participating in microcredit arrangements. 
A central dimension of women’s involvement in trade in the Andes is the no-
tion that women manage money and economic matters while men manage 
politics (Harris 2000). As indicated, the neoliberal promotion of entrepre-
neurship in Peru does therefore not exist in a vacuum and nor does women’s 
predominance in the country’s marketplaces. In the following, I describe 
one of my interlocutors’ translation of profi t to the aim of nurture and care 
for her children, as well as her experience with a confi scation – and then I 
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unpack the moral ethos and forms of sociality that characterize the practices 
of vendors. As I will illustrate, this ethos of sociality and material exchange is 
central also to people’s relationship with the state and their critical attitudes 
towards intervention.
Translation, Distribution, Socialities
For a time from 2009 onwards, one of my interlocutors, Olinda, earned a 
living by bringing fuel from Bolivia, oft en travelling by bus and hiding her 
goods underneath other packages on the roof. She brought about 50 gallons 
at a time to sell to petrol stations in Puno, where the smuggled fuel was usu-
ally mixed with ordinary products. In order to live closer to the border and 
have a place for her goods, she rented a room from a relative in Yungoyo, 
a community close to the border. Olinda is originally from Arapa, and for 
several years, the couple’s three children mainly stayed behind in the vil-
lage with their elderly grandmother, living under extremely poor conditions 
while their parents were working.
One day, just before I reached Arequipa in 2011, Olinda was caught with 
fuels worth 10,000 soles. All of her goods were confi scated, and she had to 
pay 3,000 soles to the custom offi  cials (in bribes, not in fi nes) before the 
bus could pass. As we talked one day about the incident while sitting at her 
sister’s market pitch at the Feria, Olinda stressed how much she had suff ered 
and cried aft er she was caught and lost her capital. She soon re-established 
her business through the help of her kin but decided not to include fuels. 
Before the confi scation, Olinda had been rather successful. Her earnings 
from smuggling fuels had been converted into the construction of a house in 
Arapa as well as education for her children. Aft er the confi scation, however, 
she started to smuggle olives and clothes instead. ‘You win and you lose, but 
you just have to continue,’ Olinda said. Th is is typical for vendors’ narrations 
about the risks their businesses involve; stressing how they suff er when their 
goods are confi scated – but also how they start up anew aft er a short time, 
oft en still working informally, although sometimes downsizing or switching 
to another commodity.
Olinda’s narration indicates also how contrabandistas spend their earn-
ings for the benefi t of their family and relations. One of the key freedoms of 
informality, as noted by Gandolfo, is to subsume profi t to particular modes 
of sociality. By investing in market colleagues, kin, earth beings and saints, 
wealthy vendors give time and money to ‘reciprocal relations and forms of 
consumption that limit the accumulation of wealth’ (Gandolfo 2013: 280). 
As I have illustrated elsewhere (Ødegaard 2008, 2016, 2019), this intense 
cultivation of social relationships at the margins of the formal economy car-
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ries similar importance among vendors in Arequipa. Th ey cultivate social 
relations assiduously through sharing and giving food and gift s, by estab-
lishing familial connections through god-parenthood and by maintaining 
oft en relatively stable relationships with customers and suppliers. Th ese re-
lations enable the distribution of goods beyond authorized infrastructures 
and institutions. Vendors simultaneously subsume the profi t earned from 
trade to these social relations with kin and colleagues – and to the powerful 
landscape.
Many vendors perform off erings to the powerful earth beings, such as 
apus (mountain lords) and pachamama (the powerful earth), as well as 
saints as a way of maintaining good relations with the sources of wellbeing 
and wealth and to improve success in business. Such off erings characterize 
people’s relations with the powerful landscape in the Andes (see also Allen 
1988; Canessa 2000; De la Cadena 2010; Harris 2000; Ødegaard 2008, 2016) 
and refl ect a particular cosmology of place where earth beings are consid-
ered to have a powerful infl uence over the lives of humans with the potential 
for bringing prosperity as well as causing harm. Off erings consist of alcohol, 
food, llama fat, herbs or coca and are made to pachamama and the apus, 
or to virgins or saints considered to be particularly prosperous and power-
ful. Large-scale contrabandistas and vendors are also expected to serve as 
sponsors for off erings, festivals and parties, illustrating the signifi cance of a 
relational understanding of wealth as being dependent on reciprocity, cir-
culation and exchange between humans and earth beings (see also Harris 
2000). Earth beings represent an extra-human prototype of ‘other’, whose 
power may be actualized in the form of health, income and wealth but also in 
the form of illness, accidents and death. Sustained by the off erings, earth be-
ings depend on the same vital substances as humans do (alcohol, meat, fat, 
coca) and have similar needs and feelings. People’s relationship with these 
entities is continuously nurtured, as are the relations with kin and fellow 
vendors.
Th ose who bring in contraband generally self-identify as contrabandis-
tas, and proudly so. Th ey are viewed as important suppliers of merchandise, 
constantly travelling long distances to bring goods to market vendors. Inter-
estingly, the truck occupies a central position among vendors in elaborations 
of ideas about movement, circulation and wealth. At festivals organized at 
the Feria, miniature trucks fi gure in some dances, especially one in which 
women swirl colourful ropes with miniature5 trucks fastened to the ends. 
Th ese women are usually dressed in polleras from Puno, generally of the 
most recent, colourful fashion and expressive of the successful and econom-
ically powerful Andean vendor. Movement and circulation, therefore, are 
key elements in vendors’ notions of autonomy, productivity and success. 
Vendors at the market also sell miniature trucks meant for off erings that peo-
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ple make in the hope of acquiring a real truck or other forms of wealth. Th e 
truck symbolizes the work of contrabandistas and the fl ow and circulation 
of goods and money that they ensure. Contrabandistas who succeed in their 
businesses oft en choose to invest precisely in a truck for the purpose of con-
tinuing the practice that allowed them to acquire the truck – transporting 
contraband goods.
According to the vendors I have worked with, public functionaries have 
typically shown a degree of tolerance for their unauthorized economic ac-
tivities at marketplaces and border crossings. Contrabandistas may be said 
to be involved in a kind of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1969), as their claims 
for the right to earn a living hold a certain legitimacy. Th eir claims are in-
formed by historical structural inequalities and by the recognition that there 
are no other jobs to get anyway. Until recently, many unauthorized markets 
continued for years without particular interference, and many contraban-
distas have brought goods across the borders throughout their careers; on 
occasion, their goods have been confi scated but not frequently enough to 
prevent their businesses from fl ourishing – in many cases, due to bribery. 
Many vendors have thus relied on the involvement of public functionaries, 
who oft en receive bribes in return for letting people pass and keep their 
merchandise without interference. In this way, the relational character of 
trade seems to constitute a means by which state offi  cials at diff erent lev-
els tap into and profi t from the extralegal activities of vendors. Th ese ex-
changes are called bribes (coima) and not gift s, although vendors oft en 
draw a parallel between coima and gift s and view it as lack of respect when 
public functionaries refuse to accept coima. Public functionaries, like the 
powerful surroundings and apus, must be appeased through gift s or off er-
ings to ensure, among other things, the circulation of merchandise. Compa-
rable strategies – gift s, off erings, bribes – are thus called for in dealings with 
representatives of the state as with the earth beings to ensure successful 
commodity fl ows. Central for such strategies is the exchange of material 
substances.
Public offi  cials have sometimes legitimized their non-interference in the 
same way as the vendors themselves: there are no jobs to get anyway. Th e 
legal assessor of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Arequipa esti-
mated that almost 90 per cent of the inhabitants in border areas are involved 
in contraband and provide consumer goods to the entire country: ‘It is diffi  -
cult to do anything, because people get angry, and will ask for an alternative, 
something which doesn’t exist.’6 Th e association of market vending with ba-
sic commodities, household activities and women has given market work an 
ambiguous status as work, and it is oft en not considered important enough 
by offi  cials to interfere (see also Lazar 2008). In recent years, however, ven-
dors have increasingly reported that they fi nd it diffi  cult to make a living 
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through trade, due to stricter controls and more frequent confi scations at 
markets and border checkpoints. For many, these diffi  culties are reinforced 
by more explicit demands that market organizations formalize their use of 
land. Th ese changes, and the diffi  culties that vendors and contrabandistas 
experience as a result, point to a dimension of the corporate state that might 
be worth exploring further. It relates to how market liberalization and the 
promotion of fl ow and citizens’ entrepreneurship is accompanied by new 
forms of regulation. To illustrate this, I will describe a high-profi le interven-
tion at the Santa Anita market in Lima.
An Eviction
Santa Anita is known as the location for some of the truly huge outdoor mar-
kets on the outskirts of Lima. Vendors established the Santa Anita market in 
2003, as they organized an unauthorized occupation of land and formed an 
association of almost 10,000 vendors to organize their preparation and use 
of what had previously been a deserted area. In addition to pitches for trad-
ing, the vendors established infrastructural facilities such as paved roads, a 
parking lot, water supply, toilets, small shrines and even shelters for hous-
ing. Th ey also installed electricity, despite a requirement of property titles 
for such installations. In 2007, four years aft er the formation of the market, 
the municipality requested that vendors formalize their use of the land – or 
leave, apparently because a Chilean enterprise had made an off er to buy the 
land. Th e message that the vendors had to leave resulted in several demon-
strations by the Santa Anita association and were accompanied by media 
reports portraying the vendors as associated with chaos, illegality and crime.
When I arrived at Santa Anita, it was during intense debates and confl icts 
in May 2007. A few days before my visit, the vendors had received notice of 
removal, and I found the market almost deserted. Th ere were no custom-
ers, and, except for the food vendors, most other vendors had removed their 
merchandise awaiting the formal intervention. Some vendors were standing 
in groups discussing the situation, and they all expressed their worries con-
cerning the notice of removal. Th ey said they were obliged by their leaders 
to organize a continual presence in the market, day and night, so as to pre-
vent and hinder police interference. Explaining their reluctance to formally 
pay for and legalize their use of the land, some vendors stressed that the land 
was already theirs on the basis of all their work and eff orts. One vendor of 
food explained: ‘It is we who have done all the work. God bless the person 
who gets up early. And now that it has been served [e.g. infrastructure estab-
lished] they want us to pay.’ Likewise, another woman claimed: ‘Th is land 
has always been deserted, there was only sand here before.’ Eventually, by 
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the end of May 2007, the vendors were evicted. Th e eviction reached the 
headlines of most national newspapers, picturing the dramatic removal of 
vendors, who thus lost their investments and source of income. Th e removal 
of vendors involved no less than 3,800 police, heavily armed and wearing 
brand new high-tech security uniforms, helmets and equipment, sending a 
clear message that there would be no excuses for vendors to stay or other-
wise keep their investments. Th e eviction by police force gave an impression 
of a techno-scientifi c state moving forward to eradicate the ‘chaotic, unruly 
masses’ and impose civilized, legal and formalized order. In 2012, a Chilean 
mall operator opened Mall Aventura Plaza Santa Anita, refl ecting the grow-
ing foreign interest in Peru’s retail markets.
Th e case of Santa Anita may, along with similar evictions and confi sca-
tions at markets in recent years, illustrate some important dimensions of the 
corporate state vis-à-vis those operating at the margins of formalized circuits 
of wealth accumulation. It illustrates how the corporate state’s liberalization 
of markets works through particular regulatory and juridical structures; in-
dicating some of the implications of such mechanisms for small-scale ven-
dors. Th rough these structures, the corporate state produces its ‘other’; a 
criminalized other. Rather than seeing the corporate state in terms of a uni-
form set of policies and intentions – and as creating a uniform set of impli-
cations – it may be useful to look for the kinds of diff erentiation that the 
corporate state’s emphasis on formality and the legal may create, a point I 
explain in the following.
Market Liberalization through Formality and the Legal
A central aim for Peruvian governments since the 1990s has been to develop 
policies and reforms to attract international capital and accommodate the 
national economy for competitiveness vis-à-vis global markets. While tax 
relief for international investors has been one measure to this aim, it is worth 
noting the legal measures involved and how an increasing signifi cance as-
cribed to formality and the legal is central for the liberalization of markets in 
Peru as elsewhere. While such emphasis on formality and the legal is oft en 
framed within a language of freedom and egalitarian liberalism (freedom of 
movement: equal access to markets, and equal rights to protect one’s prop-
erty), I explore how it may also create a foundation for new forms of exclu-
sion and otherness.
Th ere is signifi cant legal work involved in a state’s accommodation for 
national competitiveness vis-à-vis global markets, and worldwide, states and 
fi rms have signifi cantly increased their expenses in diff erent forms of ‘legal 
work’ in recent decades. Th e market’s ‘invisible hand’ is in fact heavily reli-
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ant on juridical process, and hence diff erent forms of juridical ‘labour’. Th e 
accommodation of policies for the promotion of an ‘ownership society’ in 
countries in the Global South is one example, and competition laws, norms 
and standards are another. Free trade agreements, on the other hand, are 
generally associated with the relaxation of regulations and norms – espe-
cially for import/export and custom requirements. From the perspective 
of vendors and contrabandistas, however, free trade agreements appear to 
entail precisely the opposite – that is, more regulation and control, espe-
cially since they oft en lack the competence and capital to undertake the ‘le-
gal work’ required to maintain their businesses. So while regulation through 
formalization and juridicalization previously might have worked to ward off  
the excesses of capitalist interest, it is increasingly used to enable these ex-
cesses. In the case of Santa Anita, it enabled the expulsion and clearance of 
large areas of land where marginalized people had found a living.
For vendors at outdoor markets such as Santa Anita in Lima and the 
Feria in Arequipa, the government emphasis on formality and the legal was 
intensifi ed with arrangements for the formalization of unauthorized land 
use initiated in the 1990s. Th e government of Fujimori established specifi c 
institutions for this purpose, such as COFOPRI (Commission for the For-
malization of Informal Property), and succeeding governments followed up 
with this and similar land titling projects aiming to promote ‘development’, 
security for owners and a more eff ective land market. Governments have 
thus introduced policies for the formalization of unauthorized economic ac-
tivities and use of land alongside the promotion of entrepreneurship. Th is 
indicates – again – how an increasing signifi cance ascribed to formality and 
the legal (see Sieder et al. 2005) is central for the liberalization of markets 
worldwide and may entail mechanisms through which contrasts between 
‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ are both intensifi ed and continually blurred (Comaroff  and 
Comaroff  2006).
In Peru, policies of formalization have been recommended by econo-
mists like De Soto (1989, 2001), who argued that formal ownership among 
the poor would promote development, by contributing to the integration 
of unauthorized economic activities into the economy at large. Formality 
is indeed part of making society legible (Scott 1998) and may represent a 
prerequisite for increasing tax revenues and improved welfare services. De 
Soto’s concern with formalization, however, appears to be related primar-
ily to its ‘property eff ects’: that formalization would promote economic 
activities and development through the security of formal ownership. For-
malization may certainly enable people to legally use and protect their re-
sources, but the terms and conditions can nonetheless create and fuel other 
processes that reinforce dispossession and exclusion (Mitchell 2002). Like 
microcredit, policies of formalization can be seen to involve an extension of 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 Social Banditry and the Legal in the Corporate State of Peru 185
the supposed benefi ts of a capitalist ethos to desperately poor and margin-
alized populations. Th ese mechanisms, intended for citizens to pull them-
selves up by their own private bootstraps, may however result in the spread 
of indebtedness and deeper impoverishment (see Kapferer and Gold 2017). 
It is therefore worth noting how diff erent kinds of credit arrangements, like 
microcredit, are accompanied by formalization and a requirement of land 
titles, contributing to facilitate a commodifi cation of land that may result in 
its dispossession. Th is is because of the high cost of formalization and rising 
land prices; policies for formalization may indeed serve to make collectively 
used land accessible for corporate interest and real estate investors. Policies 
for formalization may hence contribute to fortifying already existing fi ssures 
along class lines (see also Larkins 2015: 156). Th e emphasis on formality and 
the legal in Peruvian policymaking thus seems to be part of a continuing 
expansion of a form of rationality that allows for the involvement only of 
specifi c categories of citizens.
For vendors and contrabandistas, the emphasis on formality and the legal 
has become evident also in other ways, such as, ironically, with Peru’s signing 
of free trade agreements. Peruvian governments have signed a range of free 
trade and trade promotion agreements during the last few years, with the 
US, Canada and the EU, as well as China, Japan and Korea. Accommodating 
for bilateral trade through tax and customs reductions, such agreements also 
entail other specifi cations of norms, standards and regulations. For instance, 
Peru’s trade promotion agreement with the US7 entailed arrangements not 
only for bilateral trade itself but also for the strengthening and modernization 
of Peru’s domestic regulations and border work. As part of the agreement, 
the US was to assist Peru in limiting exportation of narcotics, modernizing 
the equipment and procedures of the National Police and Customs Agency 
and strengthening the rule of law. Th ese measures appear to have been a way 
for US authorities also to protect the US market, by assisting one of its trade 
partners to control its borders. As a result, Peruvian authorities have signifi -
cantly strengthened border control functions during the last few years. Rou-
tines for the registration (and destruction) of confi scated goods have also 
been introduced to reduce the problem of functionaries who take confi s-
cated goods for themselves. In addition to the strengthening of customs and 
tax controls at border checkpoints, control stations have been established 
also along the main intercity highways, before entering bigger cities such 
as Puno, Arequipa and Ica. In this manner, borders are actualized within 
regions of the country, in the form of intercity controls both for customs and 
taxes. Along with these initiatives, there is also increasing use of ambula-
tory fi scal patrols, especially in cities like Lima and Arequipa. Big black vans, 
with a sign saying ‘fi scalizacion’, have become a common sight in the streets, 
with guards on board ready to conduct controls.
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As the customs and tax authorities have intensifi ed their controls, some 
vendors and contrabandistas continually seek to develop new strategies for 
avoiding control and fi nding new sites to realize their businesses. Others 
have decided to downsize or leave their businesses altogether, due to stricter 
controls – and a new kind of competition. Encouraging direct import from 
bilateral trade partners, the free trade agreements have resulted in increased 
competition for those who import (informally) through neighbour coun-
tries like Bolivia or Chile. Compared to the contrabandistas’ well-established 
importation from neighbour countries, to import directly – i.e. from China 
(and formally so) – involves not only greater investment but also knowledge 
of formal procedures and writing. Additionally, direct imports create less 
need for various types of local intermediaries. Many vendors and contra-
bandistas fi nd it diffi  cult to take advantage of the agreements, leaving im-
porters who belong to the middle or upper classes as those mainly benefi ting 
from the agreements. More goods are also brought in via Lima since the free 
trade agreements, gradually reducing the advantages of bringing contraband 
from Bolivia and Chile. While people used to come to Arequipa – even from 
Lima – to buy contraband, trading activities are increasingly centred around 
Lima, as more goods are brought in directly and legally through the cap-
ital. Several contrabandistas also noted that offi  cial functionaries were be-
coming more reluctant to accept bribes in exchange for letting them keep 
or move on with their merchandise. María, one of the contrabandistas at the 
Feria, decided to take a break from contraband now that the controls have 
increased. She exclaimed that, ‘now they [public functionaries] do not even 
want to receive bribes. Th ey do not know how to respect people.’ Others 
said that these days the contraband business is ‘nothing but controls’ and 
‘failure’ (fr acaso). As a result of intensifi ed controls, some have formalized 
their businesses, like for instance my interlocutor Eufemia. Aft er repeatedly 
having her goods confi scated, Eufemia invested in authorized offi  ce equip-
ment. Aft er formalizing, however, her earnings declined and she decided to 
invest in an informal mining project to compensate. Th is investment proved 
to be more hazardous than any of her previous ventures, however. As in Eu-
femia’s case, some contrabandistas, feeling forced to formalize in response to 
increased border controls, suff er a loss of income. Formalization may thus 
pose new and unforeseen challenges.
Conclusions
During my fi eldwork in 2016, I learned not only that many contrabandistas 
in particular were leaving their businesses but also that there was a new and 
very diff erent attitude among some of them. Th is was the case for my friend 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 Social Banditry and the Legal in the Corporate State of Peru 187
Aurelia, for instance, who by this time had left  her business in contraband 
altogether, partly because she had had her goods confi scated several times. 
Her critical attitude towards offi  cial interferences described above had also 
changed, and regarding the municipal requirements for infrastructure and 
formalization at the Feria, she exclaimed: ‘that’s how it is; when the authori-
ties make requirements, we have to comply.’ Also, she was no longer direct-
ing her harsh critique against the authorities in cases when her colleagues 
had had their goods confi scated. She had started to participate in regular 
prayers in one of Arequipa’s many Pentecostal churches. In this church, Au-
relia and other members spend hours on end praying not only for their loved 
ones but for the government of Peru, its president and all other governments 
and presidents of the world, as she explained to me. Aurelia no longer made 
off erings to the earth beings, and she followed her Pentecostal Church’s 
strict condemnation of such practices as heathen and sinful.
Th is chapter is not the right place to properly discuss the many issues 
that this change of my dear friend’s attitude may raise. Suffi  ce to say that 
it throws light on her earlier, somewhat rebellious attitude towards the au-
thorities, supporting my point about how vendors’ relations with the state 
and the market have been grounded in an Andean ethos of sociality and ma-
terial exchange. Indeed, the chapter has been an attempt to analyse some 
continuities and shift s in vendors and contrabandistas’ relationship with 
state and market structures, by seeing the corporate state from the perspec-
tive of those who operate at the margins of the formal economy. A central 
argument is that vendors’ contestation of offi  cial interventions can be seen 
to gain voice and legitimacy from their ethos of sociality, exchange and re-
distribution. Th is moral ethos shapes people’s relationship with state and 
market structures in a way that has given legitimacy to vendors’ activities 
at the margins of the formal economy. Th eir practices can be seen to consti-
tute a social formation of particular socio-spatial relations created through 
exchange and redistribution, entailing an egalitarian impulse understood in 
terms of the continuous questioning and challenging of state intervention. 
Th is social formation – and its entanglement with the corporate state – is dif-
ferent from the class-oriented mobilization of the 1970s, in Europe as well as 
the Americas, and is diff erent also from the demands for racial and minority 
equality of the 1980s onwards, and from the anti-capitalist movements in 
Europe in recent years. It is characterized not by claims for cultural rights 
or by direct anti-capitalist sentiment, but rather by sentiments expressing 
certain complicity with capitalist ideology. At the same time, these vendors 
aim to redirect wealth away from offi  cial distribution and elite accumula-
tion towards other forms of sociality, constantly evading and contesting state 
involvement. As they subsume wealth to relations and exchanges with kin, 
colleagues, earth beings and saints, vendors are partaking in a kind of social 
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banditry (Hobsbawm 1969), redistributing wealth beyond the reach of the 
state. Th e practices of vendors therefore revolve around translating, incor-
porating and harnessing extralocal values to local ends (see e.g. Orta 2004), 
by their use of global commodities for trade and distribution, off erings and 
consumption; and for maintaining material exchanges. Th eir practices are 
aimed at the integration and translation of ambivalent extralocal values, and 
form part of an emphasis on harnessing value to create kinship; or familiar-
izing predation in Fausto’s terms (2007).
Meanwhile, there have been some changes to the dynamics and vitality 
of vending and contraband in recent years. Th is, I argue, is related to the 
corporatization of the state, through an emphasis on formality and the legal. 
For vendors, the intensifi ed regulation and control entails a denial of the re-
lations and exchanges through which they previously operated, and which to 
a great extent have also defi ned their relations with state and market struc-
tures. Th ese alterations have led some vendors to formalize their businesses 
by replacing contraband with other goods, selling services, or leaving their 
businesses altogether. Somewhat ironically, the state’s instigation of market 
liberalization operates through legal structures and mechanisms that oft en 
marginalize or exclude small-scale economic actors. Th erefore, central to my 
argument is that the emphasis on formality and the legal in Peruvian poli-
cymaking in recent years points to juridicalization as a crucial dimension of 
the corporate state; these policies are being developed by and through the 
structures of the nation-state and framed within a democratic and egalitar-
ian idealism and promoted as an advancement of democratic freedoms, but 
oft en with contradictory eff ects. Market liberalization through policies pro-
moting formality and the legal may contribute to further exclude already 
marginalized populations and simultaneously entail a corporatization of 
the informal – i.e. by facilitating corporate or real estate interest (see Gago 
2015). Such corporatization is enabled by the expulsion and clearance of 
large areas of collectively held land where marginalized groups had found 
a living; or by taking over the economic niche of marginalized populations. 
For instance, regulation through free trade is accommodating for the inter-
ests of capital through the replacement of long-established trade networks. 
Market liberalization through formalization policies and regulatory norms 
thus indicates a double standard, which is supported by the legal apparatus. 
My argument is therefore that we must not overlook how the emphasis on 
formality and the legal is central for the corporate state’s market liberaliza-
tion. Such mechanisms and requirements even have the eff ect that some 
people are excluded from the circuits of capital and that those excluded are 
increasingly criminalized as impertinent ‘other’.
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NOTES
 1. Th e activities of many vendors can be termed informal in the sense that they are 
oft en unauthorized and untaxed and rely on unauthorized importation of goods and 
use of land. Th at said, it should be noted that the distinction between formal and 
informal economies is complex and debated. Th is is related to the many interdepen-
dencies between informal economic activities and formal enterprises. Bigger, more 
established businesses oft en rely on smaller unauthorized operations and may also 
escape state regulation. It is therefore worth noting the challenges of distinguishing 
between formal and informal economies (Comaroff  and Comaroff  2006). 
 2. Altiplano refers to the presence of vendors and goods from the Andean highlands.
 3. Fujimori initiated a wide range of neoliberal reforms to counter hyperinfl ation and 
close a gaping government defi cit; by reducing government subsidies and govern-
ment employment, relaxing private sector price controls and reducing restrictions 
on investment, imports and capital. Th ese reforms responded to IMF’s plan for 
South American economies from the 1980s (emphasizing trade liberalization, pri-
vatization, fi scal discipline, broadening of tax reforms, liberalization of foreign di-
rect investments, property rights for the informal economy etc.), which resulted in 
rising prices and had signifi cant social costs.
 4. Th e names of my interlocutors and their villages of origin have been altered.
 5. Th is use of miniatures is part of wider practices in the Southern Andes; las alasitas.
 6. Th is is from an interview that took place with the legal assessor in Arequipa, in 
2011.
 7. Aft er Peru entered a free trade agreement with China, China was expected to re-
place the US as Peru’s most important bilateral partner, a prospect that might seem 
ever more likely with Trump as president.
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CONCLUSION
zzz
EGALITARIANISM AND DYNAMICS 
OF OPPRESSION
Constitutive Processes
Alessandro Zagato and Marina Gold
The Swing to the Right: An Update of Latin American Politics
Th e current authoritarian turn in neoliberal capitalism is providing further 
evidence that the dominant economic system is inseparable from the state 
apparatus – and, in this particular moment, from processes of state corpo ra-
tization. Currently, tendencies like neoliberalism and state corporatization 
constitute two sides of the same coin. According to David Harvey ( Jipson 
and Jitheesh 2019), this adherence is due to the fact that neoliberalism ‘no 
longer commands the consent of the mass of the population’. It has lost its 
legitimacy. According to this author,
neo-liberalism could not actually survive without entering into an alliance with 
state authoritarianism. It now is moving towards an alliance with neo-fascism, 
because as we see from all the protest movements around the world, everyone 
now sees neo-liberalism is about lining the pockets of the rich at the expense of 
the people.
As has been well developed by the contributors, neoliberalism is just one 
ideological expression of state corporatization – a process that is not limited 
to the economic fi eld, having to do with the suppression of forms of egalitar-
ianism and the subjective transformations of individuals and societies.
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Since the authors of this book wrote their contributions, the situation has 
rapidly shift ed in the Latin American continent, and some of the processes 
that we describe in our chapters have consolidated and deepened. Some 
countries are particularly representative of this evolution. In Brazil, recently 
elected president Jair Bolsonaro and his far right coalition are implementing 
an agenda that goes against any democratic principle introduced by previous 
governments, or conquered by popular mobilizations. Organizations like 
the Landless Movement (MST) that advocate for a more egalitarian and re-
distributive management of rural and urban land are threatened with being 
outlawed as ‘terrorists’. Th e government has also declared war on the indig-
enous population of this country by taking the responsibility for indigenous 
land demarcation away from FUNAI, the Indian Aff airs Department, and 
passing it to the Agriculture Ministry, foreshadowing a politics of attack and 
dispossession on native groups in favour of international agronomic corpo-
rations. Th ese initiatives go hand in hand with widespread militarization. A 
report by the newspaper Zero Hora of Porto Alegre assures that 100 offi  cers 
occupy the upper echelons of the government, from the president and his 
deputy to ministers, managers and offi  cials occupying key positions of the 
state apparatus. From these strategic places, they can make or veto decisions 
on issues that go beyond national security and intelligence (Zibechi 2019). 
According to Raúl Zibechi (2019), fi ve generals of the current government 
of Brazil are veterans of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), where Brazil played a key role between 2004 and 2017. Th ree 
other high-ranking military offi  cers served on peace missions in Bosnia and 
Angola, including Vice President Hamilton Mourão, who also served as a 
military assistant at the Brazilian embassy of Caracas. It is no coincidence 
that Mourão was the one who announced the exit of Maduro. Due to the 
country’s prominent economic position and new political alliances, the Bra-
zilian change has eff ects on the entire region.
Bolsonaro’s pro-Americanism is having a decisive infl uence on the re-
gion’s political and power relations. In particular, there is the danger that 
Brazil may become the Troy horse for a Northern American intervention in 
Venezuela. President Donald Trump has been pushing forward this initiative 
with increasing zeal since Brazil’s governmental change. Although a military 
attack may appear like a remote possibility, the recent withdrawal of US 
troops from Syria suggests the opposite, even if we consider that the United 
States usually avoids engaging in two wars at the same time on diff erent and 
distant fronts. Certainly, an intervention on Venezuela would lead to a desta-
bilization of the entire Latin American continent. It would exacerbate trans-
versal processes of militarization that – as we have highlighted in this book – 
are intrinsic to state corporatization and the current authoritarian turn. As 
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Zibechi (2019) argues, ‘it is evident that “democracy” is just an excuse in 
which nobody believes. In Venezuela geopolitical interests converge that 
have no relation to the left /right opposition or democracy’ – indeed pro-
cesses of state corporatization tend to go beyond and invalidate this dualism.
Bolivian politics is being deeply aff ected by the Brazilian transition. Th e 
government (and President Evo Morales in particular) is highly concerned 
with re-election, and Bolsonaro’s rise is having destabilizing eff ects on an 
already complex situation. Bilateral economic relations between these two 
countries are vital for Bolivia, particularly in terms of gas trade. A recent 
diplomatic case illustrates Bolivia’s urge to normalize their relations with 
Brazil, despite the political diff erences shaping the two governments. Th e 
delivery by Bolivian authorities to the Brazilian and Italian governments – in 
less than 24 hours – of Cesare Battisti is a case in point. Battisti is a former 
member of the Armed Proletarians for Communism (PAC), a small group 
that operated amongst many others in Italy in the 1970s, the so-called ‘years 
of lead’ due to the a high level of political confl ict. Battisti was subject to 
a life sentence in Italy for four homicides, two as material perpetrator and 
two as an accomplice. Aft er spending several years in Brazil under Lula’s and 
Dilma’s protection, the Italian was revoked the status of political refugee by 
the new president Bolsonaro. Th is was a fundamental step for his extradi-
tion to Italy, vehemently demanded by the country’s new right-wing gov-
ernment. Battisti escaped to Bolivia in December 2018. Surprisingly, he was 
denied the request for refuge and the basic right to an extradition process 
in which the case could be analysed. Th us, the Bolivian president became 
actively involved in an operation perpetrated by the new Italo-Brazilian axis. 
Many media commented that Bolsonaro used the arrest of the Italian ex mil-
itant as a ‘nod to Salvini’.1 However, as the new Brazilian president gave his 
‘gift ’2 to his Italian colleague, Evo Morales was looking to curry favour with 
‘Brother Bolsonaro’, as he called him in his tweet of congratulations aft er his 
electoral triumph (Stefanoni 2019). Th is attitude produced a fracture within 
Morales’ government and party (MAS) bases. Indeed in the 1990s, Bolivian 
Vice President Álvaro García Linera had also been jailed. Although he had 
no murder charges, he was accused of terrorism and convicted for being an 
active member of the Túpac Katari Guerrilla Army. Raul García Linera, the 
brother of the vice president, wrote that the delivery of Battisti constitutes 
the fi rst counter-revolutionary act of the government of Evo Morales.
Th e newly elected Mexican president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, 
pictured by the mainstream media as a ‘progressive’ alternative to the PRI 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party), is about to introduce a constitutional 
reform that will give life to the ‘National Guard’ (Guardia Nacional). Th is is 
a new military body controlled by the Ministry of Defense and responsible 
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for public security tasks such as prevention, prosecution and investigation 
of crimes. Th is reform could be a point of no return for Mexico. Its approval 
will represent the government’s renunciation of building civil and demo-
cratic security institutions. It will consolidate a twelve- year long process 
of militarization of Mexican public life, giving continuity to a strategy that 
has exacerbated violence and contributed to the deterioration of social life 
and widespread human rights violations. By giving the army unprecedented 
‘civil’ powers without mechanisms of accountability or obligations of trans-
parency, the creation of a National Guard is in line with corporate authori-
tarian tendencies shaping the Latin American region.
State corporatization is manifesting itself in El Salvador with the emer-
gence of a new ambiguous electoral force that has achieved a historical rup-
ture of the previous two-party system. Businessman Nayib Armando Bukele 
Ortez is the elected president aft er winning in the fi rst round in February 
2019 with around 53 per cent of the vote. Bukele, former mayor of San Salva-
dor, was born in the capital of the country in 1981 and will be the youngest 
president in the nation’s history. He is the owner of a famous motorcycle 
brand distributor and manages business in advertising services. Interest-
ingly, a team of consultants linked to the Venezuelan opposition worked in 
the electoral campaign of Nayib Bukele. Th e board was integrated by two of 
the most recognized pollsters in Latin America, Mitofsky and Cid Gallup, 
and two Spanish specialists in political marketing.
Th ese are all symptoms of the evolution of a struggle that has taken place 
in recent years: ‘the fi ght for or against global order has become a fi ght for 
control of the global order. While right-wing politicians like Donald Trump 
have railed against “globalists”, they are not rejecting globalisation outright. 
Instead, such leaders are embracing their own, alternative globalization’ 
(Slobodian 2019), one that is based on a new state model.
In Cuba, a new president succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018: Miguel 
Díaz Canel, the fi rst Cuban president outside the Castro family (although 
he is known as Raúl Castro’s favourite disciple). Placed on him are high 
expectations of reform but always within the framework of the revolution. 
He has carried on with Raúl Castro’s economic reform process, and in 2019 
there will be a referendum asking people whether they agree with the con-
stitutional changes proposed: the recognition of private property, the res-
toration of the position of Prime Minister, the creation of a maximum of 
two consecutive fi ve-year terms for the presidency, and which includes the 
banning of discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, race or disability, and 
the transformation of the justice system to be based on the presupposition 
of innocence. Th ese changes, while seemingly positive – and indeed long 
awaited – open the road for the penetration of neoliberal governance into 
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the island, particularly in relation to the penetration and offi  cialization of 
private property. Meanwhile, there are food shortages again, as Venezuela, 
Cuba’s main associate in the region, is in crisis. Th e impact of Brazil’s turn to 
the right will undoubtedly reach Cuba via Venezuela.
Th roughout the continent, tensions between corporatizing processes and 
egalitarian forces are ripe. Th ese tensions are constitutive of one another and 
are not at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Th roughout this book, 
we have aimed to capture a regional historic process in which these tensions 
between egalitarian ideologies, movements and processes have reached a 
particular intensity. Th rough ethnographic analyses of particular instances 
of egalitarian processes and corporatizing dynamics, we have intended to 
show how the form of the state is changing in Latin America. Th is is part 
of a global transformation of the state into a corporate formation. It is not 
complete, and it will continue to shift .
Final Words: An Overview of the Arguments
We set out in the introduction to explore the contradictions of egalitarian 
dynamics throughout Latin America at a particular historic moment when 
the Pink Tide (arguably) enabled the consolidation of egalitarian ideologies 
within and around states. Th is has also been a time when, we argue, new state 
confi gurations have emerged that take on corporate forms. Th erefore, we 
also anticipated that we understood the Pink Tide (as a particular regional 
expression of egalitarian processes) to be limited by, or exposed to, the in-
creasing pervasiveness of what we call the corporate state. Overfl owing the 
boundaries of nation states, the corporate state is instead a state dynamic of 
power. Corporate bodies, private companies and non-governmental organi-
zations operating transnationally capture the apparatus of the state and give 
it an economic rationale. Th is process of increased corporatization within 
the region (privatization, the polarization of political parties, the reduction 
of barriers for the circulation of capital, extractivism, the precarization and 
casualization of labour) stands in tension with the egalitarian expressions en-
abled by the Pink Tide, such as the inclusion of indigenous communities in 
state matters and the claims of social movements or state-sponsored egalitar-
ian projects. Th e contributors have focused on the multiple contradictions 
expressed by the expansion of corporatizing processes in the shadow of a 
region-wide movement that aimed to incorporate egalitarian policies into 
state projects, more or less successfully.
Th e tensions between state-sponsored egalitarian ideologies, social move-
ments and the increasing power of the corporate state emerge throughout 
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the material covered in this book in diff erent locations of the American con-
tinent. From the Mexican case, where low intensity warfare helps to justify 
the remaking and marginalization of indigenous and poor populations to the 
initially egalitarian MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and its co-optation by 
the corporate state, through to Cuba and Peru and the entrepreneurial ac-
tivities in the margins of these states, the multiple dimensions of the Pink 
Tide as a potentially egalitarian process and the ever encroaching tenden-
cies of corporate capital are revealed. Th e cases of Ecuador and Chile reveal 
particularly the rule of the law and other governmental organizations in the 
co-opting of egalitarian movements by corporate interests through, for in-
stance, development and environmental discourses, legal procedures and 
centralizing government organizations.
In many ways, the tensions between egalitarian potentials initially em-
bedded within the Pink Tide and the recalcitrant power of corporate capi-
tal fuel the diff erent moments of intensifi cation of crisis. Th e Brazilian case 
is perhaps the most illustrative case, as the trajectory of the PT, the 2016 
coup, and the current succession by Bolsonaro capture the consequences of 
corporate interests on democratic processes. Th is may also be the case for 
Venezuela, as people’s demand for a strong state able to resist corporatizing 
processes and remain the representative of a collective subject against the 
exploitations of neoliberal political disorder is collapsing.
Corporatization is a process of structural transformation, and it both un-
derpins the formation of the Pink Tide and undermines it. Egalitarian ideas 
emerged from this process of transformation and as a reaction to it. Egali-
tarianism is therefore a process by which hierarchical structures of power 
(in Latin America defi ned by ethnicity and class) are subverted, momentar-
ily questioned and opened up, and potentially transformed. But for its very 
transformative capacity – its potentiality for ruptures – it also always has the 
capacity for oppression and the destructive eff ects of homogenization. Th e 
Pink Tide was a (not unproblematic) moment of rupture in what had been 
a decade of neoliberal boom. It aimed to reclaim the power of government 
to be the provider for the people of an alternative project. Th is manifested 
itself diff erently in particular locations: a welfare state, an indigenous state, a 
socialist state. Simultaneously, the fi rst two decades of the twenty-fi rst cen-
tury have seen a transformation of the structures of the state in the Global 
North as processes of corporatization, expropriation and austerity caused 
increasing inequalities and the subversion of democratic processes in the in-
terests of the logic of capital (profi t, effi  ciency, economization etc.). Already, 
we are looking at a diff erent Latin America than the one explored by the 
scholars in this book. Th e swing from right to left  to right again is not unique 
to this historic moment, but it has manifested somewhat diff erently to that 
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in the 1960s and 1970s with the revolutions of the communist and socialist 
guerrilleros, therefore it required attention in order to attempt to understand 
the current potentials of the state for oppression and liberation, at a time 
when oppression comes also from corporate and non-governmental struc-
tures. We hope to contribute to the reconceptualization of the state in Latin 
America and propose a word of warning that corporatization is not a passing 
fashion easily overturned.
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NOTES
 1. Italian right-wing Interior Ministry.
 2. Th is is the word Bolsonaro used to describe the operation.
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AFTERWORD
Towards the Era of the Post-Human
Bruce Kapferer
William Dalrymple’s Th e Anarchy (2019) wonderfully reminds us that India, 
the jewel in the crown of Imperial Britain, was born in the rapacious actions 
of a trading corporation, the East India Company, oriented to extraction of 
maximum profi t. Citing Edmund Burke: ‘. . . the Company would, at last, 
like a viper, be the destruction of the country which fostered it at its bosom’. 
In the virtual anarchy that the Company wrought, as Dalrymple describes, 
was its emergence as the colonial state, eventually to metamorphose, via re-
forms, resistance and the achievement of national independence, into the 
contemporary nation-state of the Republic of India. Presenting his key point 
on the joint stock company that was the EIC, Dalrymple states,
We still talk about the British conquering India, but the phrase disguises a more 
sinister reality. It was not the British government that began seizing great chunks 
of India in the mid-eighteenth century, but a dangerously unregulated private 
company headquartered in one small offi  ce, fi ve windows wide, in London, and 
managed in India by a violent, utterly ruthless and intermittently mentally unsta-
ble corporate predator – Clive. . . . . .
Th e Victorians thought the real stuff  of history was the politics of the nation-state. 
Th is not the economics of corrupt corporations, they believed was the funda-
mental unit of study and the real driver of transformation in human aff airs. (Dal-
rymple 2019: xxv)
What happened in India was repeated around the globe as part of the Eu-
ropean expansion east, north, south and west. Th e prime instruments were 
not just adventurers in search of riches, but oft en organized in the form of 
joint stock companies that assumed the virtual autonomy of states (corpo-
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale.
 Afterword 201
rate republics in some current nomenclature), complete with their own 
administrative apparatus and instruments (police and military) for the mo-
nopolization of violent control, frequently backed by the sovereign territo-
rial states that extended them charter. Th ese companies (the EIC was among 
the most outstanding) were deterritorializing and, in eff ect, themselves ter-
ritorially unlimited – the domains of their sovereignty constrained by the 
violent competition of other territorially sovereign state-backed companies 
or corporate republics in the regions that they entered and which were open 
to grab.
Th e broad, if arguably unexceptionable point, is that the still-dominant 
global form of the nation-state saw its emergence in the political-economic, 
social and religious transformations of Europe that were also the circum-
stances for the formations of capitalism, tied to the emergence of the bour-
geoisie and their rule. Marx, of course, developed this understanding the 
most clearly, also recognizing the moral and political order of the nation-state 
(its liberal ideology, its ‘civilizing’ mission) that masked, as it may have tem-
pered, the violence and oppressive, hierarchizing, suppressive and mar-
ginalizing forces at the heart of the nation-state. Th omas Hobbes wrote his 
highly infl uential conservative monarchist traditionalist treatise on the state, 
Leviathan, in reaction to what he experienced as the socially destructive and 
fractious individualist competitiveness of the merchant groups in London, 
the adventure capitalists vital to imperialist enterprise and the forming of the 
nation-state (see Stern 2012; Kapferer and Gold 2018; Kapferer 2019).
Th e nation-state is an ideological and political economic formation that has 
a capitalist, corporatist dynamic at its beginnings and centre, the predatory 
and savage dimension of such a dynamic being domesticated or subordi-
nated (and regulated) to the legal and socio-moral political orders of the 
nation-state.
Much discussion on contemporary political processes, as in this volume 
on South and Central American states, conceive their crises as being con-
nected to neoliberalism and resistance to it. Th is is sometimes treated as rela-
tively recent, reaching a high point in the era of Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Th atcher, for instance, and extending from it. But, as should be clear here, 
what is addressed as neoliberalism has its foundation in the world of the for-
mation of the nation-state. What is referred to in this book as the corporate 
state was born with the creation of the nation-state. Th e hollowing out of 
the nation-state, the feature of the current historical moment and eff ectively 
the nation-state’s reconfi guration as the corporate state, is little short of the 
apotheosis or full actualization of capital and its pragmatism for profi t me-
diated through social and political formations of class and what was already 
immanent in the nation-state – a phenomenon that was coincident with Eu-
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ropean and North American imperialism and the establishment of the roots 
of capitalism as the global energy of modernity and post-modernity.
I stress the dynamic (and especially the inner capitalist/corporate process 
integral to nation-state formation) as one of deterritorialization/reterrito-
rialization, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari (2002; also Kapferer and 
Taylor 2012) use the concepts. Th ey are akin to the destructive/creative dy-
namic that Marx and others recognize to be distinctive of capital: its capac-
ity to adapt and transform to shift ing circumstance in the undying hunger 
to extract the greatest profi t. Such is particularly evident at the imperial/
colonial outreach that involved the radical restructuring or reformation of 
the sociopolitical (and ecological) terrains of the imperial intrusions. Th e 
class/ethnic/racial hierarchies (and other forms of social marginalization) in 
the cases presented in this volume exemplify the point. It is a dynamic of so-
ciopolitical and cultural invention and reinvention that builds and rebuilds 
the social and political ground for capital. Th is is clear in the processes of 
bourgeois control and the continual struggles of bourgeois social and polit-
ical fractions to reproduce their dominance through a process of changing 
alliances and betrayals, brilliantly discussed by Marx in Th e Eighteenth Bru-
maire of Louis Napoleon – the dynamic of which continues in what many see 
as the unfolding tragedies of Trump’s presidency and in the wranglings of 
the UK’s Brexit (see Kapferer 2016).
Such is also starkly apparent in the chapters of this volume.
One critical thesis of the volume concerns the recurrent pattern of hi-
erarchical forces giving way to egalitarian energies (of sociopolitical liber-
ation, the opening up of opportunities for the oppressed and marginalized, 
etc.) only for these to give way to hierarchical orders or reactive programs. 
A major conceptual understanding in this book relates to the fact that hier-
archy and egalitarian processes are not mutually exclusive. As I think is well-
recognized, paradoxically, egalitarian ideologies oft en embed hierarchical 
and exclusivist potential, oft en of a racist kind that present-day populism, 
for example, evinces throughout much of the globe. Further, egalitarian 
forces are premised on the imagination of hierarchy, as they are motivated, 
most oft en, by the constraining, oppressive, virtually life-extinguishing and 
marginalizing eff ects of hierarchical power.
More generally, it is the history of state formation that underpins the 
unity of hierarchical with egalitarian dynamics, the mutuality of their impli-
cation, in which apparent egalitarianizing developments come to function, 
from the perspective of the social and political order as a whole, as a means 
for the reproduction of that order. What can appear as revolutionary, as the 
American materials so tragically demonstrate, ultimately operates counter-
actively as a process of reassemblage and continuity. Egalitarian forces are, 
in the language of the kind of market logics that receive heightened value in 
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this era of the corporate state, little other than system ‘corrections’. Th ey are 
moments of social and political re-adjustment in the re-formation of inequi-
table social orders.
Th e mutual implication of hierarchical and egalitarian dynamics in state 
systems, and especially those of the nation-state, have a lot to do with the 
historically produced structural relations of class and race dominated by the 
bourgeoisie, by and large the agents of capital and a class category in contin-
ual formation – a dynamic process in capital – drawing its members from all 
points across the social spectrum. It is largely among the bourgeoisie that dis-
course couched in hierarchical and egalitarian terms is the most intense (the 
bourgeoisie provide the bulk of conservatives and radicals, however these 
are defi ned). It is such discourse, usually of a classic or conventional left /right 
kind, that comprises the terms of the political alignment of fractions of the 
bourgeoisie in controlling the sociopolitical orders that are aff ected by capi-
tal, and who become willy-nilly agents in the transitions and transformations 
of the circumstances for the survival of capital or its expansion.
Th e hierarchical/egalitarian cycle might be understood as closely con-
nected to what has been discussed, in the heyday for the European nation-
state (e.g. Pareto, Mosca, Michels; see Nye 1977), as the circulation of elites, 
a revolving or redistribution of power among dominant groups who share 
similar class interests even if they have diff erent visions of how these may be 
preserved.
But perhaps this cycle is approaching its limit and is at the threshold of 
new potential – in Max Weber’s understanding, a switching moment in his-
tory of revolutionary frustration and a deepening inequity.
Th e circulations of power within dominant elites (and the cross-class/
race/gender relations, the shift s in relations and reassembling of power blocs 
promising benefi t for sections of the wider frequently disadvantaged popu-
lations) facilitated the continuity of an inequitable social order despite or 
because of its contradictions. Th e circulation of elites might be conceived as 
a kind of political and economic redistributive dynamic that enabled partic-
ular class interests by drawing others into its web of alliance. Th e emergence 
of what is addressed in this book as the corporate state gains signifi cance in 
this regard.
What is described as the corporate state, as the editors stress, involves 
a reconfi guration, redetermination and submission of the orders of the na-
tion-state to the rationalism of the economic, to an economistic pragmatism 
that pervades most areas of sociopolitical existence. If it is an outcome of 
neoliberalism, the imaginary of the corporate state is its most potent man-
ifestation. Th us what has led to the emergence of the corporate state is a 
desire to institutionalize neoliberal ideology against resistances generated 
in the contradictions and confl icts, eff ectively class forces, born of the capi-
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talism that conditions the society of the nation-state. Th e ascendance of the 
corporate state from within the shell of the nation-state reveals itself as an 
attack on democratic value (frequently in its name) bearing that shade of the 
fascism of the recent past in cries of greater effi  ciency. Th e corporatizing of 
the nation-state is associated not just with privatization and outsourcing but 
the widespread managerialization of bureaucracy (the creation of manage-
rial hierarchies of control relatively free of democratic contingency) and the 
general establishment of a productive ethos (auditing and other methods 
of productive control) as a vital dimension of social relations reconceived 
in terms of the maximization of productive eff ort. Th e impetus is against 
any kind of social disruption threatening a ‘harmony’ of control. Th e corpo-
rate state is an imagination of the sociopolitical framed largely in terms of a 
business model founded along the lines of rational economic individualism, 
whose rationality is defi ned by results relative to the energy expended.
Manuel DeLanda (2006, see Kapferer 2010) expresses in much of his work 
a philosophy appropriate to the rise of the corporate state, in addition to an 
appreciation of the new technologies (most specifi cally relating to digitaliza-
tion) that have facilitated the corporate state and the societies of its control 
(Deleuze 1992) and surveillance (Zuboff  2019) – what may be regarded as 
the anti-democratic eff ects of the emergence of the corporate state. Such 
eff ects manifest as an attack on forms of the social that emerged in history: 
initially outside the history of capital, and/or which took form as resistant 
entities through the force of capital, as in the protests shaped in the relations 
of class/race/gender. What might be described as the corporatization of the 
social and the political has encouraged the fractionalization of contesting 
groups and social categories, oft en engaging an egalitarianizing ethos, in-
dividualist in emphasis, against their collectivist possibility (a paradox of 
much egalitarianism), with hierarchical eff ect. A radical restructuring of so-
cial and political terrains is in process. Class inequalities have intensifi ed in 
corporatism (associated with post-industrialism and new innovative forms 
of production and marketing linked to what is oft en referred to as the gig 
economy) along with a growing incapacity of the increasingly exploited and 
dispossessed to resist.
What I am suggesting is that the rise of the corporate state subverts the 
repetitive or recurrent cycle of mutually implicated hierarchical/egalitarian 
processes. Hierarchical forces gain sway and egalitarian processes are rel-
atively suppressed to build increasingly towards system-overturning rev-
olutionary potential. Perhaps there are indications of this in recent events 
in Bolivia and Chile, as well as a widespread ramping up of sociopolitical 
violence throughout the societies concerned, as Mexico possibly illustrates.
As already indicated, the wave of populist political action that is explicitly 
antagonistic not just to political elites but to the established political party 
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systems of many nation-state orders gives a sense of growing impatience al-
together with the corporatizing change in the sociopolitical orders of many 
nation-states. Th is is assuming an international dimension, even as nation-
alist sentiments are receiving increasing voice, the latter in certain cases be-
ing an eff ect of the former. Contemporary populism expresses a frustration 
with the democratic process that is the basis of state legitimacy. But this im-
patience is to a growing extent beyond the control of nation-states, whose 
erstwhile sovereignty has been compromised by globalizing processes that 
are to a major degree driven in the rise of the corporate state whose potency 
draws from its cross-state or internationally networked bases as much as or 
even more than from its supposed national home base. Th e nationalist turn 
of much populism is in many aspects a reaction to the rise of the corporate 
state, whose agents, even as they act within the political order of nation-
states, are becoming more alienated from the populations they claim to 
represent.
Th e chapters in this volume concentrate on the sociopolitical dynamics 
within nation-states. But with the rise of the corporate state the forces of 
domination and control have slipped the domains of even limited democratic 
possibility. It is in the spaces outside nation-states perhaps more than within 
them that the forces for expanding social and political abjection, driven in 
new realizations of capitalist potential and more and more impervious to 
the human suff ering that is occurring, is building. Th e current historical mo-
ment is sometimes referred to as the ‘post-human’. Th e irony of such a label 
should not be missed.
Bruce Kapferer is Emeritus Professor in Social Anthropology, University of 
Bergen, and Honorary Professor, Anthropology, University College London. 
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